scholarly journals New Approach of Game Theory for Seller’s Price Selecting Strategies in Bi-Level Programming

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Kamran Shahanaghi ◽  
Maryam Keyvani Rad
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
New Approach ◽  
General Algebraic Modeling System ◽  
Optimum Decision

<p>The relationships between the members of supply chain were modeled in many researches, such as cooperative and non-cooperative situation. In our paper, the main question is how much and for which price should each seller offer her product to maximize the profit. In the proposed methodology, Bi-level programming is used for modeling and then GAMS (general algebraic modeling system) language for solving the problem. In the presented model, the first level, called upper sub-problem and supposed as leader is trying to maximize each seller profits by obtaining the optimal offered quantity of individual seller. The objective of follower (buyer) is at second level. The lower sub-problem uses the results of the seller’s model and then maximizes its profit. These optimizations are obtained with regard to the some other constraints. Similar the other game theories problems, the Nash equilibrium point(s) is (are) the optimum decision of this seller-buyer supply chain. A numerical example is employed to illustrate the application of the proposed method.</p>

scholarly journals New Approach of Multistage Model in Supply Chain with Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Kamran Shahanaghi ◽  
Maryam Keyvani Rad
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Multistage Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Multi Level

<p>This paper researches the relationships between seller and buyer with regard to game theory. The research continues by assuming an indirectly managing by an Intermediation. The intermediation is considered as third party who tried to decrease the distance between seller and buyer willing. In our proposed methodology, Bi-level programming is used for modeling the decision making between seller and buyer in supply chain, and then extend the model in Multi-level decision making. In the presented solution, the third part offers a price to each of the seller and buyer individually and supposed as leader. Final answers of described algorithms are Nash equilibrium point for supply chain. The object of seller and buyer are considered as a follower in each stage. Profits maximization for sellers and buyer are calculated by considering their own constraints.</p>

scholarly journals A Type of Time-Symmetric Stochastic System and Related Games

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Zhu ◽  
Yufeng Shi ◽  
Jiaqiang Wen ◽  
Hui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Time Delay ◽  
Differential Equations ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stochastic Differential Equations ◽  
Stochastic System ◽  
Stochastic Systems ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Doubly Stochastic

This paper is concerned with a type of time-symmetric stochastic system, namely the so-called forward–backward doubly stochastic differential equations (FBDSDEs), in which the forward equations are delayed doubly stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and the backward equations are anticipated backward doubly SDEs. Under some monotonicity assumptions, the existence and uniqueness of measurable solutions to FBDSDEs are obtained. The future development of many processes depends on both their current state and historical state, and these processes can usually be represented by stochastic differential systems with time delay. Therefore, a class of nonzero sum differential game for doubly stochastic systems with time delay is studied in this paper. A necessary condition for the open-loop Nash equilibrium point of the Pontriagin-type maximum principle are established, and a sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Furthermore, the above results are applied to the study of nonzero sum differential games for linear quadratic backward doubly stochastic systems with delay. Based on the solution of FBDSDEs, an explicit expression of Nash equilibrium points for such game problems is established.

Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 794-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

scholarly journals Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company

2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (No. 1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Cabrera García ◽  
J.E. Imbert Tamayo ◽  
J. Carbonell-Olivares ◽  
Y. Pacheco Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Linear Programming ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Agricultural Economics ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Linear Programming Problems ◽  
The One

This paper deals with the application of Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural economics problem. The goal of this analysis is demonstrating the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, as proposed by Nash, in the case of an agricultural company that is considered together with its three sub-units in developing a game with perfect information. Production results in terms of several crops will be considered in this game, together with the necessary parameters to implement different linear programming problems. In the game with perfect information with the hierarchical structure established between the four considered players (a management center and three production units), a Nash equilibrium point is reached, since once the strategies of the rest of the players are known, if any of them would use a strategy different to the one proposed, their earnings would be less than the ones obtained by using the proposed strategies. When the four linear programming problems are solved, a particular case of equilibrium point is reached.

SYSTEMIC RISK: THE EFFECT OF MARKET CONFIDENCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2050043
Author(s):  
MAXIM BICHUCH ◽  
KE CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Simple Model ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Maximum Amount ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Optimal Mix ◽  
Uniqueness Of Nash Equilibrium

In a crisis, when faced with insolvency, banks can sell stock in a dilutive offering in the stock market and borrow money in order to raise funds. We propose a simple model to find the maximum amount of new funds the banks can raise in these ways. To do this, we incorporate market confidence of the bank together with market confidence of all the other banks in the system into the overnight borrowing rate. Additionally, for a given cash shortfall, we find the optimal mix of borrowing and stock selling strategy. We show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium point for all these problems. Finally, using this model we investigate if banks have become safer since the crisis. We calibrate this model with market data and conduct an empirical study to assess safety of the financial system before, during after the last financial crisis.

scholarly journals Dynamic Cournot Duopoly Game with Delay

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Elsadany ◽  
A. E. Matouk
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Local Stability ◽  
Stability Region ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Delayed System

The delay Cournot duopoly game is studied. Dynamical behaviors of the game are studied. Equilibrium points and their stability are studied. The results show that the delayed system has the same Nash equilibrium point and the delay can increase the local stability region.

COMPLEXITY OF A REAL ESTATE GAME MODEL WITH A NONLINEAR DEMAND FUNCTION

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 3171-3179 ◽  
Author(s):  
LINGLING MU ◽  
PING LIU ◽  
YANYAN LI ◽  
JINZHU ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Real Estate ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nonlinear Feedback ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point

In this paper, a real estate game model with nonlinear demand function is proposed. And an analysis of the game's local stability is carried out. It is shown that the stability of Nash equilibrium point is lost through period-doubling bifurcation as some parameters are varied. With numerical simulations method, the results of bifurcation diagrams, maximal Lyapunov exponents and strange attractors are presented. It is found that the chaotic behavior of the model has been stabilized on the Nash equilibrium point by using of nonlinear feedback control method.

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