scholarly journals General Principles of EU Law: The Ghost in the Platonic Heaven in Need of Conceptual Clarification

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Constanze Semmelmann

General principles are en vogue in EU law – and in need of conceptual clarification. A closer look at several concepts of principle in legal philosophy and legal theory sheds light upon the concept of general principles in EU law. A distinction between an aprioristic model of principle and a model of principle informed by legal positivism may contribute to clarifying the genesis of a (general) principle in EU law, as well as its nature and functions. This paper demonstrates that an evolution has taken place from a reliance on seemingly natural law inspired reflections of general principles via the desperate search to ground general principles in various kinds of sources based on a more or less sound methodology  towards an increasing reliance on strictly positivistic approaches. Against this backdrop, general principles are likely to lose significance where there are other norms while retaining an important yet uncontrollable role where the traditional canon of sources is silent.

2019 ◽  
pp. 174-203
Author(s):  
Lenn E. Goodman

Natural law links moral and legal theory with natural theology and science. It is critical to thinking about God’s sovereignty and human freedom. Tracing the roots of the natural law idea, I defend the approach against conventionalism and legal positivism. For they leave human norms ungrounded. Chapter 7 opens by disarming Hume’s elenchus about ‘is’ and ‘ought’. I do not deny the reality of a naturalistic fallacy, but I do argue that facts make rightful claims on us and that the unity of reality and value central to Jewish thinking and to the philosophical great tradition does not confuse facts with values but does appreciate the preciousness of being—of life and personhood most pointedly. Once again here transcendence consorts with immanence. For we find God’s law writ subtly in nature, not least when we discover what it means to perfect ourselves as loving and creative human beings.


Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Perry

To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish between substantive and methodological legal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no connection, necessary or otherwise, between morality and legal theory. The respective claims of substantive and methodological positivism are, at least on the surface, logically independent. Hobbes and Bentham employed normative methodologies to defend versions of substantive positivism, and in modern times Michael Moore has developed what can be regarded as a variant of methodological positivism to defend a theory of natural law.


1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Soper

I. INTRODUCTIONTwenty-five years is roughly the time that has elapsed since the exchange between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller and the subsequent revival in this country of the natural law/positivism debate. During this time, a curious thing has happened to legal positivism. What began as a conceptual theory about the distinction between law and morality has now been turned, at least by some, into a moral theory. According to this theory, the reason we must see law and morality as separate is not (at least not entirely) because of the logic of our language, but because of the practical implications of holding one or the other of the two traditional views in this area. The natural law theorist, it is said, can connect law and morality only at the cost of investing official directives with undeserved moral authority, thus encouraging obedience where there should be none. The natural law position should therefore be rejected – and the positivist's accepted – on moral grounds.


1994 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Devlin

In this essay, the author briefly outlines recent trends in Canadian jurisprudence. Beginning with a brief overview of the classical jurisprudential debate between natural lawyers, legal positivists, and legal realists, the author then provides an introduction to a new theoretical tradition which he terms "Artifactualism", as well as a survey of contemporary "Artifactualist Jurisprudence". He argues that there has been a significant theoretical shift away from the classical conceptualization of law as morality (as embodied in natural law, and challenged by legal positivism and legal realism), toward the conceptualization of law as politics (as promulgated by artifactualism). This new conceptualization of law as the "terrain of struggle over the meaning and quality of social existence" has informed the works of Artifactualist jurisprudents in the areas of Liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, First Nations and Critical Legal Studies, and serves to elucidate some of the tensions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
José Luis López Fuentes

RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo, con base en las teorías iusnaturalistas y del positivismo jurídico, se busca ofrecer un breve acercamiento al desarrollo que han tenido a través del tiempo las tesis más importantes en torno al problema de la relación entre derecho y moral, hasta llegar a lo que actualmente es denominado antipositivismo jurídico, pues el objetivo de este documento es presentar un análisis y exposición de las aportaciones de esta corriente de pensamiento a la teoría jurídica contemporánea, para lo cual, se analizan las propuestas de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, en especial de la tesis de los principios, y su relevancia en la interpretación y aplicación de la ley.ABSTRACT: In this work, based on natural law theories and legal positivism, I seek to offer a brief approach  to the development that the most important theses have had throughout time regarding the problem of the relationship between law and morality, arriving at what we now call legal anti-positivism, the objective of this document is to present an analysis and exposition of the contributions of this current of thought to contemporary legal theory, for which the proposals of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy are analyzed, specially the thesis of the principles, and its relevance in the interpretation and application of the law.Keywords: Natural law theories, legal positivism, legal antipositivism, moral, thesis of principles.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-214
Author(s):  
B.L.S. Nelson

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a “third way”? in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential “third theories”? of law—legal pragmatism and legal dualism—and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Dejan Stankovic

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
James Allan

‘Legal Positivism’ is a much abused term. It is often pejoratively invoked by those occupying both the natural law and critical legal studies ramparts. The former see it as a school of thought which ignores the role in law of those standards and values which have not been deliberately laid down or unintentionally evolved. Positivism, for them, fails because it is prepared to describe a legal world where moral values play no necessary part and where transcendent values may not exist at all. The latter group of critics, not too dissimilarly, see legal positivism’s doctrines as over-reliant on rules and too inclined to accept that a legal system somehow can generate a logically mandated code of answers.In order to defend positivism it is advisable to start with an enunciation of its core precepts. With all that has been written attacking and supporting positivism though, this can be a contentious matter. So instead I shall defend one particular version of positivism, that of H.L.A. Hart. As Hart’s The Concept of Law, first published in 1961, is at worst one of the handful of great legal philosophy texts written in English this century and at best “the classic work of philosophical jurisprudence”, this preference for concentrating on the tangible and identifiable precepts of Hart over the woolly, elusive and frequently caricatured precepts of something disparagingly termed positivism has much to recommend it.


Author(s):  
Arief Budiono ◽  
Dewi Iriani ◽  
Nunik Hariyani ◽  
Erma Ullul Janah

Legal positivism is influenced by natural law from Ancient Greece, natural law comes from God to regulate human life. Humans were created by reason by God to make rules, John Austin stated that to make a rule sourced from orders or policies in the field of law by the king or parliament as the highest authority. This influenced the thinking of Hans Klesen with a pure legal theory that complies with hierarchical rules and sanctions, Hart's legal positivism explains that law comes from morals that regulate one's behavior. This paper is in the form of legal research in literature studies in the form of books and journals that discuss positivism legal policy, which is legal research, then analyzed using the John Austin doctrine. The advantage of the influence of natural law on legal positivism according to Austin is that it divides the law into two forms, namely the law from God for humans (the divine law), the law created by God for His creatures. Laws are compiled and made by humans, which consist of: Laws that are actually positive laws (properly so called), and laws that are not actually laws (improperly so called). 2. The doctrine of legal positivism, state power must be limited and controlled by law, the state must be constructed as a state of law and not a state of power. Every citizen is considered to have the same position, law enforcers to think and act legally formalistically, by placing legal justice as the goal of law.


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