scholarly journals New Approach of Multistage Model in Supply Chain with Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Kamran Shahanaghi ◽  
Maryam Keyvani Rad
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Multistage Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Multi Level

<p>This paper researches the relationships between seller and buyer with regard to game theory. The research continues by assuming an indirectly managing by an Intermediation. The intermediation is considered as third party who tried to decrease the distance between seller and buyer willing. In our proposed methodology, Bi-level programming is used for modeling the decision making between seller and buyer in supply chain, and then extend the model in Multi-level decision making. In the presented solution, the third part offers a price to each of the seller and buyer individually and supposed as leader. Final answers of described algorithms are Nash equilibrium point for supply chain. The object of seller and buyer are considered as a follower in each stage. Profits maximization for sellers and buyer are calculated by considering their own constraints.</p>

scholarly journals New Approach of Game Theory for Seller’s Price Selecting Strategies in Bi-Level Programming

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Kamran Shahanaghi ◽  
Maryam Keyvani Rad
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
New Approach ◽  
General Algebraic Modeling System ◽  
Optimum Decision

<p>The relationships between the members of supply chain were modeled in many researches, such as cooperative and non-cooperative situation. In our paper, the main question is how much and for which price should each seller offer her product to maximize the profit. In the proposed methodology, Bi-level programming is used for modeling and then GAMS (general algebraic modeling system) language for solving the problem. In the presented model, the first level, called upper sub-problem and supposed as leader is trying to maximize each seller profits by obtaining the optimal offered quantity of individual seller. The objective of follower (buyer) is at second level. The lower sub-problem uses the results of the seller’s model and then maximizes its profit. These optimizations are obtained with regard to the some other constraints. Similar the other game theories problems, the Nash equilibrium point(s) is (are) the optimum decision of this seller-buyer supply chain. A numerical example is employed to illustrate the application of the proposed method.</p>

Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategic Alliance Considering the Quality Level of Remanufactured Products and Patent Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050021
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Hui Wu ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Kebing Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Alliance Structure

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer responsible for collecting used products and remanufacturing is constructed. Considering the quality level of remanufactured products, four kinds of closed-loop supply chain alliance structure models are constructed. The optimal equilibrium decisions of these four models are compared and analyzed. The optimal decisions of the models are verified by numerical analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of the quality of remanufactured products and the decision influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance on the remanufacturer’s decision are further analyzed. The results show that remanufactured products are competitive with new products, and the improvement of the remanufactured product quality will reduce the market demand of new products. The equilibrium decision of the closed-loop supply chain is affected by the alliance behavior of members in the closed-loop supply chain and the quality level of remanufactured products. The higher the decision concentration of the closed-loop supply chain is, the more favorable the supply chain is; the higher the remanufacturing quality level is, the more favorable the supply chain is, and the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer is affected by the quality level of remanufactured products and the decision-making influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance structure. We find that the improvement of the concentration degree of closed-loop supply chain decision can benefit the supply chain by improving the remanufacturing quality level, which has direct effect on the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer. In most cases, the choice of the alliance is the dominant decision of the third-party remanufacturer.

scholarly journals Managing Pricing of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Patent Protection

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Leqi Hua ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Yan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Third Party

AbstractThis paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision problem in which the original manufacturer allows the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture under patent protection. In the two cycle mode, the authors discuss the pricing decision problem of the original manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party remanufacturer in centralized and decentralized decision-making cases. The authors obtain the optimal sale price and wholesale price of new products and remanufactured products in two cases, and the optimal recycling rate of used products in centralized decision-making case. Finally, the authors carry out the corresponding numerical simulation of the pricing decision.

Complex Dynamics in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Risk Aversion and Fairness Concerns Under Supply Disruption

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (09) ◽  
pp. 2150132
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
Fairness Concerns

In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of two suppliers, one manufacturer, one risk-averse retailer and one fair-caring third-party in the presence of supply disruption. We focus on establishing a dynamic Stackelberg game model with bounded rational expectation and analyzing the game evolution process. The effects of key parameters on the Nash equilibrium solutions and their stability are investigated, as well as the complex dynamical behaviors of the CLSC system are explored by using the stability region, bifurcation graph, the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE), strange attractors, etc. Moreover, the performance of channel members under different values of parameters is researched by utilizing the (average) expected profits or utilities index. The analysis results reveal that the excessive fast adjustment speed of the manufacturer will lead to the system losing stability and falling into chaos. Also, the retailer’s risk aversion and the third party’s fairness concerns have a destabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium point, while the possibility of supply disruption has different effects on the scope of the adjustment speed of decision variables of the manufacturer. Furthermore, in most cases, an over the top adjustment speed of the manufacturer is disadvantageous to all the channel members for more expected profits, but the third-party can achieve a better performance when the system is in periodic state. Finally, the time-delay feedback control method is proposed to eliminate the system chaos.

Comparison analysis on the bilateral efforts of farmers and the third-party organization under multiple contract modes

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 818-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanying Sun ◽  
Xiaoyan Li
Keyword(s):  
System Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply System ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Agricultural Supply

Purpose The purpose of this paper is under the analysis framework of the system theory, analyzing the optimal contract mode of agricultural supply chain to guarantee the stability of agricultural supply chain and the equilibrium of agricultural product market, to analyze the effect of farmers’ risk attitude on the selection of contract modes and to find the way to encourage farmers’ productive effort and to avoid farmers’ hitchhiking behavior, to guarantee the stability of agricultural supply chain. Design/methodology/approach Under the guidance of the system theory, using the Stackelberg model and the nonlinear programming theory, this paper comparatively analyzes farmers’ effort (productive effort and sales effort), farmers’ income and the stability of agricultural supply system of four types of contract modes between farmers, third-party organizations and market. Findings First, in the agricultural market, market-type contract cannot maximize farmers’ income. The main reason is that farmers do not have enough ability to avoid market risk and to bargain. Second, for farmers of risk seeking, choosing a market-type contract and secondary-income contract can increase their income. Third, under the fixed-purchase price contract, the hitchhiking behavior would happen. Fourth, when farmers’ productive efforts are the same, farmers’ income under the secondary-income contract is higher than under the fixed-purchase price contract. Because under the secondary-income contract, farmers have the opportunity to obtain the secondary distribution of benefits, farmers’ hitchhiking behavior could be avoided. Originality/value Analyzing the contract modes between farmers and the third-party organization in the agricultural market could reduce the influence of price fluctuation, avoid the uncertainty of the relationship between the supply and demand, stimulate the productive effort of farmers and provide theoretical guidance for establishing efficient and stable agricultural supply system.

scholarly journals How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Fan Wang ◽  
Xiaofan Lai ◽  
Jingxian Hong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Technology Licensing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with the Third Party Product Recovery and Sales Effort

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Model

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.

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