scholarly journals Toleranse og anerkjenning eller: Kva vil det seia å verdsetja mangfald?

Author(s):  
Hans Marius Hansteen

Even though “toleration” and “recognition” designate opposing attitudes (to tolerate something, implies a negative stance towards it, whereas recognition seems to imply a positive one), the concepts do not constitute mutually exclusive alternatives. However, “toleration” is often associated with liberal universalism, focusing on individual rights, whereas “recognition” often connotes communitarian perspectives, focusing on relations and identity. This paper argues that toleration may be founded on recognition, and that recognition may imply toleration. In outlining a differentiated understanding of the relationship between toleration and recognition, it seems apt to avoid an all-to-general dichotomy between universalism and particularism or, in other words, to reach beyond the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in political philosophy.The paper takes as its starting point the view that the discussion on toleration and diversity in intercultural communication is one of the contexts where it seems important to get beyond the liberal/communitarian dichotomy. Some basic features of Rainer Forst’s theory of toleration and Axel Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are presented, in order to develop a more substantial understanding of the relationship between the concepts of toleration and recognition. One lesson from Forst is that toleration is a normatively dependent concept, i.e., that it is impossible to deduce principles for toleration and its limits from a theory of toleration as such. A central lesson from Honneth is that recognition – understood as a basic human need – is always conflictual and therefore dynamic.Accordingly, a main point in the paper is that the theory of struggles for and about recognition (where struggles for designates struggles within an established order of recognition, and struggles about designates struggles that challenge established orders of recognition) may clarify what is at stake in conflicts concerning toleration and its limits. At the same time, Honneth’s theory of the need for recognition seems to be a source for the kind of argumentative justifications that a just toleration are dependent on, according to Forst.Another important point in the paper is that toleration (pace Forst) is a practice or attitude that implies taking a stance, but in a differentiated way, and that this presuppose a reflective distance towards one’s own positions. To be tolerant means saying “yes” to something (the beliefs and practices that one endorses), saying “no” to something (the intolerable), but also being able to say “no, but…” to something (that which is tolerated). Intolerance means saying “no” without justifiable reasons, whereas misguided tolerance means accepting something without justifiable reasons – both attitudes may be taken to indicate that one lacks proper understanding of the reasons for holding the viewpoints that one actively endorses.In discussing of Honneth’s theory of recognition, I argue that an ability to take a stance in a differentiated way is seminal, if struggles for and about recognition are to unfold productively. In all spheres of mutual recognition (primary, secondary and tertial groups), the potential for conflicts seems to rely on an unavoidable tension between identification with the other and identification of the other as another. This is the reason why recognition – in Honneth’s sense – seems to imply toleration, or at least is reliant on the same kind of self-reflective distance and ability to differentiate that is constitutive of toleration according to Forst.Finally, I argue that the concept of “communal values” that Honneth refers to in the context of “solidarity” cannot be taken to designate a set of substantial values that are constitutive of community, but rather that important forms of recognition take place in a social space and shape cultural codes that are both the results of and the subjects of conflict. Thus while “culture” is conflictual and complex, “value pluralism” – including diversity of beliefs and practices – may be productive. In this context, toleration is not about avoiding or resolving conflict, but about establishing the conditions for productive conflicts, enabling an ongoing creation and reappraisal of values.

