The Decision to Outsource: A Case Study of the Complex Interplay Between Strategic Wisdom and Behavioural Reality

Author(s):  
James D Hunter ◽  
Ray W Cooksey

ABSTRACTThe last two decades have seen an unprecedented growth in the use of outsourcing interventions in diverse organisational contexts. This phenomenon can be viewed as a means of unbundling the vertically integrated activities of organisations in response to existing strategic wisdoms that focus upon value-creating activities as a means of enhancing an organisation's sustainable competitive advantage. This paper explores the delicate balance between these more conventional strategic motives and the more complex, emergent and interconnected behavioural impacts and considerations in the context of a decision to outsource the meter reading activities of a well-established, publicly listed Australian energy company. By drawing upon the idiosyncratic experiences reported by particular groups of individuals involved in, or affected by, an outsourcing decision, the authors note some important lessons that may inform the pursuit of such decisions in the future.In recent years the outsourcing phenomenon has fundamentally altered the processing and delivery of a wide range of goods and services by organisations in public, private and not-for-profit sectors (Auguste et al. 2002; Osterman 1998: Industry Commission 1996; Domberger & Hall 1995). Despite the stellar rise of outsourcing as a mainstream management tool, outsourcing's proponents seem unable to successfully distance themselves from ongoing questioning of the rationale for, and fallout resulting from, its adoption (Jennings 2002; Doig et al. 2001; Humphry 2000; Hunter & Gates 1998: Commonwealth Ombudsman 1996; Rees & Rodley 1995).Much of the debate and research relating to outsourcing has been informed by the principles of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1975; Coase 1937) whereby the make-or-buy decision is crystallised by simply comparing the costs of managing transactions (using the market) with production costs (producing internally). In short, the transaction cost approach suggests that markets are most efficient for all transactions, except those that involve assets of a highly specialised nature used frequently as these represent a set of circumstances open to opportunistic behaviour by the market.However, the hard lessons learned with the passage of time have shown (the informed observer) that managers who limit their sourcing decisions to cost comparisons alone are likely to run the risk of seeing their organisation wither and die: rigorous cost analysis is a part, albeit an important part, of a plethora of other strategic considerations that combine to move an organisation toward its long-term goals and objectives (Fill & Viser 2000: Rule 1999; Meredith 1998; Domberger 1998; Hunter & Gates 1998: Hodge 1996; Koehan et al. 1994). Indeed, this strategic context forms the cornerstone from which this paper proceeds to explore the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the strategic literature's conception of outsourcing decisions for the realities of a complex and dynamic operating environment.

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D Hunter ◽  
Ray W Cooksey

ABSTRACTThe last two decades have seen an unprecedented growth in the use of outsourcing interventions in diverse organisational contexts. This phenomenon can be viewed as a means of unbundling the vertically integrated activities of organisations in response to existing strategic wisdoms that focus upon value-creating activities as a means of enhancing an organisation's sustainable competitive advantage. This paper explores the delicate balance between these more conventional strategic motives and the more complex, emergent and interconnected behavioural impacts and considerations in the context of a decision to outsource the meter reading activities of a well-established, publicly listed Australian energy company. By drawing upon the idiosyncratic experiences reported by particular groups of individuals involved in, or affected by, an outsourcing decision, the authors note some important lessons that may inform the pursuit of such decisions in the future.In recent years the outsourcing phenomenon has fundamentally altered the processing and delivery of a wide range of goods and services by organisations in public, private and not-for-profit sectors (Auguste et al. 2002; Osterman 1998: Industry Commission 1996; Domberger & Hall 1995). Despite the stellar rise of outsourcing as a mainstream management tool, outsourcing's proponents seem unable to successfully distance themselves from ongoing questioning of the rationale for, and fallout resulting from, its adoption (Jennings 2002; Doig et al. 2001; Humphry 2000; Hunter & Gates 1998: Commonwealth Ombudsman 1996; Rees & Rodley 1995).Much of the debate and research relating to outsourcing has been informed by the principles of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1975; Coase 1937) whereby the make-or-buy decision is crystallised by simply comparing the costs of managing transactions (using the market) with production costs (producing internally). In short, the transaction cost approach suggests that markets are most efficient for all transactions, except those that involve assets of a highly specialised nature used frequently as these represent a set of circumstances open to opportunistic behaviour by the market.However, the hard lessons learned with the passage of time have shown (the informed observer) that managers who limit their sourcing decisions to cost comparisons alone are likely to run the risk of seeing their organisation wither and die: rigorous cost analysis is a part, albeit an important part, of a plethora of other strategic considerations that combine to move an organisation toward its long-term goals and objectives (Fill & Viser 2000: Rule 1999; Meredith 1998; Domberger 1998; Hunter & Gates 1998: Hodge 1996; Koehan et al. 1994). Indeed, this strategic context forms the cornerstone from which this paper proceeds to explore the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the strategic literature's conception of outsourcing decisions for the realities of a complex and dynamic operating environment.


