scholarly journals La cuestión prejudicial europea ante planteamientos más que dudosos

Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

El presente artículo toma como punto de partida la importancia de la cuestión prejudicial como instrumento fundamental del actual constitucionalismo europeo multinivel, en la medida en que a través de él cabe dotar de fuerza a los principios esenciales del Estado de Derecho y de la UE como comunidad de Derecho (especialmente seguridad jurídica, responsabilidad, tutela judicial efectiva y optimización de los derechos fundamentales). Con tal premisa, se efectúa un análisis crítico de estrategias más que dudosas (no siempre aparentemente guiadas por buena fe procesal) que, por acción o por omisión, vulneran el artículo 267 TFUE poniendo en entredicho la fluida articulación del sistema jurídico europeo (de las normas de producción nacional y supranacional) y el correcto reparto del poder judicial europeo (entre la Justicia nacional y supranacional) y, con ello, la óptima realización del sistema europeo de derechos fundamentales. Finalmente, el trabajo concluye con unas propuestas que pretenden mejorar el diálogo judicial supranacional a través de un verdadero espíritu de colaboración que tenga el respaldo de una sólida formación de la Judicatura en Derecho europeo, de una voluntad jurisdiccional positiva (inspirada en el principio favor libertatis), de una dinamización de la obligación de formulación la cuestión prejudicial en los casos previstos en el artículo 267 TFUE y de una disciplina precisa de la doble prejudicialidad (ante la Jurisdicción Constitucional nacional y ante el Tribunal de Justicia).This article takes as its starting point the importance of the preliminary ruling as a fundamental instrument of the current multi-level European constitutionalism, since it allows for strengthening the basic principles of the rule of law at both the State level and the EU level (especially legal certainty, responsibility, due process of law and optimization of fundamental rights). With such a premise, a critical analysis of more than dubious strategies (not always apparently guided by good procedural faith) is carried out. Indeed, these strategies, by action or omission, breach Article 267 TFEU by challenging the fluid articulation of the European legal system (of national and supranational provisions) as well as the correct distribution of the European judicial power (between national and supranational courts) and, as a result, the optimal realization of the European system of fundamental rights. Finally, the paper concludes with proposals that seek to improve supranational judicial dialogue through a true spirit of collaboration supported by a solid training of judges in European law, a positive jurisdictional will (inspired by the favor libertatis principle), a re-dimension of the obligation to submit the preliminary ruling in the cases referred to in Article 267 TFEU and a specific discipline of a double preliminary ruling (both before the national Constitutional Court and before the Court of Justice).

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474
Author(s):  
Priyo Handoko

The study aims to provide a constitutional analysis of judicial review (PK) in civil cases for more than once. The research-based is the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 in which the two judgments provide a different classification between criminal and civil cases. The method used in this research is a normative juridical with a conceptual, legislation, and case approach. The results of the study assert that: first, the opportunity for judicial review (PK) more than once in a criminal case is an effort to uphold justice substantively by the Constitutional Court. Whereas the restriction of judicial review (PK) only once in civil cases is intended to guarantee legal certainty. Secondly, there is rational inconsistency in the arguments of the Constitutional Court which is indicated in Decision No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013. Both criminal and civil cases must seek to establish and maintain substantial justice, especially since there is a due process of law principle that requires that everyone can get the same opportunity before the law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elitsa Mincheva

AbstractThe detention periods authorized by Directive 2008/115 sparked significant criticism both within and without the EU. In its preliminary ruling of 30 November 2009, the Court of Justice countered concerns that a further erosion of the fundamental rights of irregular migrants might occur due to a broad interpretation of the directive by national courts.


Author(s):  
Michael Schillig

The exercise of extensive powers by authorities during the recovery and resolution process may interfere with constitutionally protected fundamental rights of stakeholder in a multitude of ways. Particularly relevant are the right to conduct a business and the right to property under the EU Charter of fundamental rights, as well as the takings clause under the US constitution. A balance needs to be struck between the aims and objectives of bank resolution and the rights of investors and the requirements of due process. This is normally achieved through expedited and limited judicial review. This chapter assesses whether and to what extent the respective procedures are in line with constitutional and fundamental rights requirements.


