scholarly journals Exploring the Diversity in Safety Measurement Practices: Empirical Results from Aviation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Kaspers ◽  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Selma Piric ◽  
Robbert van Aalst ◽  
...  

<p>A literature review, which was conducted during the research project “Measuring Safety in Aviation – Developing Metrics for Safety Management Systems”, identified several problems and challenges regarding safety performance metrics in aviation. The findings from this review were used to create a framework for interviewing 13 companies in order to explore how safety performance is measured in the industry. The results from the surveys showed a wide variety of approaches for assessing the level of safety. The companies encounter and/or recognise problematic areas in practice when implementing their safety management. The findings from the literature review are partially confirmed and it seems that the current ways of measuring safety performance are not as straight forward as it might be assumed. Further research is recommended to explore alternative methods for measuring aviation safety performance.</p>

Author(s):  
Heidi C. Kim

In January of 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released an 80-page document outlining Safety Management Systems (SMS) for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers. This advisory circular provides a description of regulatory requirements, methods of development, and implementation of an SMS (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). The release of this document began a race to implement SMS across aviation. An all-encompassing Safety Management System currently does not apply to the manufacturing of airplane parts. This research will examine current safety management processes in place for applicants and holders of supplemental type certificates (STC). Upon review of current procedures, a model for an SMS will be created specific to supplemental type certificate applicants and holders. This SMS process created for STC holders will ultimately improve aviation safety. The FAA should mandate this framework for all applicants pursuing and holding a supplemental type certificate.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gráinne Murphy ◽  
Marina Efthymiou

Safety is at the heart of the aviation system, accident rates are on a steady downward trend with 2.1 accidents per million departures in 2016, representing the lowest annual aviation accident rate. It is predicted that globally the airline industry will grow, expecting 7.2 billion passengers to travel in 2035 (IATA, 2016). The airport domain is a complex socio technical environment where an airline receives a range of services and is the focal point for the convergence of ground activities, part of its role is creating the ‘safety picture’ and a ‘safety space’ for its industry customers to provide these services to aircraft operators. All operators (excluding ground-handling service providers) at European Union (EU) airports are regulated by European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations and now all have Safety Management Systems in place. Using Dublin Airport as a case study, the paper explores safety culture and safety challenges amongst operators in the multi stakeholder context of Dublin airport’s airside operations. In particular, the paper argues that (i) the attitudes of airport stakeholders on the effectiveness of Safety Management Systems were positive with good indicators of an engaged safety culture, (ii) operators strive for safe airport operations as well as achieving compliance operations and (iii) attitudes towards multi stakeholder safety management depend on the primary relationship held by each party. Finally, the paper recommends strategies to be adopted to enhance and improve multi stakeholder safety culture at Dublin Airport.


Author(s):  
Bart Accou ◽  
Genserik Reniers

Although mandatory in most high-risk industries, the safety management system (SMS) is often criticized as burdensome and complex. Through its requirement to formalize all main activities, the SMS is perceived as bureaucratic and a vehicle for pure compliance and Safety I (one). Furthermore, the SMS is often detached from an organization’s core activities, goes against local practice and does not deliver the safe performance that was hoped for. By comparing the model behind SMS with specific requirements for process capability, this paper identifies a safety fractal that reflects the basic requirements that are needed to control safety related activities at all levels within an organization. It is further argued that the constituent elements of this safety fractal are particularly suitable to organize resilient performance, provided that resilience is explicitly identified as the safety strategy to follow and, as such, consequently implemented. This approach is then positioned against common safety management concepts as management system maturity, leadership and safety culture, leading to a systematic and a more comprehensive view on how to measure safety performance and resilience.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Yeun ◽  
Paul Bates ◽  
Patrick Murray

2019 ◽  
Vol 273 ◽  
pp. 02005
Author(s):  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Alistair Vardy ◽  
Steffen Kaspers

In the frame of an on-going 4-years research project, the Aviation Academy Safety Management Systems (AVAC-SMS) metric for the self-assessment of aviation Safety Management Systems (SMS) was designed based on the Safety Management Manual of the International Civil Aviation Organization and in cooperation with knowledge experts and aviation companies. The particular metric evaluates three areas, namely (1) the degree of institutionalisation of SMS (design and implementation of processes), (2) the extent of managers' capability to deliver the SMS processes, and (3) the employees' perceived effectiveness of the SMS-related deliverables. The metric concludes with a score per area and per SMS component/element assessed, and it is scalable to the size and complexity of each organisation. Results of a survey at 18 aviation companies did not show statistically significant differences in their SMS scores across all three assessment areas but revealed a distance between the area of Institutionalization and the areas of Capability and Effectiveness. Also, differences were detected regarding the scores per SMS component and element within and across companies and assessment areas. The various assessment options offered for the AVAC-SMS metric accommodates the resources each SME and large company can invest in the application of the metric. Even the lowest level of resolution of the SMS metric can trigger companies to investigate further their weaker areas and foster their SMS-related activities. Therefore, the AVAC-SMS metric is deemed useful to organisations that want to self-assess their SMS and proceed to comparisons amongst various functions and levels and/or over time.