Author(s):  
Hans Marius Hansteen

Even though “toleration” and “recognition” designate opposing attitudes (to tolerate something, implies a negative stance towards it, whereas recognition seems to imply a positive one), the concepts do not constitute mutually exclusive alternatives. However, “toleration” is often associated with liberal universalism, focusing on individual rights, whereas “recognition” often connotes communitarian perspectives, focusing on relations and identity. This paper argues that toleration may be founded on recognition, and that recognition may imply toleration. In outlining a differentiated understanding of the relationship between toleration and recognition, it seems apt to avoid an all-to-general dichotomy between universalism and particularism or, in other words, to reach beyond the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in political philosophy.The paper takes as its starting point the view that the discussion on toleration and diversity in intercultural communication is one of the contexts where it seems important to get beyond the liberal/communitarian dichotomy. Some basic features of Rainer Forst’s theory of toleration and Axel Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are presented, in order to develop a more substantial understanding of the relationship between the concepts of toleration and recognition. One lesson from Forst is that toleration is a normatively dependent concept, i.e., that it is impossible to deduce principles for toleration and its limits from a theory of toleration as such. A central lesson from Honneth is that recognition – understood as a basic human need – is always conflictual and therefore dynamic.Accordingly, a main point in the paper is that the theory of struggles for and about recognition (where struggles for designates struggles within an established order of recognition, and struggles about designates struggles that challenge established orders of recognition) may clarify what is at stake in conflicts concerning toleration and its limits. At the same time, Honneth’s theory of the need for recognition seems to be a source for the kind of argumentative justifications that a just toleration are dependent on, according to Forst.Another important point in the paper is that toleration (pace Forst) is a practice or attitude that implies taking a stance, but in a differentiated way, and that this presuppose a reflective distance towards one’s own positions. To be tolerant means saying “yes” to something (the beliefs and practices that one endorses), saying “no” to something (the intolerable), but also being able to say “no, but…” to something (that which is tolerated). Intolerance means saying “no” without justifiable reasons, whereas misguided tolerance means accepting something without justifiable reasons – both attitudes may be taken to indicate that one lacks proper understanding of the reasons for holding the viewpoints that one actively endorses.In discussing of Honneth’s theory of recognition, I argue that an ability to take a stance in a differentiated way is seminal, if struggles for and about recognition are to unfold productively. In all spheres of mutual recognition (primary, secondary and tertial groups), the potential for conflicts seems to rely on an unavoidable tension between identification with the other and identification of the other as another. This is the reason why recognition – in Honneth’s sense – seems to imply toleration, or at least is reliant on the same kind of self-reflective distance and ability to differentiate that is constitutive of toleration according to Forst.Finally, I argue that the concept of “communal values” that Honneth refers to in the context of “solidarity” cannot be taken to designate a set of substantial values that are constitutive of community, but rather that important forms of recognition take place in a social space and shape cultural codes that are both the results of and the subjects of conflict. Thus while “culture” is conflictual and complex, “value pluralism” – including diversity of beliefs and practices – may be productive. In this context, toleration is not about avoiding or resolving conflict, but about establishing the conditions for productive conflicts, enabling an ongoing creation and reappraisal of values.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.


2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-68
Author(s):  
Gordana Djeric

This text is part of a research conducted under the working title "What do we talk about when we are silent and what are we silent about when we are talking? - premises for the anthropology of silence about the nearest past." In the first part the author investigates the meaning of silence in the Croatian and Serbian press right before and during Croatia's Operation Storm. The ratio between silence, suppression of information and forgetting, on the one hand, and social memory, on the other, has been elaborated in the final part of the text by following reports about the anniversaries of Operation Storm in both Croatian and Serbian publics. The starting point lies in the belief that the phenomenon of silence (and suppression of information), being an immanent part of each discourse, represents an important factor in the creation of social relationships and system of value models, that it has important communication and cognitive functions and that the performance character lies in its essence. In short, silence makes it possible to form the prevailing image about this event, even if it does not construct it indirectly - through speech. The author has elaborated on the meaning of silence in the context of Operation Storm partly because studies about the breakup of Yugoslavia frequently mention silence as a manipulation strategy employed by some of the sides in the conflict (or analysts dealing with Yugoslav topics), while not a single study systematically investigates the semantic of silence and suppression of information in these conflicts. Most importantly, taking into account the frequency of direct silence in the newspaper discourse and rhetoric strategies that point at silence indirectly from the context and discourse, the author focuses on the relationship between the event (situation) and silence. In order to shed light on the way in which Operation Storm is remembered, i.e. forgotten, in the stakeholders' publics and political imageries, she follows the dailies - Vecernje Novosti Politika, Danas (Belgrade) - Vecernji List, Jutarnji List, Magazin supplement of the Jutarnji List (Zagreb), as well as texts about Operation Storm in weeklies such as the NIN and Vreme of Belgrade or Globus of Zagreb in the period between August 2, 1995 and mid-August 2006.


PMLA ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caryl Emerson

Mikhail Bakhtin's work on Dostoevsky is well known. Less familiar, perhaps, is Bakhtin's attitude toward the other great Russian nineteenth-century novelist, Leo Tolstoy. This essay explores that “Tolstoy connection,” both as a means for interrogating Bakhtin's analytic categories and as a focus for evaluating the larger tradition of “Tolstoy versus Dostoevsky.” Bakhtin is not a particularly good reader of Tolstoy. But he does make provocative use of the familiar binary model to pursue his most insistent concerns: monologism versus dialogism, the relationship of authors to their characters, the role of death in literature and life, and the concept of the self. Bakhtin's comments on these two novelists serve as a good starting point for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Bakhtinian model in general and suggest ways one might recast the dialogue between Tolstoy and Dostoevsky on somewhat different, more productive ground.


Author(s):  
Eduardo Simões

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein Tractatus deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the Tractatus in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the Tractatus, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.


2019 ◽  
pp. 37-52
Author(s):  
Moisés de Lemos Martins

The self and the other. Totality and the infinite. In other words, totality as the discourse of the self which erases the other; and the infinite as the discourse of the other, which constrains and imposes reservations on the discourse of totality. I encounter the other in a face-to-face relationship, who thereby starts to exist within me, becomes part of me, constitutes me. This is the path whereby we fall in love, and can also be the path of compassion and solidarity. But the relationship with the other is not exhausted in the encounter. The encounter with the other is often followed by erasure, assimilation, and even domination of the other. Strictly speaking, we can say that the other can never be reduced to the self, i.e. may never be erased within me. And if the issue at stake is to ignore the other, or segregate, discriminate and dominate him, this implies exerting a form of violence over him. This is my starting point and my focus on discussing the “refugee crisis” in Europe.


