Verfassungsgerichtliche Entscheidungsfindung und ihre Folgen
How do constitutional courts decide and how do institutional factors affect decision-making processes and their outcomes? This book answers these questions—in a way that is relevant for law and politics—in two steps. In the first place, it develops possible theoretical models of constitutional courts’ decision-making. Thereafter, they are applied to the politically significant Turkish Constitutional Court (1962–2012) for the first time. Using interviews with former judges and analyses of court rulings, the author proposes that ‘unfavourable coupling’ takes place at the Turkish Constitutional Court in the form of a decision-making logic that follows majority principles combined with a process that requires a willingness to compromise and seek consensus for the court to function appropriately. This coupling affects the court’s decision-making process, its case law and, indirectly, even its ability to gain institutional autonomy and authority.