Author(s):  
Dilek Erdogan

Outsourcing has become a management tool that is increasingly involved in the manager's agenda, but the decision to outsource is a problematic issue for decision makers in organizations. Outsourcing provides many benefits but also includes many risks, so every outsourcing agreement does not result in success. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the outsourcing problem in light of transaction cost economics. For this purpose, the concept of outsourcing is first explained. The transaction characteristics and the behavioral assumptions of the theory, which play a role in increasing or decreasing transaction costs, are clarified. Finally, governance decision (outsource or not) and some critical issues (safeguarding mechanism against opportunistic behavior by supplier, adaptation, and performance evaluation problem) that will arise after the outsourcing decisions are discussed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 120-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine M. O’Regan ◽  
Sharon M. Oster

Increasingly, nonprofit, for-profit, and public organizations have been cooperating in producing and distributing a wide range of goods and services. In many cases, the partnerships have arisen from the recognition that different activities are best suited to different governance structures. Yet, working through a cross-sectoral partnership can bring with it complicated managerial issues. This article explores partnering in two important sectors: higher education and welfare reform. In both areas, cooperation across the sectors is widespread and follows lines of comparative advantage. At the same time, there is ample evidence in our cases of classic transactions costs in implementing cross-sectoral partnerships. The article explores ways in which organizations deal with problems of opportunism and imperfect information in contracting across the sectors.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Asbjornsen ◽  
V. Hernandez-Santana ◽  
M. Liebman ◽  
J. Bayala ◽  
J. Chen ◽  
...  

AbstractOver the past century, agricultural landscapes worldwide have increasingly been managed for the primary purpose of producing food, while other diverse ecosystem services potentially available from these landscapes have often been undervalued and diminished. The incorporation of relatively small amounts of perennial vegetation in strategic locations within agricultural landscapes dominated by annual crops—or perennialization—creates an opportunity for enhancing the provision of a wide range of goods and services to society, such as water purification, hydrologic regulation, pollination services, control of pest and pathogen populations, diverse food and fuel products, and greater resilience to climate change and extreme disturbances, while at the same time improving the sustainability of food production. This paper synthesizes the current scientific theory and evidence for the role of perennial plants in balancing conservation with agricultural production, focusing on the Midwestern USA as a model system, while also drawing comparisons with other climatically diverse regions of the world. Particular emphasis is given to identifying promising opportunities for advancement and critical gaps in our knowledge related to purposefully integrating perennial vegetation into agroecosystems as a management tool for maximizing multiple benefits to society.


2016 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 649-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen S. Farnsworth Mick ◽  
Patrick D. Shay

Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach, this paper explores which organizational forms Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may take. A critical question about form is the amount of vertical integration that an ACO may have, a topic central to TCE. We posit that contextual factors outside and inside an ACO will produce variable transaction costs (the non-production costs of care) such that the decision to integrate vertically will derive from a comparison of these external versus internal costs, assuming reasonably rational management abilities. External costs include those arising from environmental uncertainty and complexity, small numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information “impactedness.” Internal costs include those arising from human resource activities including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplining, appraising, or promoting), and otherwise administering programs. At the extreme, these different costs may produce either total vertical integration or little to no vertical integration with most ACOs falling in between. This essay demonstrates how TCE can be applied to the ACO organization form issue, explains TCE, considers ACO activity from the TCE perspective, and reflects on research directions that may inform TCE and facilitate ACO development.


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.


2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.


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