scholarly journals On The Verge of the Hybrid Mind

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Wallace ◽  
Janice Brock Wallace

Let’s continue on the self-help road to improving fibromyalgia symptoms. Suppose we are eating healthy, well-balanced meals, are no longer smoking, have learned to pace ourselves, cope with changes in the weather, are sleeping well, and have reconfigured the house. At this point, how can the body be trained to reduce pain, stiffness, and fatigue? This chapter will explore how physical, mental, and complementary modalities allow fibromyalgia patients to feel better about their bodies and minds. Therapeutic regimens that help the body and mind, whether physical therapy, yoga, acupuncture, or chiropractic methods, are all based on similar tenets of body mechanics: 1. Fibromyalgia patients will never improve unless they have good posture. Bad posture aggravates musculoskeletal pain and creates tight, stiff, sore muscles. Therefore, stretch, change positions, and have a good workstation that does not require too much leaning or reaching. 2. The way we get around is a demonstration of body mechanics. The fundamental principles of good body mechanics in fibromyalgia include using a broad base of support by distributing loads to stronger joints with a greater surface area, keeping things close to the body to provide leverage, minimizing reaching, and not putting too much pressure on the lower back. Also, don’t stay in the same position for a prolonged period of time. 3. Exercise is necessary. It improves our sense of well-being, strengthens muscles and bones, allows restful sleep, relieves stress, releases serotonin and endorphins, which decreases pain, and burns calories. 4. Don’t be shy about using supports. Whether it be an armrest, special chair, brace, wall, railing, pillow, furniture, slings, pockets, or even another person’s body, supports allow fibromyalgia patients to decrease the amount of weight or stress that would otherwise be applied to the body, producing discomfort or pain. 5. All activities should be conducive to relaxation and stress reduction, whether they be deep breathing, meditation, biofeedback, or guided imagery. There are a surprisingly large number of ways these activities can be carried out. They are discussed in the next few sections.


Sarwahita ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Dinny Devi Triana ◽  
Eddy Husni

ABSTRACT: Brain gymnastic is a collection of simple movements that aim to connect or unite the mind and body through kinesiology educational process. Kinesiology is a science that studies body movement and the relationship between muscle and posture to brain function. The motion of the limbs that is emphasized in brain gymnastics is a cross movement. The movement moves the extremes on one side of the body intersecting the midline and coordinates with the extremes on the other side of the body so that both hemispheres are used at the same time. Gymnastics of the brain in special needs children (simple children needs) as a child slow or slow (retarded) that will never succeed in school as children in general. Thus the basis of the need for bridal gymnastics is devoted to special needs of children who have been learning difficulties or concentrating disorders, and do not have a good focus on observing everything, so there needs to be a drill or balance exercise of coordination and asymmetric movements or crosses to optimize focus and his concentration.   ABSTRAK: Senam otak merupakan kumpulan gerakan-gerakan sederhana yang bertujuan menghubungkan atau menyatukan akal dan tubuh melalui proses edukasi kinesiologi. Kinesiologi merupakan suatu ilmu yang mempelajari gerakan tubuh dan hubungan antara otot dan postur terhadap fungsi otak. Gerak anggota tubuh yang ditekankan pada senam otak adalah gerakan menyilang. Gerakan tersebut menggerakkan ekstremitas pada satu sisi tubuh menyilang garis tengah dan berkoordinasi dengan ekstremitas pada sisi tubuh yang lain sehingga kedua hemisfer dipergunakan pada saat yang bersamaan. Senam otak pada anak kebutuhan khusus (special needs children) secara simple sebagai anak yang lambat (slow) atau mengalami gangguan (retarded) yang tidak akan pernah berhasil di sekolah sebagaimana anak-anak pada umumnya. Dengan demikian dasar kebutuhan adanya senam otak dikhususkan pada anak kebutuhan khusus yang mengalami kesulitan belajar atau gangguan berkonsentrasi, dan tidak memiliki fokus yang baik dalam mengamati segala hal, sehingga perlu adanya drill atau latihan keseimbangan gerak-gerak koordinasi dan asimetris atau menyilang untuk mengoptimalkan fokus dan konsentrasinya.


