Levinas, Darwall, and Løgstrup on Second-Personal Ethics

Author(s):  
Robert Stern

This article considers the relationship between Levinas’s ethics and the “second-personal” approach adopted by Stephen Darwall and K. E. Løgstrup. Darwall’s ethics treats the second-personal relation as one of command as an exercise of authority, while K. E. Løgstrup treats the second-personal relation as one of responsibility rather than command. It is argued that Løgstrup raises a fundamental difficulty for any command view, namely that the reason to act on a command is because one has been commanded to do so, where this cannot provide the right reason for a moral action. This article considers where Levinas should be located in this debate between the two models of second-personal ethics represented by Darwall and Løgstrup. It is suggested that while Levinas’s position reflects elements of both accounts, he is perhaps closer to the command approach, in a way that then makes him vulnerable to Løgstrup’s objections.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Viz Quadrat

AbstractIn 2011, twenty-six years after the end of the military dictatorship, the Brazilian government took the initiative of implementing the right to memory and to the truth, as well as promoting national reconciliation. A National Truth Commission was created aiming at examining and shedding light on serious human rights violations practiced by government agents from 1946 to 1985. It worked across the entire national territory for almost three years and established partnerships with governments of other countries in order to investigate and expose the international networks created by dictatorships for monitoring and persecuting political opponents across borders. This article analyzes the relationship between historians and the National Truth Commission in Brazil, in addition to the construction of dictatorship public history in the country. In order to do so, the Commission’s relationship with the national community of historians, the works carried out, as well as historians’ reactions towards its works, from its creation until its final report in 2014, will be examined.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong

Chapter 5 develops and defends an original account of the necessity constraint on the use of defensive force. The chapter argues that the necessity condition is grounded in the right to be rescued from harm when this rescue can be provided at reasonable cost. The chapter argues that even wrongful attackers have the right to be rescued from serious harm when others can do so at reasonable cost, and this right explains why there is a necessity condition on the permissible use of defensive force. The chapter also offers criticisms of competing conceptions of the necessity condition, as well as offering a particular view regarding the relationship between necessity and liability.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-626 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Adams

What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something A, one’s desire to do that thing A is one’s motivation. Second, when Dave throws out a pack of cigarettes, this may or may not be part of an attempt to quit smoking. It may be a political protest against R.J.R. Nabisco (Dave may be changing brands, not lifestyles). Dave’s throwing out the cigarettes only counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, if it is done for the right reason, out of the right motivation. Again, the right motivation seems to be the desire to quit smoking. Thus, the desire to do A appears to play important roles in the attempt to do A. At the very least, it helps to motivate, guide, and constitute the attempt as the attempt to do A. It is because Dave wants to quit smoking that his throwing out his cigarettes counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, not as a political protest.


2021 ◽  

The responsibility to protect and intervention possessed a central political importance in the early modern period. This volume asks whether there was also a duty to intervene alongside the right to do so. This draws attention to the relationship between the responsibility to protect, security and reputation, which is the focus of the contributions the book contains. Chronologically, they range from the 15th to the 18th centuries and discuss monarchical duties to protect, alliance commitments, confessional legitimation and motives, as well as those based on patronage, contractual relationships and electoral processes. One of the book’s important findings is a deeper understanding of reputation, which is comprehensively examined here as a political guiding factor with reference to changing understandings of security for the first time.


