Transaction Cost Approach to the Outsourcing Decision Problem

Author(s):  
Dilek Erdogan

Outsourcing has become a management tool that is increasingly involved in the manager's agenda, but the decision to outsource is a problematic issue for decision makers in organizations. Outsourcing provides many benefits but also includes many risks, so every outsourcing agreement does not result in success. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the outsourcing problem in light of transaction cost economics. For this purpose, the concept of outsourcing is first explained. The transaction characteristics and the behavioral assumptions of the theory, which play a role in increasing or decreasing transaction costs, are clarified. Finally, governance decision (outsource or not) and some critical issues (safeguarding mechanism against opportunistic behavior by supplier, adaptation, and performance evaluation problem) that will arise after the outsourcing decisions are discussed.

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oded Shenkar ◽  
Ilgaz Arikan

This paper broadens the scope and depth of business alliance research by way of interdisciplinary enrichment. The paper draws on the political science literature on nation-state alliances to generate insights into the establishment, operations and performance of inter-firm alliances. Shared theory bases of game theory and transaction cost economics, as well as theories, variables and research findings indigenous to political science are posited as a platform from which propositions regarding inter-firm alliances are derived.


Author(s):  
James D Hunter ◽  
Ray W Cooksey

ABSTRACTThe last two decades have seen an unprecedented growth in the use of outsourcing interventions in diverse organisational contexts. This phenomenon can be viewed as a means of unbundling the vertically integrated activities of organisations in response to existing strategic wisdoms that focus upon value-creating activities as a means of enhancing an organisation's sustainable competitive advantage. This paper explores the delicate balance between these more conventional strategic motives and the more complex, emergent and interconnected behavioural impacts and considerations in the context of a decision to outsource the meter reading activities of a well-established, publicly listed Australian energy company. By drawing upon the idiosyncratic experiences reported by particular groups of individuals involved in, or affected by, an outsourcing decision, the authors note some important lessons that may inform the pursuit of such decisions in the future.In recent years the outsourcing phenomenon has fundamentally altered the processing and delivery of a wide range of goods and services by organisations in public, private and not-for-profit sectors (Auguste et al. 2002; Osterman 1998: Industry Commission 1996; Domberger & Hall 1995). Despite the stellar rise of outsourcing as a mainstream management tool, outsourcing's proponents seem unable to successfully distance themselves from ongoing questioning of the rationale for, and fallout resulting from, its adoption (Jennings 2002; Doig et al. 2001; Humphry 2000; Hunter & Gates 1998: Commonwealth Ombudsman 1996; Rees & Rodley 1995).Much of the debate and research relating to outsourcing has been informed by the principles of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1975; Coase 1937) whereby the make-or-buy decision is crystallised by simply comparing the costs of managing transactions (using the market) with production costs (producing internally). In short, the transaction cost approach suggests that markets are most efficient for all transactions, except those that involve assets of a highly specialised nature used frequently as these represent a set of circumstances open to opportunistic behaviour by the market.However, the hard lessons learned with the passage of time have shown (the informed observer) that managers who limit their sourcing decisions to cost comparisons alone are likely to run the risk of seeing their organisation wither and die: rigorous cost analysis is a part, albeit an important part, of a plethora of other strategic considerations that combine to move an organisation toward its long-term goals and objectives (Fill & Viser 2000: Rule 1999; Meredith 1998; Domberger 1998; Hunter & Gates 1998: Hodge 1996; Koehan et al. 1994). Indeed, this strategic context forms the cornerstone from which this paper proceeds to explore the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the strategic literature's conception of outsourcing decisions for the realities of a complex and dynamic operating environment.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D Hunter ◽  
Ray W Cooksey

ABSTRACTThe last two decades have seen an unprecedented growth in the use of outsourcing interventions in diverse organisational contexts. This phenomenon can be viewed as a means of unbundling the vertically integrated activities of organisations in response to existing strategic wisdoms that focus upon value-creating activities as a means of enhancing an organisation's sustainable competitive advantage. This paper explores the delicate balance between these more conventional strategic motives and the more complex, emergent and interconnected behavioural impacts and considerations in the context of a decision to outsource the meter reading activities of a well-established, publicly listed Australian energy company. By drawing upon the idiosyncratic experiences reported by particular groups of individuals involved in, or affected by, an outsourcing decision, the authors note some important lessons that may inform the pursuit of such decisions in the future.In recent years the outsourcing phenomenon has fundamentally altered the processing and delivery of a wide range of goods and services by organisations in public, private and not-for-profit sectors (Auguste et al. 2002; Osterman 1998: Industry Commission 1996; Domberger & Hall 1995). Despite the stellar rise of outsourcing as a mainstream management tool, outsourcing's proponents seem unable to successfully distance themselves from ongoing questioning of the rationale for, and fallout resulting from, its adoption (Jennings 2002; Doig et al. 2001; Humphry 2000; Hunter & Gates 1998: Commonwealth Ombudsman 1996; Rees & Rodley 1995).Much of the debate and research relating to outsourcing has been informed by the principles of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1975; Coase 1937) whereby the make-or-buy decision is crystallised by simply comparing the costs of managing transactions (using the market) with production costs (producing internally). In short, the transaction cost approach suggests that markets are most efficient for all transactions, except those that involve assets of a highly specialised nature used frequently as these represent a set of circumstances open to opportunistic behaviour by the market.However, the hard lessons learned with the passage of time have shown (the informed observer) that managers who limit their sourcing decisions to cost comparisons alone are likely to run the risk of seeing their organisation wither and die: rigorous cost analysis is a part, albeit an important part, of a plethora of other strategic considerations that combine to move an organisation toward its long-term goals and objectives (Fill & Viser 2000: Rule 1999; Meredith 1998; Domberger 1998; Hunter & Gates 1998: Hodge 1996; Koehan et al. 1994). Indeed, this strategic context forms the cornerstone from which this paper proceeds to explore the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the strategic literature's conception of outsourcing decisions for the realities of a complex and dynamic operating environment.


Urban Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (10) ◽  
pp. 2265-2283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rong Tan ◽  
Volker Beckmann ◽  
Futian Qu ◽  
Cifang Wu

This paper considers farmland conversion for the purpose of urban development as a series of transactions and discusses the determinants of appropriate governance structures for governing farmland conversion in terms of process efficiency. Towards this end, the paper develops a theoretical framework for analysing the process of farmland conversion based on transaction cost economics. The framework covers transactions, transaction attributes, governance structures and performance with the aim of minimising transaction costs. The paper also demonstrates the usability of the framework by creating a corresponding quantitative model for a case study in China. Furthermore, it identifies factors that influence the transaction costs associated with farmland conversion in China and explains why the related governance structures are chosen.


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.


2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.


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