scholarly journals Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature

2009 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georges Dionne
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
The State ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
The World ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Private And Public

ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a survey of the two main problems of information in insurance markets: moral hazard and adverse selection. Both arise because the insurers are less informed than the insureds. Moral hazard is explained by the fact that the insurer cannot observe, ex ante, the activities of the insured who may have the incentive to change the state of the world in response to insurance coverage. Adverse selection arises since the insurer cannot determine without costs, the risks inherent in the individuals. After defining formally these two problems, we shall present different insurance strategies (private and public) with a view to correct them. In conclusion we shall propose some avenues of research.

ESPORTS TOURNAMENTS AS A FORM OF STRATEGIC PROMOTION OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (7) ◽  
pp. 19-23
Author(s):  
V. V. VELIKOROSSOV ◽  
◽  
Yu. M. BRYUKHANOV ◽  
A. O. TITOVA ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
World Economy ◽  
The State ◽  
Generation Z ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
Analytical Studies ◽  
International Consulting ◽  
The World ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Effective Integration ◽  
Official Data

The article is dedicated to eSports as a new and promising sector of the world economy that provides businesses with effective integration scenarios. This contributes to the development of cooperation of private and public investors with eSports holdings, as well as to the involvement of the generation Z audience in promising consumption of interested companies’ products. The article examines the current trends in the development of the eSports market using analytical studies of international consulting companies. The official data characterizing the state of the eSports market in Russia are also represented. The article provides information about the model of monetization of eSports and its perspective directions. In conclusion, the article makes the necessary inferences to assess the prospects of such areas of the economy as eSports, both for the industry of interactive entertainment and for representatives of other market sectors.

scholarly journals Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 174-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gharad Bryan ◽  
Dean Karlan ◽  
Jonathan Zinman
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)

The Grain Trade

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Temin
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
The State ◽  
Grain Trade ◽  
Wheat Market ◽  
The Mediterranean

This chapter explores the Mediterranean wheat market. The Romans made many products, from wines to pottery and glass, but wheat was the most widely traded commodity during those times. Shipped from distant provinces, the grain changed hands many times before it reached Rome. This trade was organized by the state and private merchants who did not have the benefit of modern means of transportation or communication, and merchants faced high transaction costs from several sources. The Roman government cleared the Mediterranean of pirates in 67 BCE, reducing greatly one major source of risk for merchants. However, merchants in Rome still had to rely on potentially corrupt agents operating in faraway provinces for months at a time. This arrangement created adverse selection and moral hazard problems from the asymmetric information available to merchants and their agents.

scholarly journals Social Preservation of Traditional Administration of Indigenous Peoples — The Ho Tribe in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-151
Author(s):  
Christina Deogam
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Social Structure ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
The State ◽  
Linguistic Identity ◽  
The West ◽  
Cultural Traditions ◽  
The World ◽  
Private And Public

Indigenous peoples have distinguished cultural traditions and linguistic identity. Across the world, Indigenous peoples have always asked the State to recognise their social structure and opportunities to preserve their traditional lifestyles. The issues at stake are their rights over habitat and natural resources and the need to curtail private and public sector exploitation through alien hands. Due to the need to survive, helplessness and systematically forced assimilation, the traditional fabric of their culture are being distorted and defaced. This study deals with the concerns and issues relating to the protection of identity, tradition and customs of Ho tribe that inhabits the West Singhbhum in the State of Jharkhand in India.

scholarly journals Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (7) ◽  
pp. 2643-2682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin R Handel
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Large Firm ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Major Change ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Health Insurance Markets ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated, these improved individual-level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting, leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection. (JEL D82, G22, I13)

scholarly journals Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Roger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Soft Information ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Strategic Complements ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit and transfer become strategic complements; this is rooted in the nonseparability of the problem. (JEL D82, D86)

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