AUP Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-57
Author(s):  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Selma Piric ◽  
Robert Jan de Boer ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Steffen Kaspers ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Lisa Whittaker

Improving safety was the goal when Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) was first introduced for the Boeing 747 in 1968. The goal was to develop a system of evaluation for scheduled maintenance by using decision logic. This was MSG-1. As theory evolved, MSG-2 brought process orientation and failure modes analysis. Then in 1978, United Airlines, commissioned by the Department of Defense, developed a methodology based on tested and proven airline practices. With that MSG-3 was born. MSG-3 is the current standard for risk management in aviation (McLoughlin, 2006). In 2006, ICAO released a new initiative known as Safety Management Systems (ICAO, SMM, 2006). All domains within aviation will be required to implement a safety management system that complies with ICAO’s guidelines set forth by member states within their own regulations. This is the SSP or State Safety Program. The goal is to provide support for continued evolution of a proactive strategy to improve safety performance (ICAO Safety Management, n.d.). Aviation safety is key, but it is certainly not a new goal. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two programs, MSG-3 and SMS. The study reveals similarities and differences of organizational structures and procedures required to carry out the programs. By identifying growth areas for expertise and personnel, this analysis may be of interest to those starting the journey into SMS.


Author(s):  
Alexa S. Burr ◽  
S. David Toth ◽  
Colin M. Frazier

Abstract Since the publication of API Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, in July 2015, the energy pipeline trade groups in North America (American Petroleum Institute, Association of Oil Pipelines, American Gas Association, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, and the American Public Gas Association) have worked collaboratively to develop tools and programs to assist energy pipeline operators with the development and implementation of Pipeline Safety Management System (Pipeline SMS) programs and processes. These resources include a Planning Tool, Implementation Tool and Evaluation Tool, as well as an industry-developed Maturity Model that describes a continuum of implementation levels, based on conformance to RP 1173 as well as implementation effectiveness. These resources can be found online and are supplemented by the Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program developed by API. Applying API’s experiences with successful safety programs in other segments and with significant contributions from the Pipeline SMS Implementation Team (aforementioned trade groups and various industry operators), the Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program is designed to be a key tool to facilitate Pipeline SMS implementation and to share and benchmark information to drive improvements in safety performance. The assessments also provide the pipeline industry with an objective, third-party option to test their systems and address the conformity auditing (API RP 1173, Section 10.2.2) and performance and maturity evaluation (API RP 1173, Section 10.2.3 to 10.2.5) requirements of the recommended practice. In 2019, pilot assessments were conducted and in 2020 the Assessment Program is being implemented. Through the piloting process, significant insights were gained into the practical application of the industry Maturity Model and how the assessments can contribute to an operator’s journey improving safety performance. Aligning with the flexibility and scalability goals of RP 1173, the pilot experiences included liquids transmission and gas distribution operators with varying approaches to pipeline SMS implementation. We will discuss the lessons learned through the piloting process and how the plan-do-check-act cycle was applied to improve the processes for planning, staffing and conducting the assessments to ensure that value is being provided to the pipeline industry. An independent assessment through the API Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program can validate internal efforts to increase maturity of programs, as well as provide operators with benchmarking data so that they can understand where other operators are in their maturity journey.


2018 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-196
Author(s):  
Anna V. Chatzi

Purpose Most military aviation organisations today have not evolved their safety management approach towards harmonising with civil aviation. Safety culture is the base for any civil aviation organisation, enabling employees to communicate effectively and be fully aware and extrovert on safety. Just culture and reporting culture both are related to safety culture. Both are parts of the awareness process, enhancing safety promotion. These distinct elements and the safety management systems (SMS) can serve well the military aviation. This paper aims to present and discuss the SMS philosophy, structure and elements as a solution for military aviation organisations. Design/methodology/approach The feature of civil aviation SMSs are presented and discussed, with reference to the applicable frameworks and regulations governing the SMS operation. A discussion on the challenges faced within the military aviation organisations, with a brief examination of a European Union military aviation organisation, is presented. Findings The European Military Airworthiness Requirements, which are based on the European Aviation Safety Agency set of rules, can act the basis for establishing military aviation SMSs. A civil-based approach, blended, as necessary, with military culture is workable, as this is the case for many defence forces that have adopted such aviation safety systems. Originality/value This viewpoint paper discusses the opportunities and challenges associated with the adoption of SMS by military aviation organisations. This is the first time that this issue is openly discussed and presented to the wider aviation community, outside military aviation.


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