The Vienna Circle

Author(s):  
Peter Murray

In 1922 Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) transformed the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society), a weekly reading group concerned with logical positivism, into an international assembly of academics known as der Weiner Kreis, or the Vienna Circle, which responded to recent developments within analytic philosophy by leading thinkers Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Early members included Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) and Otto Neurath (1882–1945). In 1929, Neurath published Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle), a pamphlet delineating the group’s rejection of metaphysics in favour of a scientific worldview predicated upon empirical phenomena.

Author(s):  
Jan von Plato

This chapter discusses how Kurt Gödel found his theorem. He started to study physics at the University of Vienna in 1924, then changed to mathematics in 1926. That same year, he started attending the meetings of the Vienna Circle. These were weekly gatherings on philosophical topics that were headed by the philosopher Moritz Schlick. The philosophy of the circle came to be known as logical empiricism and had an enormous effect on the world of philosophy. Gödel later wanted to emphasize that he by no means shared all of the philosophical ideas of the circle. In the meetings, Gödel came to know the philosopher Rudolf Carnap and the mathematician Karl Menger, in whose mathematical colloquium he later presented many of his results.


1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-312
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church

Author(s):  
Andy Hamilton

Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher. Though not one of the great philosophers, he was tremendously influential in the development of ‘scientific philosophy’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A vigorous opponent of ‘metaphysics’, he was celebrated as a progenitor of logical positivism. His work is regarded as a limiting case of pure empiricism; he stands between the empiricism of Hume and J.S. Mill, and that of the Vienna Circle. Mach’s positivist conception of science saw its aims as descriptive and predictive; explanation is downgraded. Scientific laws and theories are economical means of describing phenomena. Theories that refer to unobservable entities – including atomic theory – may impede inquiry. They should be eliminated where possible in favour of theories involving ‘direct descriptions’ of phenomena. Mach claimed to be a scientist, not a philosopher, but the ‘Machian philosophy’ was ‘neutral monism’. Close to phenomenalism, it saw the world as functionally related complexes of sensations, and aspired to anti-metaphysical neutrality.


Author(s):  
Sanford Shieh

A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if the truth of its conclusion follows necessarily from the truth of its premises or, put differently, if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and modality was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible and the actual. In this first of a two-volume book, I investigate the grounds and consequences of this anti-modal position. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The main consequence is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance. The coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays, because it is assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism, and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions.


Author(s):  
Ricardo José Da Silva Araujo

The main purpose of the present paper consists in analyzing the arguments, interpretations and concepts offered by both Gottlob Frege and Kurt Gödel in some of their works in defense of platonic realism in mathematics, where they do not rely on epistemologically complex concepts such as the world of Ideas or an intellectual intuition.


Author(s):  
Friedrich Stadler

The Vienna Circle was a group of about three dozen thinkers drawn from the natural and social sciences, logic and mathematics who met regularly in Vienna between the wars to discuss philosophy. The work of this group constitutes one of the most important and most influential philosophical achievements of the twentieth century, especially in the development of analytic philosophy and philosophy of science. The Vienna Circle made its first public appearance in 1929 with the publication of its manifesto, The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle (Carnap, Hahn and Neurath 1929). At the centre of this modernist movement was the so-called ‘Schlick Circle’, a discussion group organized in 1924 by the physics professor Moritz Schlick. Friedrich Waismann, Herbert Feigl, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, Philipp Frank, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Kurt Gödel and Edgar Zilsel belonged to this inner circle. Their meetings in the Boltzmanngasse were also attended by Olga Taussky-Todd, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Felix Kaufmann, Rose Rand, Gustav Bergmann and Richard von Mises, and on some occasions by visitors from abroad such as Hans Reichenbach, Alfred Ayer, Ernest Nagel, Willard Van Orman Quine and Alfred Tarski. This discussion circle was pluralistic and committed to the ideals of the Enlightenment. It was unified by the aim of making philosophy scientific with the help of modern logic on the basis of scientific and everyday experience. At the periphery of the Schlick Circle, and in a more or less strong osmotic contact with it, there were loose discussion groups around Ludwig Wittgenstein, Heinrich Gomperz, Richard von Mises and Karl Popper. In addition the mathematician Karl Menger established in the years 1926–36 an international mathematical colloquium, which was attended by Kurt Gödel, John von Neumann and Alfred Tarski among others. Thus the years 1924–36 saw the development of an interdisciplinary movement whose purpose was to transform philosophy. Its public profile was provided by the Ernst Mach Society through which members of the Vienna Circle sought to popularize their ideas in the context of programmes for national education in Vienna. The general programme of the movement was reflected in its publications, such as the journal Erkenntnis (‘Knowledge’, later called The Journal for Unified Science), and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Given this story of intellectual success, the fate of the Vienna Circle was tragic. The Ernst Mach Society was suspended in 1934 for political reasons, Moritz Schlick was murdered in 1936, and around this time many members of the Vienna Circle left Austria for racial and political reasons; thus soon after Schlick’s death the Circle disintegrated. As a result of the emigration of so many of its members, however, the characteristic ideas of the Vienna Circle became more and more widely known, especially in Scandinavia, Britain and North America where they contributed to the emergence of modern philosophy of science. In Germany and Austria, however, the philosophical and mathematical scene was characterized by a prolongation of the break that was caused by the emigration of the members of the Vienna Circle.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-30
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Nikiforov ◽  

The article examines the question of whether L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus had any influence on the formation and development of logical positivism. It is shown that the members of the Vienna Circle were familiar with the Tractatus, but practically did not accept anything from its content. Wittgenstein's reasoning about the world, about facts, about the structure of fact were rejected by them as a bad metaphysics, with which they fought. The denial of causality and the deprivation of the meaning of scientific laws could not be accepted by representatives of logical positivism, whose main task was the logical analysis of the language of science in order to cleanse it of metaphysical concepts and build a unified science on a solid empirical foundation. If the members of the Vienna Circle were even familiar with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, then representatives of the Berlin Group, the Lvov-Warsaw School, the Uppsala School and supporters of logical positivism in other countries hardly heard of it. This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein's Tractatus did not have any impact on the logical positivism.


George Boole. Of syllogisms. Reprinted from 191. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 177–191. - Rudolf Carnap. Elementary and abstract terms. Reprinted from IV 117. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 221–229. - Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson). The bilateral diagram. Reprinted from 674. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 230–233. - Gottlob Frege. Definitions. Reprinted from XVIII 92(12). Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 329–342. - John Neville Keynes. Propositions. Reprinted from 631. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 453–470. - Augustus De Morgan. On the syllogism. Reprinted from 201. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 556–578. - Josiah Royce. The principles of logic. Reprinted from 1403. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 654–683. - Bertrand Russell. Definition of pure mathematics. Reprinted from 1116. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 684–692. - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Facts. Reprinted from 2812. Classics in logic, Readings in epistemology, theory of knowledge and dialectics, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York1962, pp. 791–793.

1964 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 135-135
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church

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