scholarly journals Frege, Poincaré, Carnap, Kripke: cuatro réplicas a un dogma kantiano

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (138) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Emilio Méndez Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Henri Poincaré ◽  
Rudolf Carnap ◽  
Conceptual Schemes

I present the replies that Gottlob Frege, Henri Poincaré, Rudolf Carnap, and Saul Kripke made to the assumption that apriority and necessity are interchangeable synonyms, an assumption that I take, together with the assumptions that there is a split between analytic truths and synthetic truths and that there is a dichotomy between our conceptual schemes and empirical content, as a Kantian dogma.

The Predicate of Existence

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Nathan Salmon

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.

The Vienna Circle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Murray
Keyword(s):  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Rudolf Carnap ◽  
Ernst Mach ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
The World ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Scientific Worldview

In 1922 Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) transformed the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society), a weekly reading group concerned with logical positivism, into an international assembly of academics known as der Weiner Kreis, or the Vienna Circle, which responded to recent developments within analytic philosophy by leading thinkers Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Early members included Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) and Otto Neurath (1882–1945). In 1929, Neurath published Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle), a pamphlet delineating the group’s rejection of metaphysics in favour of a scientific worldview predicated upon empirical phenomena.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Oskari Kuusela
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Rudolf Carnap ◽  
Peter Strawson ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Philosophical Progress

Gottlob Frege and Bertand Russell are widely regarded as the founders of analytic philosophy. A longer list also includes G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is not because analytic philosophers subscribe to Frege’s and Russell’s views about particular philosophical matters. It is hard to think of examples of such agreed-upon views. Rather, Frege’s and Russell’s role as founders is due, before all, to certain methodological ideas which they introduced. Especially important in this regard is the idea that philosophical progress could be achieved by means of the methods of symbolic or mathematical logic to whose development both contributed in important ways. This book, in essence, is an examination of Frege’s and Russell’s methodological and logical ideas and their further development and transformation by certain other philosophers, especially Ludwig Wittgenstein, but also Rudolf Carnap and Peter Strawson. It is in this sense a book on methodology in analytic philosophy. And although the book assumes the form of the examination of the history of analytic philosophy, especially the work of Wittgenstein, it is just as much—or more—about the future of analytic philosophy. The underlying question that motivates this book is what analytic philosophy could be or become, and whether it is possible for it to redeem its original promise of progress. For it seems fair to say that progress has been less impressive than Russell promised and more controversial than he may have expected (see ...

George Boole. Of syllogisms. Reprinted from 191. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 177–191. - Rudolf Carnap. Elementary and abstract terms. Reprinted from IV 117. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 221–229. - Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson). The bilateral diagram. Reprinted from 674. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 230–233. - Gottlob Frege. Definitions. Reprinted from XVIII 92(12). Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 329–342. - John Neville Keynes. Propositions. Reprinted from 631. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 453–470. - Augustus De Morgan. On the syllogism. Reprinted from 201. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 556–578. - Josiah Royce. The principles of logic. Reprinted from 1403. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 654–683. - Bertrand Russell. Definition of pure mathematics. Reprinted from 1116. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 684–692. - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Facts. Reprinted from 2812. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 791–793.

1964 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 135-135
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Rudolf Carnap ◽  
Pure Mathematics ◽  
George Boole ◽  
Josiah Royce ◽  
Definition Of

Derrida and Frege

Paragraph ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-195
Author(s):  
Marian Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Derrida, for reasons which he never made clear publicly, published his mémoire for the diplôme d'études supérieures only in 1990, some thirty-five years after it had been written. Had it been published much earlier, some of the dispiritingly ill-informed remarks about his work might have been avoided. The mémoire, entitled The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, reveals that he is, when required, perfectly able to write a standard thesis in straightforward French. And that, in particular, he is aware of the work of the great logician Gottlob Frege in its relation to Husserl.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document