scholarly journals The Roots of Canadian Law in Canada

2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ralston Saul

Abstract This article asks the Canadian legal community to look beyond the standard historical viewpoint that roots Canadian law in the British common law and French civil law traditions. The author discusses the historical foundations of Canadian law in a uniquely Canadian context, beginning with the earliest interactions between the First Nations and the Europeans. Drawing on the research outlined in his recent book, A Fair Country, the author challenges his audience to think of Canadian law as far more than the local implementation of foreign legal traditions. While Canada has freely borrowed from various legal traditions, the application of law in Canada has been a unique process intimately tied to Canadian history. The author calls on us to recognize a distinctly Canadian legal tradition which has grown out of Aboriginal law and subsequent local experience while being influenced by, but by no means limited to, common law and civil law traditions.

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Poku Adusei

This article provides comprehensive insights into the study of the Ghana legal system as an academic discipline in the law faculties in Ghana. It urges the view that the study of the Ghana legal system, as an academic discipline, should be transsystemic. Transsystemic pedagogy consists in the introduction of ideas, structures and principles which may be drawn from different legal traditions such as civil law, common law, religion-based law, African law and socialist law traditions to influence the study of law. Transsystemia involves teaching law ‘across,’ ‘through,’ and ‘beyond’ disciplinary fixations associated with a particular legal system. It is a mode of scholarship that defies biased allegiance to one legal tradition in order to foster cross-cultural dialogue among legal traditions. It involves a study of law that re-directs focus from one concerned with ‘pure’ legal system to a discourse that is grounded on multiple legal traditions.


This chapter examines the relations between rhetoric and law across cultures, grounding the discussion in U.S. common law, Latin American Civil law, and Asian law. It also explores the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a model of developing “international” or “universal” approaches to law and human rights. It concludes by discussing recent events of international law involving intellectual property and global communications.


Author(s):  
Daniel Gervais

This chapter reviews the emergence of intellectual property (IP) norms in the areas of copyright, trademarks, patents, and designs in Canadian law from the early days of the Dominion’s complex relationship with British IP statutes and policy to a time of progressive independence from those statutes. It then reviews more recent changes, some of which were made to bring Canada’s laws into line with major international registration systems. Canada has also been ready to experiment with variations on IP themes. This is visible both in statutes and in decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada. The impact of the bijural nature of Canada’s legal system and its proximity to the United States are also discussed: Canada has integrated civil law notions into an edifice constructed mostly of common law bricks, and must confront demands from its most important trading partner in adapting its intellectual property framework.


2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 662-663

Eric Tymoigne of Lewis and Clark College reviews “Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages to Bretton Woods,” edited by David Fox and Wolfgang Ernst. The Econlit abstract for this book begins: “Thirty-three papers, most previously presented at conferences held in Cambridge in 2011 and 2012 and supported by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung, provide a history of some of the main topics in the monetary law of the civil law and common law systems at different stages of its development over the past eight hundred years, from the Middle Ages until the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944.”


Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-173
Author(s):  
Sune Sønderberg Mortensen

This study compares the use of interjections by the defence lawyers in an American and a Danish criminal trial during their direct-examination of their clients, i.e. the defendants. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses it is shown that the Danish lawyer uses interjections much more frequently than the American lawyer, and that the interjections used by the American lawyer tend to have different interactional functions than those used by the Danish lawyer. Thus, while the American lawyer practices a composed and transactional style of interaction, the Danish lawyer adopts a fairly loose and casual style. The interactional styles of the two lawyers, as seen through their use of interjections, are discussed and explained as reflections of central cultural traits of the two countries’ legal traditions, drawing, amongst others, on the basic divide between common law adversarialism and civil law inquisitorialism.


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter explains briefly the origins and development of the common law tradition in order to better understand the rise of judicial review in the seven common law countries discussed in this volume. The common law legal tradition is characterized historically, in public law, by limited, constitutional government and by forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In private law, the common law tradition is characterized by judge-made case law, which is the primary source of the law, instead of a massive code being the primary source of the law. The common law tradition is also characterized by reliance on the institution of trial by jury. Judges, rather than scholars, are the key figures who are revered in the common law legal tradition, and this is one of the key things that distinguishes the common law legal tradition from the civil law legal tradition. The common law legal tradition emphasizes judicial power, which explains why it has led to judicial review in the countries studied in this volume. It is the prevailing legal tradition in the four countries with the oldest systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation: the United States, Canada, Australia, and India. Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in these four countries is very much shaped by common law attitudes about the roles of judges.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Mahendra Pal Singh ◽  
Niraj Kumar

Examination of Indian legal history illustrates the presence of multiple legal orders that coexisted in India through the ages. Moreover, certain ‘modern’ conceptions of law were present in similar forms in India before the medieval period, contrary to Western assumptions. Largely ignoring these legal traditions, the British attempted to re-give law and legal systems to the Indians. This was part of the larger project of ideologically justifying the presence of the British Raj in India. The British used India’s extant legal diversity to argue for the lack of a dominant legal tradition, leading to the introduction of British common law as the law of the land.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (S1) ◽  
pp. 63-70
Author(s):  
Russell A. Miller

In an essay from 1998 the comparative law scholar Pierre Legrand asked the question “are civilians educable?” It was a theme that had preoccupied him for some years as he agonized over what he regarded as the intolerant, totalizing, and normalizing manner in which civilian legal systems and their acolytes encounter other legal traditions. He had documented, for example, the ways in which Quebec's new 1994 Civil Code constructively sought to suppress and exclude the significant and historically relevant Anglophone community in Quebec. Legrand argued that this domineering posture is a product of the civil law's cosmological and autarkic mentality. “The difficulty,” Legrand lamented, “is that the civil law mind … is reflexively imperialistic … because of its penchant for universalization.” Far more than his disquiet over the precarious future of Quebec's Anglophone community, Legrand came to be concerned about the fate of the English common law tradition in the face of the European Union's convergence agenda. This was, to Legrand's mind, an apocalyptic confrontation between England's still-proud legal culture and Europe's horsemen of convergence: the ECJ, the Commission, the Parliament. With increasing distress Legrand turned his attention to the way in which the European Community (and later the Union) “is liable to achieve … the marginalization of one of the subcultures that have defined western Europe historically.” He would go on to insist that “European legal systems are not converging” and to raise ever-more strident objections to the idea of a European civil code. This would not cease until Legrand had written “Antivonbar,” an incendiary manifesto aimed at salvaging the English common law from what he viewed as the Union's closed-fisted and violent politics of supremacy, which had taken the form of the proposed European Civil Code.


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