Bashing Public Employees and Their Unions

Author(s):  
Nelson Lichtenstein

This chapter considers the idea of governmental “sovereignty,” as used by the right, to undermine the rationale for collective bargaining in the public sector. From the Boston Police Strike of 1919 forward, conservatives have considered the organization of government workers to be incompatible with the sovereign status of those entities sustained by taxes and elected by the populace. Public employee unions subverted the will of elected officeholders and undermined state power. That antiunion ideology faded in the two decades after 1958 when public employee unionism grew by leaps and bounds, but in recent years it has returned, albeit in a distinctively neoliberal, antistate guise. Conservatives today charge that instead of challenging the power of the state, public sector unionism is illegitimate because these institutions support those governmental functions that regulate commerce, sustain public education, and provide other public goods now under attack from the neoliberal right.

1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth M. Jennings ◽  
Steven K. Paulson ◽  
Steven A. Williamson

Public employees in Florida have been permitted by law since 1974 to engage in collective bargaining with their employers. Along with the right to engage in collective bargaining, the law established a dispute resolution process for resolving bargaining impasses in lieu of the strike, which was strictly prohibited. This law also established the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), which was created to oversee the process. The present study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the present impasse procedure as perceived by the concerned parties. This study was exploratory in nature and designed to provide PERC and thus the Florida Legislature with the documentation required for review of the present law. A total of 1,150 questionnaires were mailed to union representatives and public employers. A 45 percent return rate was achieved. The return was approximately equally divided between the unions and the employers. Frequency distributions of these responses and regression analyses are presented and conclusions are drawn as to the perceived effectiveness of the process.


2002 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 688-700
Author(s):  
Marie-Armelle Souriac

The right to strike has been recognised in France, even as a right guaranteed by the Constitution, since 1946. Strikes in the public sector are subject to specific legal regulation, including requirements for minimum notice periods and, in some circumstances, minimum service requirements. This contribution examines these special legal features of public-sector strikes. It is necessary to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of the management of public enterprises (or administrative authorities) and the government. The article also considers alternative (and new) forms of collective action and agreements. In the future there may well be even greater scope for the regulation of strikes to be covered by collective bargaining.


2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2227-2246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Matsusaka

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)


2012 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Cantin

SummarySince the onset of the Great Recession, anti-union conservatives have been hammering out an arguably bogus yet politically potent argument: collective bargaining with government workers is unaffordable as their wages, health benefits, and pensions are driving states into deficits. Whilst evidence does not support the politically motivated attacks on public sector workers and their unions, a confluence of political-economic factors has been abetting efforts to scapegoat public employees and their unions.The first section of this essay places the 2011 wave of anti-public-sector-collective-bargaining statutes in its broad political and economic context. Whilst resulting from a longstanding hostility of the USA’s conservative movement to unionism and collective bargaining, recent anti-public-sector-collective-bargaining statutes are also the outcome of three political-economic developments galvanising anti-union GOPers—first, the fact that most US union members are now government workers, which makes it easier for anti-unionists to characterize them as a “privileged” elite; second, the Great Recession and ensuing deficit crisis; and third, the rousing of the conservative movement that led to the 2010 electoral “shellacking” of the Democrats. The second section focuses specifically on Wisconsin and argues that what is going on there ought to be seen for what it is: an attempt to exploit the economic crisis to win an eminently political victory over organised labour and allied Democrats.


2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 699-713
Author(s):  
Joseph Frossard

This paper describes the limitations on the constitutional right to strike that apply to public employees in France. While recognizing the right to strike for all salaried workers, whether employed in the private or public sector, the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, incorporated by reference into the present Constitution, allows for limitations being imposed on that right by statute. Indeed, specific legislation has either prohibited or limited the right to strike for various classes of public employees. This has been held constitutionally valid insofar as the statutory bar or restriction is required to prevent essential functions of the State from being interrupted or to ensure that the vital needs of the country are being provided for. Even where no specific restrictive legislation applies, strikes by the staff of « public services » — including not only central and local government employees, but also employees of major nationalized industries, institutions such as hospitals, and even private undertakings providing some public utility or service — are subject, under the Labour Code, to a number of restrictions. In particular, five days' notice of the strike must be given by a representative union. And certains forms of striking, such as rotating strikes, are prohibited. In addition, the employer authority may, under the doctrine of « essential services », make administrative regulations identifying which units or staff positions are considered essential. These regulations are subject to review by the administrative courts on the basis that the constitutional right to strike may only be curtailed insofar as is needed to preserve State authority and security or the safety of the public.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-174
Author(s):  
Daniel Chigudu