2011 ◽  
pp. 17-39
Author(s):  
Matthew W. Guah

As evidence relating the reality and basic features of the application service provider (ASP) market continues to grow, there begins to be less concern about confirming that any structural economic shift has continued historically, and more concern about understanding how the ASP industry is performing, and its impacts on productivity, investment, corporate capital formation, labor force composition, and competition. The relationship between the traditional outsourcing and the “latest wave” e-sourcing on the one hand, and Internet investment productivity on the other, is at the centre of the IT strategic problem confronting corporate management in the 21st century.


Maska ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (179) ◽  
pp. 34-45
Author(s):  
Renaud Herbin

The close connection between creation, theory, and institutions is the starting point for the author’s reflection on the kinds of spaces the latter should prepare. He emphasises that of particular interest are those spaces that are established between different approaches (or rather relationships between the body, the object, and the image). In Reprendre son soufflé by Julika Mayer, the puppet and the actor form a relationship that leaves none of the participants untouched but allows their identities to be changed. Similarly, the puppeteer-dancer in Uta Gebert’s Anubis reveals himself in order to uncover the relationship which links him and the puppet: both exist solely in motion, in the zone of exchange. Bodies and objects, assembled into body-objects, seem to meet by chance in Miet Warlop’s Springville, but in the forefront is the Image, which follows a visual logic in placing the body-objects in different configurations. On the other hand, the space occupied by the body in Yngvild Aspeli’s Signaux is undefined: the actor, his puppet-double, and his phantom limb embody a feeling of strangeness and pain. In the project Anémochore, Christophe Le Blay enables the embodiment of the environment (the wind) in the image of a recorded trace, with which a dancer then engages in dance. Space is therefore something unfinished, something open, undefinable and empty, all of which applies equally to bodies, objects, and images.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Pomieciński ◽  
Agnieszka Chwiediuk

Roma - Others Everywhere. An Example of France and Other European CountriesWhy Europe treats Roma as “others” and why Europe is “foreign” to Roma? The starting point is the relationship of domination of one collective entity – European countries which are affiliated to the EU on the other countries (groups having the status of minorities, the most marginalized and discriminated). This dependence describes the category of foreign, developed by Marc Augé as a concept “close-another”. Following this concept, the authors of the article distinguish four criteria of analysis: endoetnonim, language, habits (routine practices) and a place for life, which show the mechanism of differentiation and domination, present in most collective entities. The proposed approach has been applied to some European countries, in particular to France, which policy of domination/ discrimination against Roma provides many wondering examples, which are still worth a fundamental rethinking of the theoretical plane. Romowie – wszędzie obcy. Przykład Francji i innych krajów europejskichDlaczego Europa traktuje Romów jak „obcych” i dlaczego Romom „obca” jest Europa? Punktem wyjścia jest relacja dominacji jednego podmiotu zbiorowego, jakim są państwa europejskie zrzeszone w UE, nad drugim, czyli grupami mającymi status mniejszości, najczęściej zmarginalizowanej oraz dyskryminowanej. Tę zależność opisuje kategoria obcego, rozwinięta przez Marca Augé jako koncepcja „bliskiego-innego”. W nawiązaniu do niej autorzy artykułu wyodrębniają cztery kryteria analizy: endoetnonim, język, zwyczaje (praktyki rutynowe) oraz miejsce do życia, które ukazują mechanizm różnicowania oraz dominowania, obecny u większości podmiotów zbiorowych. Zaproponowane podejście zostało odniesione do krajów europejskich, w szczególności do Francji, której polityka dominacji/dyskryminacji wobec Romów dostarcza wielu zastanawiających przykładów wartych nadal dogłębnego przemyślenia teoretycznego.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Giddy

In his autobiographical account of his theology Augustine Shutte (2016) clarifies how his understanding of the Christian faith has, finally, put him in conflict with orthodoxy. More recently he explains that “in the absolute distinction between creator and creature it is appropriate to see God alone (Father, Word and Spirit) on one side and Jesus and me and you on the other.” This affords us a useful starting point for a discussion of a Christian faith marked by unorthodoxy. As foil for the discussion I take Bart Ehrman’s thesis that the early development of the understanding of Jesus as “uniquely divine” is unjustified, and this undermines Christian faith. I argue in response that the cognitional dimension is only one aspect of religious faith; secondly I unpack the structural side of orthodoxy; and thirdly I introduce Shutte’s concept of salvation in terms of a fundamental human need. The uniqueness of God’s presence in Jesus implies a sectarianism unhelpful in a plural culture.


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