Philosophy ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 52 (199) ◽  
pp. 27-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Stevenson

The distinction between mental illness and bodily illness would seem to presuppose some sort of distinction between mind and body. But dualist theories that the mind is a substance separable from the body, or that mental events could occur without any bodily events, raise ancient conceptual problems, which I do not propose to review here. What I want to do is to examine the psychiatric implications of materialist theories, which hold that the mind is the brain, or a function of the brain. If all character has a basis in chemistry, can we still attribute some mental distress to character and some to chemistry, as if the two categories were different?


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-13

This paper deals with the history of the relationship between the mind-body dualism and the epistemology of madness. Earlier versions of such dualism posed little problem in regard to the manner of their communication. The Cartesian view that mind and body did, in fact, name different substances introduced a problem of incommunicability that is yet to be resolved. Earlier views that madness may be related to changes in the brain began gaining empirical support during the 17th century. Writers on madness chose to resolve the mind-body problem differently Some stated that such communication was not needed; others, that mind was a redundant concept, as madness could be fully explained by structural changes in the brain; and yet others described psychological spaces for madness to inhabit as a symbolic conflict. The epistemology of the neurosciences bypasses the conundrum, as it processes all together the variables representing the brain, subjectivity, and behavior and bridges the “philosophical” gap by means of correlational structures.


Author(s):  
A. Zeman

‘The great regions of the mind correspond to the great regions of the brain.’ Paul Broca ‘… the master unsolved problem of biology: how the hundred million nerve cells of the brain work together to create consciousness …’ E.O. Wilson, Consilience, 1998 Here is one view of the relationship between medicine and psychiatry. Physicians study, diagnose, and treat disorders of the body; psychiatrists (by contrast) study, diagnose, and treat disorders of the mind. Medicine has to do mainly with processes in objects, such as the circulation of blood to the kidneys; psychiatrists concern themselves mainly with the experiences of subjects, such as auditory hallucinations. Medical disorders are ‘organic’; psychiatric disorders are ‘functional’. Medicine is mainly a science; psychiatry mainly an art. The brain, on this view, occupies an ambiguous position, poised between body and mind: it is an ambiguous intermediary, a skilful interpreter between the languages of mind and body. Nevertheless, disorders of body and mind can and should be rigorously distinguished....


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
De Chong ◽  
Wen Xiao

The article stands in the position of theoretical psychology, and exploresthe possible relationship between cognition and the body from the dimensions of the body. The article points out that, dualism has always dominated Western culture since ancient Greece. Plato is the earliest representative of the dualism thought. Descartes confirms the existence of the binary world of mind and matter from epistemology.Traditional cognitive psychology inherits the dualistic tradition of separation of mind and body, and regards the mind as the processing of abstract symbolic informationindependent of the body s sensory movement system. But the rise of personal cognition challenges the dualism. From the perspective of the body, cognition is the cognition of the body, and the body is the subject of cognition. Cognition shows dependence on the body in three ways: a. The body limits the characteristics and scope of cognition. The body structure of the organism and the ability of the body is limiting the nature and content of cognitive representation; b. The body not only limits cognitive processing, but also can be used as an integral part of cognitive processing to distribute cognitive tasks between the brain and the body, playing a role similar to a distributor; c. The body regulates cognition, affecting mental processessuch as thinking, judgment, emotion, and motivation. The above facts show that mind and body are not binary, but one and the interaction between body and environment create mind and cognition. The mind, body, and environment are the process of integration.


Author(s):  
Chantal Jaquet

Lastly, on the basis of this definition, the author shows how affects shed light on the body-mind relationship and provide an opportunity to produce a mixed discourse that focuses, by turns, on the mental, physical, or psychophysical aspect of affect. The final chapter has two parts: – An analysis of the three categories of affects: mental, physical, and psychophysical – An examination of the variations of Spinoza’s discourse Some affects, such as satisfaction of the mind, are presented as mental, even though they are correlated with the body. Others, such as pain or pleasure, cheerfulness (hilaritas) or melancholy are mainly rooted in the body, even though the mind forms an idea of them. Still others are psychophysical, such as humility or pride, which are expressed at once as bodily postures and states of mind. These affects thus show us how the mind and body are united, all the while expressing themselves differently and specifically, according to their own modalities.


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