Causally Driven Analogs

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Neander
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Representational System ◽  
Similarity Relations ◽  
Intuitive Appeal ◽  
The World ◽  
State Changes ◽  
Perceptual Systems

In chapter 8, the author brings causal, teleosemantic and resemblance theories of content together by extending CT (as presented in chapter 7) to explain how homomorphism (more specifically, analog relations, or second-order similarity relations) can play a content-constitutive role. While the idea that some systems have the function to model the world might explain why a natural representational system counts as a representational system, it is neutral between iconic mental representation and a more language-like version of Mentalese. The author then addresses traditional objections to resemblance theories of content, to show how they can now be met. She argues that sensory-perceptual systems can have functions to produce inner state changes that are caused by and the analogs of their contents, and that this casts light on the intuitive appeal of resemblance theories of mental representation, and that it permits some sensory-perceptual simples to represent novel and non-existent contents. Chapter 8 also addresses the fourth and fifth content-determinacy challenges: why does R have the content there’s C and not there’s Q, when (iv) C is a determinate of Q, or (v) C is a determinable for Q? In the last few sections, Berkeley’s problem of abstraction and two contemporary strategies for its solution are discussed, insofar as it concerns the representation of perceptible properties (e.g., shape and color).

A Mark of the Mental

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Neander
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
The World ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ancient Problem ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
State Changes ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
Information Processing Approach ◽  
The Way

How do thoughts get to be about the world, how do they refer to their contents? This book tackles the most tractable part of this ancient problem by offering a theory of original intentionality for (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations. To pave the way, Neander discusses the role played by the notions of representation and representational content in cognitive science, and explain how it stems from combining a standard biological strategy for explaining how bodies and brains operate or function with a mainstream information-processing approach to explaining cognitive (including perceptual) capacities. The author also argues that this supports an informational version of teleosemantics, and develops the theory of content in three stages. First she elucidates how sensory-perceptual systems have response functions, and why the sensory-perceptual representations they produce may be said to refer to the causes in response to which they are, in that sense, supposed to be produced. Second, she explains how sensory-perceptual systems might therefore have functions to produce inner state changes that are both caused by and the analogs of their contents, and thus how analog relations (i.e., relations of second-order similarity) as well as causal-information relations can be content-constitutive. Finally, she discusses the notorious problem of distal content and offers a solution that ismost suited for (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations. Along the way, the author solves six aspects of the content-indeterminacy problem.

Imaginings

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Group Violence ◽  
The World ◽  
The Universe

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 

Numerical symbols as explanations of human perceptual experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Barner
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Number Words ◽  
The World ◽  
Symbolic Systems ◽  
Perceptual Systems

Why did humans develop precise systems for measuring experience, like numbers, clocks, andcalendars? I argue that precise representational systems were constructed by earlier generationsof humans because they recognized that their noisy perceptual systems were not capturingdistinctions that existed in the world. Abstract symbolic systems did not arise from perceptualrepresentations, but instead were constructed to describe and explain perceptual experience. Byanalogy, I argue that when children learn number words, they do not rely on noisy perceptualsystems, but instead acquire these words as units in a broader system of procedures, whosemeanings are ultimately defined by logical relations to one another, not perception.

Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order

Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
The World ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract In what sense do people doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first-order and second-order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of their concepts. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concepts. Many cases of second-order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the article by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second-order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably has sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.

Knowledge from the Outside

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-79
Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
Obvious Source

Knowledge may be examined from the third-person perspective, as psychologists and sociologists do, or it may be examined from the first-person perspective, as each of us does when we reflect on what we ought to believe. This chapter takes the third-person perspective. One obvious source of knowledge is perception, and some general features of how our perceptual systems are able to pick up information about the world around us are highlighted. The role of the study of visual illusions in this research is an important focus of the chapter. Our ability to draw out the consequences of things we know by way of inference is another important source of knowledge, and some general features of how inference achieves its successes are discussed. Structural similarities between the ways in which perception works and the ways in which inference works are highlighted.

1. What is perception?

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Brian Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Word Perception ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
The World ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
Extract Information

The word ‘perception’ can be used in two different ways. It can refer to our experience of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling objects and individuals around us. It can also refer to the processes that allow us to extract information from the patterns of energy that impinge on our sense organs. Thinking about perception as a set of processes has the advantage that it includes situations where there is no subjective experience. ‘What is perception?’ explains that sometimes our perceptual systems can be fooled and we experience illusions. Is this because of past experience and our knowledge of the world, or is it that we are not extracting the information in the patterns of energy reaching our senses?

scholarly journals Divinity, Noēsis, and Aristotelian Friendship

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-29
Author(s):  
John A. Houston
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
Human Community ◽  
Rational Nature ◽  
Living Together ◽  
The World ◽  
Virtuous Activity

Aristotle's NE X claim that the best human life is one devoted to contemplation (theoria) seems in tension with his emphasis elsewhere on our essentially political nature, and more specifically, his claim that friendship is necessary for our flourishing. For, if our good can be in principle realized apart from the human community, there seems little reason to suggest we 'need' friends, as he clearly does in NE VIII & IX. I argue that central to Aristotle's NE X discussion of contemplation is the claim that our chief good accords with whatever is 'most divine' in us, viz. our rational nature (NE 1177b2-18). Thus, the best human life involves the excellent exercise of our rational capacities. I distinguish two ways in which human beings flourish through exercising their rationality. The first is in the activity of theoria. The second, I argue, can be found in the virtuous activity of complete friendship (teleia philia). For Aristotle the truest form of friendship is an expression of rationality. It is characterized not merely by our living together, but conversing, and sharing one another's thoughts (NE 1170b12-14). Examining Aristotle's notion of a friend as 'another self (alios autos), I argue that through friendship human beings come to better know themselves and the world in which they live. Complete friendship involves a (uniquely human) second-order awareness of oneself in another, and through this awareness our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed through the presence of other minds. Thus, the highest form of Aristotelian friendship is an intellectual activity through which we attain an analogue of the divine contemplation of the unmoved mover, thereby living with respect to what is most divine in us, but doing so in accordance with our uniquely rational-political nature.

Putting the world in mind: The case of mental representation of quantity

Cognition ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 104088 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naama Katzin ◽  
David Katzin ◽  
Adi Rosén ◽  
Avishai Henik ◽  
Moti Salti
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
The World

The translator as cartographer

Target ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Leonora Min Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Text ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
English Translation ◽  
Cognitive Maps ◽  
Systematic Investigation ◽  
Spatial Layout ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Spatial Cues ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The World

Abstract The concept of a cognitive map has been borrowed from psychology by literary scholars to denote the mental representation of the spatial layout of (a) storyworld(s). The classic Chinese novel 紅樓夢 Hongloumeng ‘The Story of the Stone’ (also known as The Dream of the Red Chamber) is particularly well-known for its topographic representation of a storyworld of self-contained totality and detailed veracity. Using David Hawkes’s English translation of the novel and various materials from his notebooks, this article demonstrates the translator’s (mental) cartographic effort to conjure up ‘maps in mind’ in response to the textual spatial cues. I argue that Hawkes’s cognitive maps offer explanations to some translational performances that have been too readily glossed over as insignificant. The article also aims to chart a new path forward for systematic investigation into the significance of the translator’s imaginative participation in ‘the world inside the text’, for the sake of an enriched understanding of translation, both as a product and a process.

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