This article discusses the arguments against adopting collective bargaining in the public sector and its benefits. Collective bargaining in the public sector is viewed primarily as undermining democratic governance in one way and paradoxically it is seen as an essential part of democratic governance. In the former view, collective bargaining in the public sector is seen as an interference with administrative law for personal benefit to the detriment of the taxpayer. Proponents of this view argue that unionising public sector employees encourages disloyalty to the government at the expense of public welfare. In the later view, public sector collective bargaining is viewed as a fundamental human right in a pluralistic society. Advocates of this view posit that, public sector unions provide a collective voice that stimulates improvement of government services as well as sound administration of law. They also argue that, public sector collective bargaining represents public policy interests and serves as a watchdog to government’s monopoly power in employment matters. Public sector unions raise employee salaries and perks to levels higher than they would have been in the absence of collective bargaining. These two opposite views are subjected to a critical analysis in this paper, with empirical evidence for both the benefits of public sector collective bargaining and arguments against public sector unions. The article found that public sector collective bargaining depends on the socio-economic background of states although international laws favour public sector unionism.


Author(s):  
Pedro PADILLA RUIZ

LABURPENA: Herritarrei emaitza onak eskaintzeko orduan, Administrazio Publikoa ez dute beti gidatu izan bere xede eta betebeharrekin bat egiten duten jarduera-ereduek, eta administrazio txarra deritzona ekarri du horrek. Horren ondorioak ahultzeko, administrazio ona edukitzeko eskubidea eta administrazio onaren printzipioa agertu ziren, administrazioak jarduteko esparru gisara. Hala ere, enplegatu publikoek jarduteko esparrua izateko sortu ziren batez ere, horiexek baitira gizarteak eskatzen duen administrazioaren benetako egileak. Kontzeptu horretara hurbildu ondoren, eta hortik abiatuta, printzipio horren eta enplegatu publikoek kalitateko administrazioa lortzeko egiten duten jardueraren arteko harremana aztertuko dugu. Zehazki, printzipioak enplegatuen jarrera profesionalarekin eta lanaren gaineko ebaluazioarekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu; izan ere, ebaluazio hori funtsezko tresna da, administrazio on horren betetze-maila egiaztatzeko informazioa ematen du-eta. RESUMEN: La Administración Pública no siempre se ha guiado por modelos de actuación acordes con sus objetivos y obligaciones a la hora de ofrecer resultados satisfactorios a los ciudadanos, dando lugar a lo que se ha venido en llamar una mala Administración. Para contrarrestar sus defectos apareció el derecho-principio de buena Administración como marco de actuación de aquella, pero sobre todo de los empleados públicos, verdaderos artífices de la Administración que reclama la sociedad. Partiendo de una aproximación a tal concepto, analizamos la relación existente entre dicho principio y la actuación del empleado público para el logro de una Administración de calidad, abordando en particular su conexión con la conducta profesional y con la evaluación del desempeño, herramienta esencial, por otra parte, por la información que ofrece a la hora de comprobar el grado de cumplimiento de esa buena Administración. ABSTRACT: Public Administration has not always been guided by models of action according to its objectives and duties in order to offer satisfactory results to the citizens. This has gave rise to what it has been called a bad Administration. In order to counteract its shortcomings the right-principle of good Administration has appeared as a framework of the Administration action, but above all of the public employees, real authors of the Administration that the society demands. On the basis of an approach to this concept we analyze the existing relationship between this principle and the public employee performance in order to achieve the quality in the Public Administration, addressing, in particular, its con nection with professional behaviour and job evaluation, which is an essential tool, on the other hand, due to the information it offers to verify the degree of compliance of that good Administration.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document