scholarly journals Why Luck Egalitarianism Fails in Condemning Oppression

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia A. Stark
Keyword(s):  
Moral Standing ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Do So

Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for (1) condoning some cases of oppression and (2) condemning others for the wrong reason—namely, that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, regardless of whether victims are responsible for it, simply because it is contrary to the equal moral standing of persons. I argue that four luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances of oppression and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.

Utilitarianism and the Noble Art

Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (243) ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Radford
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Positive Difference ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Human Happiness ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. (This, of course, is just a philosopher's excessive and incorrect way of making the platitudinous point that one may do the wrong thing for the right reason and the right thing for the wrong reason.) But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be.

scholarly journals STUDENTS MISCONCEPTION IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL CANDIDATES TEACHERS USING THREE TIER TEST METHOD IN THE BASIC CONCEPT OF CHEMICAL BOND

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-43
Author(s):  
Napsin Palisoa ◽  
Dominggus Tahya ◽  
Victor Kayadoe
Keyword(s):  
Teacher Candidates ◽  
Diagnostic Methods ◽  
Test Method ◽  
Chemistry Teacher ◽  
Tier 2 ◽  
Wrong Answer ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Teacher Students ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right

Misconceptions possessed by prospective chemistry teacher students greatly affect the learning process when teaching in class, because the information or concepts conveyed to students are misconceptions. Prospective chemistry teacher students who experience misconceptions are simply reduced, because if a long misconception is left in the memory of the student there is a resistant misconception, namely a strong misconception that is difficult to reduce and constantly occurs. To find out whether the concepts stored in the memory of prospective chemistry teacher students, misconceptions need to be detected using the diagnostic three-tier test method. Diagnostic three-tier test method consists of 3 tiers, tier 1 is the choice of answers, tier 2 choices of reasons, and the third tier is the choice of the level of confidence of the answers and reasons. Diagnostic three-tier test method can detect misconceptions owned by students with the category of misconception 1 (M1), misconception 2 (M2), and misconception 3 (M3). The MK1 category students have the right answer choices, the wrong reason choices, but have the right beliefs, the M2 category students have the wrong answer choices, the right reason choices, but have the right beliefs, while the M3 category of students have the wrong answer choices, the wrong reason choices, but have confidence right. Detection test results using three-tier diagnostic methods, obtained from 32 students who took the test there are (28) 87% of chemistry teacher candidates experienced misconceptions (M1, M2, and M3). Prospective chemistry teacher students who have detected misconceptions on the basic concepts of chemical bonds need to be corrected, so that after graduating from college they do not bring misconceptions to students while teaching. Students' misconceptions can be reduced using an integrated 3R conceptual change (recall, recognition, and reintegration) (CC3R) strategy

Levinas, Darwall, and Løgstrup on Second-Personal Ethics

2018 ◽  
pp. 302-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stern
Keyword(s):  
Moral Action ◽  
Personal Relation ◽  
Fundamental Difficulty ◽  
Personal Approach ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right ◽  
Personal Ethics ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Stephen Darwall ◽  
Do So

This article considers the relationship between Levinas’s ethics and the “second-personal” approach adopted by Stephen Darwall and K. E. Løgstrup. Darwall’s ethics treats the second-personal relation as one of command as an exercise of authority, while K. E. Løgstrup treats the second-personal relation as one of responsibility rather than command. It is argued that Løgstrup raises a fundamental difficulty for any command view, namely that the reason to act on a command is because one has been commanded to do so, where this cannot provide the right reason for a moral action. This article considers where Levinas should be located in this debate between the two models of second-personal ethics represented by Darwall and Løgstrup. It is suggested that while Levinas’s position reflects elements of both accounts, he is perhaps closer to the command approach, in a way that then makes him vulnerable to Løgstrup’s objections.

scholarly journals Right for the wrong reason; wrong for the right reason: Gibson and Arnheim on picture perception

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-87
Author(s):  
Ian Verstegen
Keyword(s):  
Visual Field ◽  
Virtual World ◽  
Picture Perception ◽  
Visual World ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right ◽  
Semiotic Theory

