Board of Director Characteristics and Earnings Management in Malaysia

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sohail Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Director Characteristics

Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Research Evidence ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Composition And Structure ◽  
High Incidence ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Director Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

Due to the high incidence of fraud in Australia, regulatory reports suggest strengthening the monitoring role of the board of directors (BOD). These reports recommend greater independence and no duality (chairperson of the BOD should not be the CEO) on the BOD. While there is no Australian evidence, research evidence in the U.S. supports these suggested reforms. It is not clear whether the research evidence observed in the U.S. will generalize to the Australian setting because of contextual differences. This study extends the U.S. findings to the Australian context and investigates the relationship between two attributes of the BOD, independence and duality, and fraud. In addition, I examine whether institutional ownership plays a role in the context of fraud. The more highly concentrated institutional ownership in Australia suggests the presence of some relationship. Using a matched sample of fraud and no-fraud firms from 1988–2000, I find that as the percentage of independent directors and the percentage of independent institutional ownership increases, the likelihood of fraud decreases. As expected, the results show a positive relationship between duality and the likelihood of fraud. These results support the call for strengthening the composition and structure of the BOD in Australia.

The Effect of Board of Director Composition and Audit Committee Expertise on The Real Earnings Management in Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-117
Author(s):  
Feby Astrid Kesaulya ◽  
Weny Putri ◽  
Dewi Sri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
The Real ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Director ◽  
Real Activities Manipulation

The Objective of this research was to prove that the implementation of good corporate governance will have an effect on the real activities manipulation which was done by the management. The implementations of good governance used by this research are board of director composition and audit committee expertise. This research was conducted in Indonesia by using 306 firm years’ observations. The result of this research showed a different result from previous researches. This research showed that the implementation of good corporate governance in the form of board director composition and audit committee expertise do not impact the practice of real activities manipulation. Or, in other words some of the good corporate governance tool could not mitigate the real activities manipulation in the company.

scholarly journals Ukuran Dewan Direksi, Aktivitas Komite Audit Dan Ukuran Komite Audit Terhadap Manajemen Laba

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-103
Author(s):  
Mei Rinta
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Board Directors

In accordance with the agency theory that management is responsible to the owner, so he will try to keep the performance of financial statements is always good and will act opportunistically to manage earnings if the performance of financial statements shows a decline. Therefore, the role of the board of director and audit committee is needed to protect the interests of the owner and manager. This study aims to investigate the effect of board of directors size, audit committee activities and the size of the audit committee on earnings management. This study uses a quantitative approach using secondary data from 322 samples of companies in the manufacturing sector during the period 2015-2017. The data collected was tested using multiple linear regression analysis techniques. This study produces findings that the size of the board directors have an insignificant negative effect on earnings management, the activities of the audit committee have a significant negative effect on earnings management and the size of the audit committee have an insignificant positive effect on earnings management. Keywords: Board Directors Size, Audit Committee Activities, Audit Committee Size, Earnings Management.

scholarly journals PENGARUH STUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN DAN DEWAN KOMISARIS INDEPENDEN TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN DENGAN MANAJEMEN LABA DAN KEBIJAKAN HUTANG SEBAGAI VARIABEL INTERVENING

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Etty M. Nasser
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Board Of Director

<p class="Style17">The objective of this research are to identi6 'the direct and indirect influences of corporate gover­nancesbucture such as, board of independent commissioner, institutional ownershi :rand manajerial ownership to the fimes value and earnings management debt as intervening variable.</p><p class="Style17">This research examine 37 manufacturing companies fisted in Jakarta Stock Exchange and issues waled financial statement since 2002-2004. The statistical methods used to test the hypothesis is Structural Equation Model (SEM). The empirical result of this research indicates that manajerial ownership has a positif significant and board of commissionerhas a negative significant influences to earnings management whereas institutional ownership have no influence to earnings manage­ment. The following test indicates that board of commissioner and manajerial ownership and institutional ownership have no significant influence to the firm's value. The control variable, firm's size, has a positive significant influence to earnings management whereas leverage has a negative significant influence to the firm's value. The Last test indicates that earnings management and debt have influence to the firm's value, so it can be concluded that earnings management and debt is an intervening variable.</p><p class="Style1"><strong><em>Keywords: </em></strong><strong><em>corporate governance, earnings management, debt, firm's value, board of director, </em></strong><strong><em>manajerial ownership, institutional</em></strong></p>

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