1975 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 113-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.B. Peires

Among the Xhosa the institution of the ‘Right-Hand House’ acts both as a political charter and as an historical explanation. As a political charter it defines the relationship between the Ngqika Paramount (the Right-Hand House) of the Ciskei ‘Bantu Homeland’ and the Gcaleka Paramount (the Great House) of the Transkei Homeland. As it presently stands, the essence of this relationship is that the Ngqika Paramount recognizes the Gcaleka Paramount as his superior in rank, but without accepting any implications of practical political subordination. This position was defined by J.H. Soga, the standard authority on Xhosa history and customs, and himself an umNgqika, as follows: By courtesy, matters affecting Xosa customs might occasionally be referred to a chief of the older [i.e., Gcaleka] branch especially when a precedent was involved, but this did not prevent the Right-Hand House from following its own line of conduct, irrespective of what that precedent might be, should it choose to do so. Laws promulgated by the court of the Gaikas [Ngqika] were not subject to interference by the Gcaleka chief.In terms of historical explanation, secondary authorities from 1846 to 1975 have singled out the privileged status of the Right-Hand House as the principal cause of Xhosa political fragmentation.Whereas historians of Africa normally agree that institutions and their myths of origin are, at least in part, susceptible to historical interpretation and reconstruction, they may justifiably be more doubtful of an historical approach which seeks to explain historical events by imputing to the past the continuous retrogressive operation of institutions which can be seen to be operating in certain ways in the present. In this regard the present exercise has two aims.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia A. Stark

Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for (1) condoning some cases of oppression and (2) condemning others for the wrong reason—namely, that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, regardless of whether victims are responsible for it, simply because it is contrary to the equal moral standing of persons. I argue that four luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances of oppression and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (6. ksz.) ◽  
pp. 89-106
Author(s):  
Lívia Horgos

The present study focuses on preliminary session, which was altered in its function by the resolutions of the new Law of Criminal Procedure (entering into force in 2018), that is Act XC of 2017 (henceforth LCP) with special regard to the relationship between accusation and evidentiary procedure with the help of a case. I also examine the rules of criminal procedure codified in Hungarian judicature, the function and influence of preliminary session, the main characteristics and the place of preliminary session among procedural forms of court procedures. The study examines whether preliminary session regulated by LCP meets the requirements and checks indictment eliminating unsubstantiated procedures. In case it fails to do so, what further regulations are needed to be added to present ones in order to meet requirements with special regard to codification policy embodied in criminal judicature, especially effectiveness, promptness, simplicity and coherence. I examine in details the possibility whether it could be the right and obligation of the court to examine not only the means of evidence deriving from legal elements and other informative elements contained in the presented indictment but also the legality of preliminary sessions and investigation procedures as a legal condition of initiating a court procedure. The study describes the regulation of LCP concerning evidentiary procedures in the preliminary session emphasizing the modifications by Act XLIII of 2020 concerning the interrogation of the accused. I examine its significance and point out whether anomalies in connection with the limits of evidentiary procedure are successfully eliminated in judicature.


Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
MICAH LOTT

In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism.


Romanticism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254
Author(s):  
Jan Mieszkowski
Keyword(s):  

This essay explores the conceptualization of warfare in Romanticism. The focus is on two plays by Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea and Prince Friedrich von Homburg. I begin by discussing Carl von Clausewitz's influential understanding of conflict and the problems that arise when he attempts to explain the interdependence of warring parties. I go on to argue that in Kleist's dramas war is a competition between different languages of authority. When no coherent paradigm of agency emerges from this contest, the right to wage war is revealed to be anything but a guarantee that one knows how to do so.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gagah Yaumiyya Riyoprakoso ◽  
AM Hasan Ali ◽  
Fitriyani Zein

This study is based on the legal responsibility of the assessment of public appraisal reports they make in land procurement activities for development in the public interest. Public assessment is obliged to always be accountable for their assessment. The type of research found in this thesis is a type of normative legal research with the right-hand of the statue approach and case approach. Normative legal research is a study that provides systematic explanation of rules governing a certain legal category, analyzing the relationship between regulations explaining areas of difficulty and possibly predicting future development. . After conducting research, researchers found that one of the causes that made the dispute was a lack of communication conducted between the Government and the landlord. In deliberation which should be the place where the parties find the meeting point between the parties on the magnitude of the damages that will be given, in the field is often used only for the delivery of the assessment of the compensation that has been done.


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