A History of Public Mapping

Author(s):  
Michael P. McDonald ◽  
Micah Altman

This chapter discusses the history of public mapping. The earliest reform efforts in redistricting were made possible because districts were primarily drawn out of large geographic units such as counties, which greatly simplified the redistricting task. That task grew more complex in the early 1960s, when the Supreme Court ruled that districts had to be of roughly equal population: counties would now often have to be split between two or more districts. The increasing computational demands effectively shut the public out of redistricting, since redistricting could be performed only on extremely costly computer systems. The reemergence of public mapping began in the 1990s, when states began offering public access to computer terminals loaded with their redistricting software and data. Eventually, two technological innovations by 2010 made public mapping available to the general public. Organizations and individuals are now able to leverage high-speed internet and open-source software to disseminate easy-to-use redistricting systems through the Web.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1335
Author(s):  
Pelemon Siagian ◽  
Sugandi Ishak

Baiq Nuril Maknun is accused of violating Article 27 paragraph (1) of Law Number 11 Year 2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE). In the Mataram District Court found not proven guilty, the Public Prosecutor filed an appeal with Decision Number 574K / Pid. Sus / 2018 and the Supreme Court (MA) sentenced him guilty to Baiq Nuril Maknun with 6 month prisons sentence and a Rp. 500 million. Baiq Nuril Maknun then submitted a Review (PK) with Decision Number 83PK / Pid.Sus / 2019 and the Supreme Court rejected the PK proposed by Baiq Nuril Maknun. Method research used in writing this thesis is normative legal research. The results showed that Baiq Nuril Maknun submitted an amnesty request to President Joko Widodo and was granted, Baiq Nuril Maknun was free from the snares of the law. Submission of amnesty must be selective and for certain cases that are felt by the general public, the court's decision must be able to reflect justice because it is in accordance with the Judicial Act and the Supreme Court, and judges are required to explore the values of justice in society.


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.


Author(s):  
Caitlin A. Ceryes ◽  
Christopher D. Heaney

The term “ag-gag” refers to state laws that intentionally limit public access to information about agricultural production practices, particularly livestock production. Originally created in the 1990s, these laws have recently experienced a resurgence in state legislatures. We discuss the recent history of ag-gag laws in the United States and question whether such ag-gag laws create a “chilling effect” on reporting and investigation of occupational health, community health, and food safety concerns related to industrial food animal production. We conclude with a discussion of the role of environmental and occupational health professionals to encourage critical evaluation of how ag-gag laws might influence the health, safety, and interests of day-to-day agricultural laborers and the public living proximal to industrial food animal production.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Diana Majury

In this paper, Diana Majury looks at the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent s.15 decision, R. v. Kapp, in a preliminary exploration of the different understandings of equality she sees operating in three different sites (the Supreme Court, equality advocates, and the general public). She looks at the first two sites simultaneously by offering her equality advocate’s critique of the Kapp decision, outlining where the decision falls short of the substantive equality that equality advocates have been theorizing and promoting. She then looks at media responses to the decision, responses that almost unanimously present a formal equality understanding of equality. Recognizing that media coverage provides only a very limited and partial window on public perceptions, the media coverage of Kapp nonetheless raises the spectre that the general public understands equality only to mean formal equality. This conclusion highlights the importance of Rose Vyovodic’s work in combining equality and public education and the need for that work to be continued and expanded.Dans cet article, Diana Majury examine le récent jugement R. c. Kapp de la Cour Suprême du Canada en rapport avec l’article 15 pour faire une exploration préliminaire des compréhensions diverses de l’égalité qu’elle constate être en jeu dans trois lieux différents (la Cour Suprême, chez les défenseurs de l’égalité et chez le grand public). Elle examine les deux premiers lieux simultanément en présentant sa critique du jugement Kapp en tant que défenseure de l’égalité, exposant en quoi le jugement n’atteint pas l’égalité de fond au sujet de laquelle théorisent et que préconisent les défenseurs de l’égalité. Puis elle examine les réactions médiatiques au jugement, réactions qui présentent presque unanimement une compréhension d’égalité comme égalité formelle. Tout en reconnaissant que la couverture médiatique ne présente qu’une fenêtre très limitée et partielle sur les perceptions du public, la couverture médiatique de Kapp laisse tout de même pressentir que le grand public ne conçoit l’égalité que dans le sens d’égalité formelle. Cette conclusion fait ressortir l’importance de l’oeuvre de Rose Vyovodic qui combinait égalité et éducation du public et le besoin que cette oeuvre se poursuive et grandisse.


1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.


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