scholarly journals The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Anand

The rules regarding shareholder rights plans, also known as “poison pills”, ensure that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time has grown in length from twenty to thirty-five days and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) have recently proposed a 120-day period during which takeover bids would remain open. In light of the historical rationale of takeover bid law to protect the interests of target shareholders, this article argues that the legal regime should not allow an extensive bid period of 120 days. While other aspects of the CSA proposal are sound, a lengthy bid period disadvantages both target shareholders and bidders and will ultimately deter bids from occurring.

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Katherine I. Gleason ◽  
Mark S. Klock

Dead hand poison pills prevent potential hostile acquirers from circumventing a poison pill with a proxy contest whereby newly elected directors could redeem the pill. Dead hand provisions only permit continuing directors to redeem. Shareholder rights advocates and legal scholars have criticized dead hand poison pills as an assault on shareholder governance, but economic theory suggests potential shareholder benefits. We provide the first empirical study of dead hand poison pills. We find that adoption of dead hand poison pills leads to gains for shareholders and losses for bondholders. This supports Schwert’s (2000) conjecture that poison pills provide shareholders with better premiums rather than entrench ineffective managers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 353-362
Author(s):  
Marieke Wyckaert

This paper explores takeover bids in Europe in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. The search for a balance between maintaining the open market as a European achievement and the protection of national security and public order is not a new phenomenon. This search is not easy with the future FDI Regulation and will raise additional questions.The FDI Regulation became very concrete thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic: At the beginning of the crisis, the Commission presented a Communication setting out guidelines for FDI to be applied prior to the regulation.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Susan L. Kulp ◽  
Karen L. Sedatole

ABSTRACT We investigate whether boards of directors adjust compensation contracts to lengthen a CEO's decision horizon, and if the use of such contract adjustments depends on the levels of external (i.e., shareholder-based) and internal (i.e., board-based) CEO monitoring. Based on insights from the career-concerns literature, we identify short-horizon CEOs as those nearing retirement, at a firm with a current earnings decline or loss, and/or with an impending job change. We find that firms with a CEO identified as having a short-horizon place greater contract weight on forward-looking information. This horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is less pronounced when there is greater external monitoring (i.e., as proxied by a high level of shareholder rights), consistent with the intuition that increased shareholder rights mitigate CEO entrenchment, leading to less myopic decision making, independent of a contract adjustment. However, we also find that the horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is more pronounced when there is greater internal monitoring (i.e., as proxied by characteristics of the board), consistent with the intuition that increased employment risk from more intense internal monitoring itself creates a demand for increased incentive weights as a means of compensating the CEO for the increased risk. Data Availability: Data used for this study are derived from publicly available databases and proxy statements. JEL Classifications: M52; M41; J33.


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 160-163
Author(s):  
Darlene M. Andert

The future will provide the lesson about the effects of Board declassification. Yet, without question, declassification does degrade the synergy needed to build learning and decision-making symmetry, and it makes these part-time professionals, a temporary and potentially short-term member of a decision-making community. As a poison pill, this strategy remains questionable. Clearly, the alchemy of providing excellent oversight that generates great business outcomes is not the mandate of declassification. Declassification is a re-structuring strategy only. Real alchemy comes from a great deal of knowledge,, and sprinkle of luck, but remains unlinked to potentially changing the seats in the chairs after each election. Perhaps corporate governance restructuring should begin to address the real problem, which is positioning Directors to be knowledgeable, accountable, and ethical fiduciaries


JURIST ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Oleg V. Makarov ◽  

Taking into account the historical and legal aspects, the article examines the current problems of improving the system of contractual relations of construction activities. The doctrine’s lack of attention to the study of contractual relations on construction, taking into account the combination of socio-economic factors and trends in the development of civil and legal regulation, has been revealed. The theoretical development of the problems of unification and differentiation of contractual relations on construction taking into account the specifics of construction and installation works was noted. The improvement of the civil-legal regime of contractual construction activities is seen in the adoption of the consolidation act.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Sindico

This paper analyses the environmental integrity, the nature and the political relevance of the Copenhagen Accord. According to the first two parameters, the Copenhagen Accord is not satisfactory. From a political point of view the conclusion is slightly different, albeit not positive. This paper concludes arguing that after the Copenhagen Conference the future of the international climate change legal regime is likely to be more fragmented, the Accord being one further piece of the global carbon puzzle.


Author(s):  
Andreone Gemma

The role of the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) in the international law of the sea remains a controversial issue two decades after the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) came into force. This chapter examines the evolution of the concept and its juridical nature, and the legal regime applicable to the EEZ. It considers the future development of the EEZ legal regime, exploring the principal controversial features that may influence its course.


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