Although J J Gibson’s theory of picture perception was often crude and biased toward naturalism, its fundamental division between the visual world and the visual field made it a semiotic theory. Contrariwise, although Arnheim wrote sensitively on pictures, he never seemed to admit that they were signs. This paper reviews both Gibson’s and Arnheim’s theories of picture perception, and explains where Arnheim’s biases caused him to lose the possibility of framing his approach in the most basic semiotic terms. Nevertheless, using the phenomenological semiotics of Sonesson and his theory of the Lifeworld Hierarchy, I demonstrate latent semiotic elements in Arnheim’s theory, due perhaps to Alfred Schutz’s influence. Hoping to argue against the brute theory of denotation, Arnheim instead sought to delay invocation of (conventional) signs as long as possible, and his idea of iconic pictorialization assumes but does not name signification. Nevertheless, I propose that Arnheim has a kind of theory of the Lifeworld Hierarchy inside the picture. Thus, he (wrongly) does not see the picture as overtly signifying but interestingly gives hints about how to treat the objects of the virtual world of the picture based on their relationship to the overall style of the work.

Proleptic Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnes Callard
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Extrinsic Rewards ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Good Grade ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right

If someone is to rationally engage in a large-scale transformative pursuit, she must be acting on some reason. The would-be music-lover cannot listen to music for the “right” reason, namely the intrinsic value of that music. For in order to grasp this reason, she would have to already value music. Nor can she act on the “wrong” reason, for instance because she wants a good grade or in order to impress someone: if she were listening only for the sake of such extrinsic rewards, she would not be transforming herself. Such agents act on proleptic reasons, which are acknowledged to be defective variants of the reasons they will come to grasp fully at the end of their transformations. Proleptic reasons are not internal reasons—they cannot be arrived at by sound deliberation from what the agent already cares about. Instead, they reflect the possibility of rationally coming to care about something new.

The Problem Of Mistaken Self-Defense: Citizenship, Chiasmus, and Legal Form

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Norrie
Keyword(s):  
Modern Society ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
The Law ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Understanding

This essay concerns the law of mistaken self-defense in England and Wales. It considers the widely held view that the honest mistake rule is wrong because it relates the mistake to mens rea. It accordingly fails to distinguish between offense and defense, and within defenses between justification and excuse. I argue against this view that these core criminal law concepts are fluid and irresolute. Mistaken self-defense can be analyzed in terms of an irreducible chiasmus (antithesis) in the law between "doing the right thing for a wrong reason" and "doing the wrong thing for a right reason." This makes it doctrinally unstable. When this is understood, it becomes clear that it may sometimes make moral and legal sense to analyze mistaken self-defense as concerning proof of mens rea, and sometimes not. What determines the matter in individual cases is a political understanding of the nature of citizenship in modern society. The analysis is offered in the light of recent police killings of innocent members of the public in London.

Heinrich von Kleist and the Right to War

Romanticism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254
Author(s):  
Jan Mieszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Heinrich Von Kleist ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay explores the conceptualization of warfare in Romanticism. The focus is on two plays by Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea and Prince Friedrich von Homburg. I begin by discussing Carl von Clausewitz's influential understanding of conflict and the problems that arise when he attempts to explain the interdependence of warring parties. I go on to argue that in Kleist's dramas war is a competition between different languages of authority. When no coherent paradigm of agency emerges from this contest, the right to wage war is revealed to be anything but a guarantee that one knows how to do so.

Fellow Creatures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Good For ◽  
Treat All ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. As beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends in ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of reciprocal moral lawmaking. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient animal as something of absolute importance. The book also argues that human beings are not more important than, superior to, or better off than the other animals. It criticizes the “marginal cases” argument and advances a view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. It offers a non-utilitarian account of the relationship between the good and pleasure, and addresses questions about the badness of extinction and about whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets.

In the Labyrinth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McNeillie
Keyword(s):  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
Do So

It is now widely acknowledged, and far beyond Ireland, that Tim Robinson’s two volumes jointly known as Stones of Aran (‘Pilgrimage’ and ‘Labyrinth’) are modern classics, exemplary in every way of how to write about place and to do so with a formal, literary accomplishment that more than earns the right to nod at Ruskin’s own classic. In 2012, Robinson went back to Árainn, the largest of the three islands, for the first time in nearly ten years. He did so at the urging of Andrew McNeillie, with whom he spent two and a half days revisiting old haunts. This chapter makes account of the occasion and uses, in the process, a unique document provided by Robinson as an experiment in annotating his work. This prompts McNeillie to investigate some of his own annotations and footnotes to Aran.

Inheritance and Luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Mediating Effects ◽  
Inherited Wealth ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.

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