Kindergrundrechte

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Hepp

Children are only explicitly mentioned in the Basic Law as the subject of the norm and the object of parental care. The thesis explores both the existence and formulation of fundamental rights in relation to children according to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court as well as the underlying fundamental rights dogmatics of the Court. In this way, an overall picture of the current constitutional status of the child in Germany is established. The study aims to shed light on the controversy in the points that have been insufficiently addressed so far and to resolve underlying misunderstandings. Finally, it serves to clarify the constitutional status of children in Germany.

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Michael Wrase

Drawing on the socio-legal concept of legal culture, this chapter tries to explain the initial objections by many traditionalist legal scholars, politicians, and legal practitioners alike against comprehensive anti-discrimination regulation in Germany. It contrasts the rather weak culture of non-discrimination with a broadly shared appreciation for civil rights fostered by a long-established and extensive adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court (‘FCC’). It can be shown that the missing national support for the new regulation has led to a very restricted transposition of the EU anti-discrimination directives. The Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz more or less confines itself to implementing the provisions stipulated in the directives, and even contains several shortcomings and potential breaches of EU law, especially with regard the provision of public goods and services. Consequently, mobilization of non-discrimination rights has been rather weak in practice so far. However, there is good reason to conclude that anti-discrimination law has been gaining ground in Germany in recent years, and that it will be even more relevant in future. The ECJ adjudication has exerted considerable influence on the case law of the German labour courts. This might in the longer run also impact on the adjudication of the FCC with regard to the clause on non-discrimination in Article 3 Basic Law.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Hanebeck

In a unanimous, surprising decision the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) announced last Tuesday, 22 January 2002, that the hearing in the NPD Party Ban Case - scheduled for five days in early and late February - was suspended. The Court did not yet set a new date. The Court explained that facts had now become known to the Court that raised serious legal questions which can not be resolved in the two weeks before the scheduled hearings. Even the decision from October 1st, 2001, in which the motions by the Bundesregierung (German Federal Government), the Bundestag (Federal Par-liament) and the Bundesrat (Federal Legislative Chamber of the Länder) seeking a ban of the extremist right wing National Democratic Party (NPD) were ruled to be admissible and not evidently unfounded is called into question by the Court. The FCC had been told by a senior civil servant from the Federal Ministry of the Interior that there would be one so-called “V-Mann” among the 14 people to appear as witnesses before the FCC at the scheduled hearing. The motions to ban the NPD build upon numerous sources in order to show that the NPD seeks to undermine or abolish the “freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung” (free democratic basic order) and therefore must be banned under Art. 21 (2) of the German Basic Law (“Grundgesetz. Among those quoted is the V-Mann, Wolfgang Frenz, a former high-ranking official of the NPD. The rather drastic reaction by the FCC to these news is explained by the significance of the information about the V-Mann, an often dubious source (infra I.) and the way this information made its way to the Court, which is a scandal in itself (infra II.). The fallout from the decision will be the subject of the closing remarks (infra III.).


Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas

This book provides a comprehensive summary of German constitutional law, in particular the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It provides first-hand insight into the complex principles of the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), and an authoritative introduction to the history of the German constitution, the Basic Law, and the methodology of the Federal Constitutional Court. As well as an analysis of the general principles of German constitutional law, the book covers the salient articles of the German constitution and offers relevant extracts of the Court's most important decisions on the provisions of the Basic Law. It provides notes and discussions of landmark cases to illustrate their legal and historical context and give the reader a clear understanding of the principles governing German constitutional law. The book covers the fundamental rights catalogue of the Basic Law and offers a comprehensive account of its intellectual moorings. It includes landmark jurisprudence on the equal treatment of same-sex couples, life imprisonment, the legal structure of property, the right to assembly, and the right to informational self-presentation. The book also covers the provisions and respective case law governing the state structure of Germany, for instance the recent decisions on the prohibition of the far-right German nationalist party, and the Court's jurisprudence on European integration, including the most recent decisions on the OMT program of the European Central Bank.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider

AbstractThe First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.


Author(s):  
Tristan Barczak

The law governing the German intelligence services lacks a consistent concept, is non-transparent, fragmented and in urgent need of reform. In May 2020, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court held that the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst - BND) is bound by the fundamental rights of the Basic Law when conducting telecommunications surveillance of foreigners in other countries (so-called Foreign-Foreign Strategic Surveillance), and that the statutory bases in their current design violate the fundamental right to the privacy of telecommunication and freedom of the press. The judgment put an end to the long-running discussion about whether intelligence operations abroad are suitable for statutory regulation at all. Moreover, the Constitutional Court’s decision provided the impetus for one of the most significant reforms in recent German security law. By April 2021, the amendment of the BND Act was finally on the books. It will enter into force in January 2022. It codifies important new rules about the practice, authorization and oversight of foreign data collection by the BND as well as legal requirements for Germany’s participation in international intelligence cooperation. The reform’s provisions implement the constitutional requirements, as stated in the judgement, almost literally. Nonethele⁠ss, the reform created a number of new problems and left major deficits in German intelligence law unresolved. It is far from creating a clear and consistent legal framework for the activities of the three federal intelligence services, in particular their surveillance practices. The article outlines the major shortcomings, developments and perspectives in this field of security law.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).


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