Large Shareholders as a Tool of Corporate Governance: A Panel Study for Turkish Firms

2015 ◽  
pp. 96-115
Author(s):  
Özgür Arslan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
Large Shareholders

scholarly journals The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders on Banks’ Profitability and Risk

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1888
Author(s):  
Maria Gaia Soana ◽  
Laura Barbieri ◽  
Andrea Lippi ◽  
Simone Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Bank Ownership ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

The wide-ranging academic literature on corporate governance in the banking sector includes only a few studies on bank ownership and, specifically, on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate structure. This paper reports an investigation into the presence of multiple large shareholders and their influence on profitability and risk in the long-term, considering a sample of 697 U.S. and European listed commercial banks from 2008 to 2018. It was found that the number of large and institutional shareholders has a positive impact on profitability, but no effect on risk. However, long-term ownership by multiple large shareholders contributes to decreasing risk in banks.

scholarly journals Transaksi Pihak Berelasi: Kompensasi Manajemen Kunci, Kinerja Akuntansi, dan Multiple Large Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 877
Author(s):  
Gandy Wahyu Maulana Zulma ◽  
Fitri Chairunnisa ◽  
Azolla Degita Azis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Research Period ◽  
Positive Effect

The aim of this study is to examine whether multiple large shareholders held by the company can affect the relation between accounting performance and executive compensation, using panel data of all publicly company in Indonesia (except financialand mining industries) with the research period 2017-2019. The result shows that the existence of 2nd largest shareholders that owns more than 10% stocks and also if the board has representation from 2nd largest shareholders in the company, it can reduce the positive effect of accounting performance to executive compensation. This research findings could be as an additional literature in financial accounting and corporate governance area, and also for practitioners in Indonesia that if a firm has good controlling function from multiple large shareholders, it can reduce the opportunistic discretion from executive management if the company has performance evaluation based on earnings.

Large shareholders and corporate governance

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 297-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Frantz ◽  
Norvald Instefjord
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Large Shareholders

When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments

2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (6) ◽  
pp. 2975-3007 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGHUI LI ◽  
FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN ◽  
PETER KIEN PHAM ◽  
JASON ZEIN
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Large Shareholders

DO MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS PLAY A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Najah Attig ◽  
Sadok El Ghoul ◽  
Omrane Guedhami
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Large Shareholders

Corporate governance in an emergent economy: a case of Ghana

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otuo Serebour Agyemang ◽  
Monia Castellini
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Ownership Control

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine corporate governance practices in an emerging economy. It focusses on how ownership control and board control systems operate in corporate organisations in an emergent economy, assuming that these systems are essential for enhancing good corporate governance practices in emerging countries. Design/methodology/approach – The paper builds on descriptive multiple-case study with multiple units of analysis to divulge how ownership control and board control systems function to ensuring effective corporate governance in publicly listed corporate organisations in Ghana. A criterion-based sampling technique is used to select the companies. Thereafter, three techniques of data collection are used to gather data from the companies: archival records, semi-structured interviews and observation. Findings – By linking the gathered data to the paper’s theoretical propositions, the study highlights that all the companies are characterised by the presence of large shareholders, and, in consequence, they tend to exert extensive control over the activities of the companies through their involvement in the decision-making processes. However, whilst the presence of large shareholders has the tendency to solve the agency problem, it poses challenges in regards to minority shareholders’ interests in these corporate organisations. The study also reveals that boards of directors tend to exercise control over corporate organisations when majority shareholders stop interfering in their dealings. This implies that when major shareholders fully partake in corporate decision-making processes of companies, boards of directors seem to be sheer advisory bodies to management. Research limitations/implications – This is a paper to shed light on corporate governance practices in four large publicly listed corporate organisations on the Ghana Stock Exchange, so the observable facts do not apply to other emergent economies. In addition, the sample does not represent all corporate organisations in Ghana; thus, the empirical observations cannot be generalised to other organisations that have not been included in this study. However, the empirical results can be applied to other similar corporations in Ghana and other emergent economies in an analytical sense. With the application of inductive reasoning, the results can be applied to provide important appreciation in an effort to understand the structure of corporate governance practices in organisations in developing countries. Practical implications – A comparative analysis of the empirical observations from this study and the recommended guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana has been carried out, and aspects in which organisations need to reform and improve to fully comply with the guidelines are highlighted: director independence, director evaluation, introduction of new directors and board education. This could possibly be the foundation upon which corporate governance structures in these organisations can be restructured and further enhanced. Originality/value – The majority of the studies of corporate governance in emergent economies have used quantitative techniques to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. However, this study takes a different approach to examine corporate governance practice in an emergent economy by using a comprehensive and defensible qualitative analysis to examine relations between ownership structure and shareholder control, and board of directors and board control. In addition, it highlights how ownership and board control systems interact in corporate organisations in emergent economies.

