scholarly journals Consciência intencional e autoconsciência. As teses de Brentano perante as teorias de ordem superior

2021 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Pedro M.S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Related Question ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Higher Order Theory

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

scholarly journals Durand of St.-Pourçain on Reflex Acts and State Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-240
Author(s):  
Peter John Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Mental Power ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Conscious Mental State

Abstract Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.

scholarly journals The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Brown ◽  
Hakwan Lau ◽  
Joseph LeDoux
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
First Order ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
Episodic Memories ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models, such as first-order local recurrency theory. The criticism that HOT overintellectualizes conscious experience is inaccurate because in reality the theory assumes minimal cognitive functions for consciousness; in this sense it is an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views, and plausibly accounts for shortcomings of both. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can more readily account for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories, and make HOT potentially useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

Seeming to Seem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
The Third Person

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.

scholarly journals Estimating the Use of Higher-Order Theory of Mind Using Computational Agents

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harmen de Weerd ◽  
Denny Diepgrond ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Competitive Game ◽  
Matching Pennies ◽  
Reactive Strategy ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Recursive Thinking

Abstract When people make decisions in a social context, they often make use of theory of mind, by reasoning about unobservable mental content of others. For example, the behavior of a pedestrian who wants to cross the street depends on whether or not he believes that the driver of an oncoming car has seen him or not. People can also reason about the theory of mind abilities of others, leading to recursive thinking of the sort ‘I think that you think that I think…’. Previous research suggests that this ability may be especially effective in simple competitive settings. In this paper, we use a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection to determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning in a particular competitive game known as matching pennies. We find that while many children and adults appear to make use of theory of mind, participants are also often classified as using a simpler reactive strategy based only on the actions of the directly preceding round. This may indicate that human reasoners do not primarily use their theory of mind abilities to compete with others.

Executive control and higher-order theory of mind in children at risk of ADHD

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Perner ◽  
Winfried Kain ◽  
Petra Barchfeld
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Children At Risk ◽  
Higher Order Theory

scholarly journals Understandable robots - What, Why, and How

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hellström ◽  
Suna Bensch
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Communicative Actions ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Novel Model

Abstract As robots become more and more capable and autonomous, there is an increasing need for humans to understand what the robots do and think. In this paper, we investigate what such understanding means and includes, and how robots can be designed to support understanding. After an in-depth survey of related earlier work, we discuss examples showing that understanding includes not only the intentions of the robot, but also desires, knowledge, beliefs, emotions, perceptions, capabilities, and limitations of the robot. The term understanding is formally defined, and the term communicative actions is defined to denote the various ways in which a robot may support a human’s understanding of the robot. A novel model of interaction for understanding is presented. The model describes how both human and robot may utilize a first or higher-order theory of mind to understand each other and perform communicative actions in order to support the other’s understanding. It also describes simpler cases in which the robot performs static communicative actions in order to support the human’s understanding of the robot. In general, communicative actions performed by the robot aim at reducing the mismatch between the mind of the robot, and the robot’s inferred model of the human’s model of the mind of the robot. Based on the proposed model, a set of questions are formulated, to serve as support when developing and implementing the model in real interacting robots.

Theory of Mind Performance in Middle Childhood: Australian Normative and Validation Data

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-153
Author(s):  
Larry Cashion
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Middle Childhood ◽  
The United States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Validation Data ◽  
Cultural Aspects ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Reported Data

AbstractTheory of mind tests are regularly used in childhood research and clinical practice for autism spectrum disorders in Australia. Despite this, there is little empirical evidence that the tests used in the United Kingdom and the United States have validity for Australian children. Furthermore, many tests believed to assess ‘advanced’ or ‘higher-order’ theory of mind have not had their reliability or validity rigorously evaluated. In the current study, seven theory of mind tasks were administered to 216 Australian children aged 6 to 12 years as part of a larger research project. While Australian children performed similarly to previous research samples on some tasks, there were marked discrepancies on others. Despite these differences, the validity of using a three-factor structure of first-, second-, and higher-order theory of mind tasks was supported by subsequent confirmatory factor analysis. Methodological issues accounted for some differences between the Australian and previously reported data. However, there were also some cross-cultural aspects of the results that require further investigation.

Subjectivity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Francescotti
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Intentional State ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Qualitative Character ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

Consider those aspects of the world that are the way they are in virtue of how we think about them, or the way we feel about them, or how we view them. Those are the subjective aspects of the world. What makes them subjective can be understood via the notion of an intentional state. The label ‘intentional state’ is often used to refer to mental states that have intentionality. These mental states (including but not limited to thoughts, beliefs, desires and perceptual images) are representational; they represent the world as being a certain way. They are mental states with ‘aboutness’; they are about objects, features and/or states of affairs. Using ‘intentional state’ to refer to mental states with intentionality, a subjective fact about some item x may be defined as a fact that obtains in virtue of someone’s intentional states regarding x. Objective facts are those that are not subjective. So an objective fact about x may be defined as one that does not obtain by virtue of anyone’s intentional state regarding x. Subjectivity is often mentioned in the philosophy of mind because so much of mentality is subjective, with a special brand of subjectivity present in the case of conscious experience. Whenever one has an intentional state, consciously or non-consciously, there is a subjective fact. Suppose an individual s has an intentional state directed toward some item x. Then the fact that s is representing x is, obviously, a function of s’s intentional state regarding x, which makes the fact that s is representing x a subjective fact. Assuming, also, that the intentional state is conscious, there is an additional element of subjectivity involved. Suppose you are visually perceiving a tree and your visual perception is a conscious mental state. Then not only are you representing the tree to yourself; it also seems that you are in some way aware of your representation of the tree. That this extra element of subjectivity seems to be present in the case of conscious experience is part of the reason ‘higher-order’ accounts of consciousness are so attractive. Higher-order accounts capture the intuition that if a mental state is conscious, then its host is aware of the mental state in some suitable way (while adding that the right sort of higher-order awareness is also sufficient for the target state’s being conscious). A higher-order account arguably does capture the unique way in which conscious experience is subjective. There is the subjective, perspectival element characteristic of intentional states in general, including those that are non-conscious. And there is the special brand of subjectivity found in conscious experience, where one’s intentionality is directed toward one’s own mental states. Now suppose that mental representation can be understood purely physically; suppose there is a true and complete account in purely physical terms of what it is for a mental state to have the content it has. Then, one might think, with a higher-order theory we can close the infamous explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal components of consciousness. Some have noted, however, that within the realm of the phenomenal we should distinguish between the subjective character of a conscious state and its qualitative character, where the latter is the way the mental state feels and the former is its feeling a certain way for-a-subject. There is reason to doubt that any higher-order account can explain why a mental state has the qualitative character it has, or any qualitative character at all. Yet, even if higher-order accounts fail to solve the hard problem of consciousness, by failing to close the explanatory gap between the physical and the qualitative aspects of consciousness, it is tempting to think that with a higher-order account we might be able to close the explanatory gap between its physical and its subjective character.

Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Self ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Materialist Theory ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Another kind of representational theory of phenomenal character is higher-order theory, which identifies our awareness of our conscious states with a higher-order representation of them. One version of such a theory is the “self-representational” theory, according to which phenomenally conscious states are those that include a representation of themselves, along with whatever perceptual content they possess. I criticize this approach for not properly capturing conscious subjectivity, which is its alleged principal virtue. In particular, I argue that the kind of cognitive relation that obtains between ourselves and the contents of our conscious experience cannot be appropriately modeled on the causal relations that underlie any materialist theory of representation.

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