Author(s):  
Juan José Ruiz Ruiz

La adopción de los Protocolos 15 y 16 ha culminado un nuevo proceso de reflexión sobre las deficiencias y transformaciones que habrá de afrontar en los próximos decenios el sistema de protección del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. El nuevo Protocolo, bautizado el Protocolo 16 como el «protocolo del diálogo» incorpora una novedosa «vía incidental de diálogo» en el marco del control de convencionalidad, vía que viene a sumarse a las vías incidentales ya existentes en el marco de los controles de incidentales en aplicación del Derecho de la Unión Europea (UE) y en el marco del control de constitucionalidad. Este artículo dedica especial atención a la creciente complejidad de cuestión prejudicial convencional traerá en aquellos sistemas en los que hay una cuestión previa de constitucionalidad y la cuestión prejudicial en virtud del Derecho de la UE. El reenvío que incorpora el Protocolo 16 puede convertirse en una valiosa herramienta en el proceso de cooperación y propulsión de la coherencia del circuito jurisprudencial construido a partir de la circularidad de interpretaciones conformes de Tribunal Constitucional, Tribunal de Justicia de la UE y TEDH. La inserción de una nueva cuestión prejudicial no traerá por ello consigo una disminución en la autonomía del juez nacional, sino que debe ser vista como una garantía más de la triple tutela de derechos que se superponen y que tiene como regla esencial la del mejor standard de protección a partir de una disputa discursiva construida sobre la mejor solución.The adoption of the Protocols 15 and 16 to the ECHR has completed a new process of reflection on the shortcomings and transformations that the protection system of the European Convention on Human Rights will face in the coming decades. The new protocol, named the «protocol of dialogue», incorporates a novel «incidental procedure of dialogue » in the framework of the conventionality control, a procedure in addition to preliminary questions which already exist under European Union law (EU) and in the framework of constitutional control. This article aims to address particular reference to the increasing complexity that Conventional preliminary procedure will bring in those systems in which there are a preliminary question of constitutionality and the preliminary reference procedure on the interpretation of EU law. The preliminary reference procedure enacted by Protocol 16 can become a valuable tool in the process of cooperation and coherence propulsion of jurisprudential circuit, built from the circularity of conforming interpretations of the Constitutional Court, Court of Justice of the EU and ECtHR. The new preliminary question will not bring a reduction in the autonomy of national jurisdiction, but should be seen as a further guarantee of the triple protection of rights that overlap and whose essential rule is «the best standard of protection» from the starting point of a discursive argument founded on the best solution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 694-707
Author(s):  
Justine N. Stefanelli

In its preliminary ruling in Haqbin, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) ruled for the first time on whether the EU Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (RCD) prohibits Member States from withdrawing material reception conditions in the event of a breach of the rules of accommodation centers, or in the context of violent behavior within those centers. In holding in the negative, the CJEU affirmed the important role played by fundamental rights in the EU's asylum system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1097-1118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Fichera ◽  
Oreste Pollicino

AbstractThis Article revisits the role and function of constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions and claims that the latter have had an increasingly stronger influence on the process of European integration—more than may appear at first sight. In addition, the relevance of common constitutional traditions has not been undermined but, on the contrary, strengthened by the emergence of fundamental rights in EU law and the subsequent conferral of binding force on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions are part of two discourses—security and fundamental rights—which are an expression of the security of the European project as an overarching frame characterizing the EU as a polity and legal system. After an overview of some of the most important rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the recent conciliatory attitude recently adopted by the Court of Justice, although the more ambivalent attitude of the Italian Constitutional Court indicates how conflictual features are becoming increasingly important and can no longer be concealed as the EU reaches a more advanced stage of integration.


Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.


1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-81
Author(s):  
Alberto Soria Jiménez

SUMMARY Judgment 107/1992 of the Spanish Constitutional Court has not only cleared up any possible doubts about the alleged unconstitutionality of State immunities and it has discarded any possible contradictions that these immunities might have with art. 24.1 of the Spanish Constitution.. Judgment 107/1992 has also directly linked the right to due process of law with the correct jurisdictional application of the international rules to which art. 21.2 of the LOPJ remits. The Constitutional Court feels that extending immunity from enforcement to foreign State property beyond the provisions of Public International Law violates the right to due process because it limits the right to enforcement of judgments without any legal support. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court points out that when the rules of Public International Law impose absolute immunity from enforcement, the aforementioned right is not violated. That in these cases, this right might be guaranteed by diplomatic protection or, as a last resort, by an assumption by the forum State of its duty to satisfy judicially mandated obligations when the absence of enforcement of these might imply undue sacrifice for an individual contrary to the principle of equality before public burdens. Therefore it seems wise for the Spanish State to establish some procedure which would prevent the recognition of immunity would also be highly recommendable for Spain to enact a statute containing a list of exceptions to State immunity as soon as possible. It is the executive branch, therefore, that should resolve this situation by proposing a bill on this issue and perhaps, as a complementary measure, by ratifying the European Convention on State Immunity.


2019 ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Anniek de Ruijter

The main thrust of this last chapter is that, while the EU’s power in public health and health care is expanding, the current constitutional doctrines for constraining EU power in the field of human health are not designed specifically with human health in mind and therefore are not capable of safeguarding the values and rights that are intrinsically connected to human health law and policy. The constitutional setting of the EU affects the place and protection of values and rights in EU health law that are central to the health law of the Member States—values and rights such as human dignity, equality, and solidarity. At Member State level, EU law affects health law, as it is approached as a barrier to trade, whereas at EU level, health law is re-created, but its inherent values are often depoliticized through science or lose significance in light of ‘higher’ internal market objectives. If the EU is expanding its powers in human health, and there are constitutional constraints to offer fundamental rights protections to individuals and populations, the legitimacy of EU power in health can be questioned. Hence, considering the reciprocal relationship of health policy with fundamental rights and values, EU health policy has an important role to play in the legitimacy of the EU political system itself, and this might involve taking a step back from its growing power in the field of human health.


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