Monitoring or tunneling by large shareholders: evidence from China private listed companies

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobao Song
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
State Dependency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Managers ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in China private listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – By taking into account of the difference of managerial positions of large shareholders in listed companies (whether they assume the posts as presidents or general managers), and based on the two agency theories, the paper analyzes the state dependency of the relationship between ownership concentration and the company performance of listed companies with the samples of China private listed companies from 2003 to 2011. Findings – The paper finds that if the large shareholders assume no posts in the listed companies, there is an inverted U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the inadequate or excessive monitoring to the companies by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. If large shareholders assume posts in the listed companies, there is a U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the tunneling and propping to the small shareholders by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. Research limitations/implications – This paper has not taken the influence of earnings management of the listed companies. Practical implications – For strengthening the protection of investors, proper distinction shall be made among shareholders of different conditions, and difference of roles large shareholders play in the company under different conditions shall be understood correctly, so as to formulate and perfect market rules for corporate governance, rather than just restraining the power (rights) of large shareholders. The study in this paper is for helping understand the different roles large shareholders play under different corporate governance conditions. Originality/value – First, different from the research paradigm of relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in existing literature, the paper discriminates the study background with the post-assuming conditions of large shareholders in listed companies and believes that relationship between ownership concentration and company performance shall be presented differently under different post-assuming conditions. Second, by using monitoring theory and tunneling and propping theory to explain the behaviors of large shareholders under different post-assuming conditions respectively, a new theory explanation view is provided for explaining the relation between ownership concentration and company performance.

scholarly journals When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century

2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 645-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC HILT
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
Governance Institutions

This article analyzes the ownership structures and governance institutions of New York's corporations in the 1820s, using a new dataset collected from the records of the state's 1823 capital tax, and from the corporate charters. In contrast to Berle and Means's account of the development of the corporation, the results indicate that many firms were dominated by large shareholders, who were represented on the firms' boards, and held sweeping power to utilize the firms' resources for their own benefit. To address this problem, many firms configured their voting rights in a way that curtailed the power of large investors.“…we complain of directors considering themselves thecompany,when they are merely theagents.”1

Ownership concentration, ownership composition and the performance of the Kuwaiti listed non-financial firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mejbel Al-Saidi ◽  
Bader Al-Shammari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Arab Countries ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Ownership Composition ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure (ownership concentration and ownership composition) and firm performance in Kuwaiti non-financial firms. To this end, it examines the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration to determine whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the nature of the large shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – First, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance was tested using ordinary least squares regressions on 618 observations (103 listed firms) from 2005 to 2010; next, the ownership compositions were classified as institutional, government and individuals (families) and their impact on firm performance examined. Findings – The overall concentration ownership by large shareholders showed no impact on firm performance. However, when the type of shareholders was introduced, only the government and individuals (families) ownership categories influenced firm performance. Therefore, certain types of shareholders are better at monitoring, and not all concentration by large shareholders is beneficial to Kuwaiti firms. Research limitations/implications – This study examined only one important aspect of the corporate governance mechanisms, namely, ownership concentration. Thus, further study may include other mechanisms such as board variables, role of debt and shareholders rights in examining the firm performance. This study is limited to the Kuwaiti environment, and thus, next step can be very useful in case of comparing ownership concentration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) or across different Arab countries. Practical implications – The results of this study have important implications for the regulators in Kuwait in their efforts to increase the efficiency of the rapidly developing capital markets and in protecting investors and keeping confidence in the economy. They may mandate a corporate governance code to protect minority shareholders. Investors may use the findings to understand Kuwaiti companies. Such findings may assist them to diversify their investment portfolios. Originality/value – This paper extends literature review by investigating the role of large shareholders in the context of a developing country that is characterized by high level of ownership concentration and weak legal protection for investors as well as the absence of code that organized the corporate governance practices.

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