CONVERSION” OF A CUSTOMS OFFICER’S SERVICE RELATIONSHIP INTO AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

2021 ◽  
Vol specjalny (XXI) ◽  
pp. 387-398
Author(s):  
Stefan Płażek

The selection method of existing employees or officers has been used since the beginning of the Third Polish Republic during the transformation of various public institutions, which consists of making discretionary decisions about whose employment will be continued, as well as under what new conditions it will be carried out. Using the framework for termination of employment for this purpose in subsequent acts, missing in them precise criteria for qualifying persons and the lack of regulations as to the manner of judicial protection are designed to reduce the number of people who would make attempts to contest their decisions. In 2016 on the occasion of the reform of the fiscal apparatus, this method was additionally extended to include the possibility of unilateral and selectively transforming the service relationships of customs officers into employment relationships, or vice versa - fiscal officials to officers. This option was implemented in practice in 2017. This represents a serious threat to the freedom to choose and pursue a profession which must either be restrained by declaring this type of regulation unconstitutional, or by making it unprofitable through court judgments restoring prior employment relationships. The recent case law of common courts and the Supreme Court favours it.

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-617
Author(s):  
Anna Wallerman

AbstractThis article examines the jurisprudence of the Swedish Supreme Court during WW2 in disputes between exiled Jewish business owners and the Nazi-appointed administrators of their companies over the rights to the enterprises’ assets in Sweden. Contrary to assertions in previous scholarship, this article argues that the judgments of the Supreme Court were dictated neither by moral indignation in the face of the treatment of Jews in the Third Reich, nor by political considerations in a time of war. Instead, they were based on principles of private international law that predated, and outlived, the Third Reich. The outcome of the cases hinged upon whether the claim to Swedish assets arose before or after the date when the enterprise was placed under forced administration. If before, the claims of the Jewish owners were in principle successful; if after, they were not. This reasoning was well in line with both previous and subsequent case law on confiscations effected abroad. The article therefore concludes that the Swedish Supreme Court's judgments on Jewish assets in Sweden should be viewed not as outflows of extrajudicial considerations, but rather as failures to recognize political or ethical responsibility.


Author(s):  
David GARCÍA CASTRO

LABURPENA: Botere Judizialari buruzko uztailaren 1eko 6/1985 Lege Organikoa aldatu duen 07/2015 Lege Organikoa indarrean jarri izanak irauli egin du Auzitegi Nagusiko hirugarren Salaren aurreko kasazio-errekurtsoa, antolakuntzako, legezko, prozesuzko eta prozedurazko berrikuntza garrantzitsuak sartu baititu. Horien artean, auziak onartzeko betekizun bakar gisa kasazio-interes objektiboa sartu izana nabarmentzen da. Legegileak ahalegina egin du bai zantzuen kasuak zehazteko (Administrazioarekiko Auzien Jurisdikzioa arautzen duen Legearen 88.2. artikulua), bai kasazio-intereseko ustekizunak zehazteko (Administrazioarekiko Auzien Jurisdikzioa arautzen duen Legearen 88.3. artikulua). Hala ere, kontzeptu berri hori sartu izanak zalantzak eragin ditu kasazio-interesaren kontzeptuaren eta interes hori egiaztatzeko moduaren inguruan. Auzitegi Nagusiko hirugarren Salaren onarpen-sekzioaren jurisprudentzia hasiberriaren azterketan zentratzen da lan hau, kasazio‑interesaren kontzeptua eta interes hori egiaztatzeko modua zehazteari begira. RESUMEN: La entrada en vigor de la LO 07/2015, por la que se reforma la LO 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial, ha dado un vuelco al recurso de casación ante la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo, introduciendo relevantes novedades organizativas, legales, procesales y procedimentales, entre los que destaca la incorporación del interés casacional objetivo como requisito único de admisión de los asuntos. La introducción de este nuevo concepto, pese al esfuerzo realizado por el legislador para concretar supuestos de indicios (art. 88.2 LJCA) y presunciones de interés casacional (art. 88.3 LJCA), ha generado dudas sobre el concepto mismo de interés casacional y sobre la forma de acreditarlo. Este trabajo se centra en analizar la incipiente jurisprudencia de la Sección de Admisión de la Sala Tercera del TS para concretar el concepto de interés casacional y la forma de acreditarloen los escritos de preparación de recursos de casación. ABSTRACT: The entry into force of Organic Act 7/2015 that amends Organic Act from July 1st of the Judiciary has drastically changed the right of appeal before the Supreme Court Third Chamber by introducing relevant organisational, legal, procedural and of proceeding novelties, among which stands the incorporation of objective interest for appeal as the unique condition for the admission of the cases. The introduction of that new concept, in spite of the legislator effort to establish specific cases for indications (art. 88.2 LJCA) and presumptions for the interest for appeal (art. 88.3 LJCA) has created doubts about the concept itself of interest for appeal and the way to demonstrate it. This work is focused on analyzing the incipient case law by the section for admissions within the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court in order to specify the concept of interest for appeal and the form to demonstrate it in the written pleadings of preparation of the rights of appeal.


Author(s):  
Chris James Pretorius

In Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine if the material mistake of a contractual party induced by the fraud of an independent third party could sustain a plea of iustus error raised by the mistaken party. The position prior to this decision was uncertain and characterised by inconsistency, mostly occasioned by the application of the iustus error doctrine together with fault. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that in the circumstances the mistaken party was liable, despite the fraud of the third party, on the basis of the reliance theory. The decision is commendable for bringing a measure of certainty to the law of mistake on this point and indicating that the reliance theory (as opposed to the iustus error doctrine) is the appropriate means to resolving such cases. Nevertheless, it is suggested that although the general rule implied by the court's approach is entirely apposite, there may well be exceptional instances where on the basis of relevant policy considerations the reliance theory should not prevail and the mistaken party should be absolved from contractual liability. In this manner reliance, which at first seems reasonable for being induced by the conduct of the contract denier, may upon further reflection be regarded as unreasonable based on the consideration of risk creation at the hand of the contract assertor, for instance. Admitting exceptions in appropriate circumstances would also provide a degree of consonance with earlier case law, where, even if the court's approach was open to theoretical criticism, a court has intuitively felt that liability should not lie.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 215
Author(s):  
Mirosław Wincenciak

<p>Lack of court protection for officers whose current service relationship is substituted with a form that is less beneficial – an employment relationship, should be seen as a violation of their right to trial. A labour court, by definition, is not an appropriate court when it comes to cases of entering into or the termination of service relationships having a legal and administrative character. This court can judge cases concerning the employment relationship of an employee but fundamentally does not have jurisdiction to assess the establishment and termination of a legal and administrative relationship. Therefore, sending customs officers to labour courts causes the transformation of a service relationship into an employment relationship to slip out of court control.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-292
Author(s):  
Mariusz Lekston

In spite of its obligation-based nature, the contractual employment relationship of university teachers still has some properties that make it similar to the structure of a public law service relationship. Here, the specificity of the employment of university teachers is determined by the elements of content of their employment relationship that are closely linked to the realisation of the government’s duties related to science and higher education. The different employment status of university teachers is in fact a heterogeneous solution, where the obligation-based nature of the employment relationship is complemented with elements that are characteristic for public law service relationships.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Dieuaide

This article discusses the changes in employment relationships under globalisation and, more specifically, the phenomenon of triangulation and the attendant proliferation of employment grey zones. The first section sets out a framework for analysis of the conditions governing the organisation and exercise of power by employers in such situations by reviewing two types of relationship: an agency relationship and a relationship of intervention. Drawing on fieldwork and a number of case studies, the second part examines how human resources managers in large corporations use their powers of discretion in these situations. The third part analyses this particular form of regulation with regard to the nature of the subordinate relationship of employees to their employers. We show that the existence of employment grey zones reflects not so much a watering down of that subordinate relationship as a shift towards new values and new means of expression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-19
Author(s):  
Justin D. Beck ◽  
Judge David B. Torrey

Abstract Medical evaluators must understand the context for the impairment assessments they perform. This article exemplifies issues that arise based on the role of impairment ratings and what edition of the AMA Guides to the Impairment of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) is used. This discussion also raises interesting legal questions related to retroactivity, applicability of prior precedent, and delegation. On June 20, 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its decision, Protz v. WCAB (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), which disallows use of the “most recent edition” of the AMA Guides when determining partial disability entitlement under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. An attempted solution was passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and was signed into law Act 111 on October 24, 2018. Although it affirms that the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, must be used for impairment ratings, the law reduces the threshold for total disability benefits from 50% to 35% impairment. This legislative adjustment benefited injured workers but sparked additional litigation about whether, when, and how the adjustment should be applied (excerpts from the laws and decisions discussed by the authors are included at the end of the article). In using impairment as a threshold for permanent disability benefits, evaluators must distinguish between impairment and disability and determine an appropriate threshold; they also must be aware of the compensation and adjudication process and of the jurisdictions in which they practice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


Author(s):  
Shreya Atrey

This chapter provides an expository account of Indian appellate courts’ engagement with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the developing case law on disability rights. As a dualist State, India has ratified but not incorporated the CRPD into its domestic law. This has not deterred frequent references to the CRPD in litigation at the highest level. The appellate courts—High Courts and the Supreme Court—have resorted to the CRPD in diverse ways. The analysis of the small but not insignificant body of case law shows that these instances can be classified into two broad themes of ‘citation’ and ‘interpretation’. In the final analysis, the overall impact of references to the CRPD can be considered largely positive but still modest in the absence of new legislation embracing the human rights framework and social model of the CRPD in India.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


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