scholarly journals „Kiri ütleb, et peab tuginema vene teadusele…“ ÜK(b)P Keskkomitee 16. juuli 1947. aasta kinnine kiri professorite N. Kljujeva ja G. Roskini süüasjas ja selle ajaloolisest kontekstist / Closed letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of July 16, 1947: Its historical context

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (20) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tõnu Tannberg

The main sources of Estonian history are predominantly stored in the Estonian archives, yet it is also impossible to ignore archival sources located in the archives of Russia when it comes to studying most topics of importance, particularly as regards the periods of the Russian Empire and the Estonian SSR. This article is concerned with the closed letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of July 16, 1947 regarding the accusations against Nina Klyueva and Grigorij Roskin that served as an excuse for Joseph Stalin to initiate a massive anti-Western campaign directed and to establish an official Soviet patriotism in society. The closed letter of 1947 is one of the key documents that enables us to understand the circumstances of the internal politics of the late Stalinist USSR in the context of the developments leading to a confrontation of superpowers – the Cold War.  The organisational format of launching the campaign consisted in the so-called Courts of Honour that had been created upon the decree of the Central Committee of the AUCP(b) from March 28, 1947 and tasked with revealing “antipatriotic” transgressions and deeds “directed against state and society” and with public condemnation of “those found guilty”. The Soviet Court of Honour was designed as a form of instructing society, a new means of restraining the growing dissent; it was to meant to discipline the officials of the Party and state apparatuses and particularly to keep the intellectuals within the required ideological limits. The first who were picked by Stalin as a warning example to be given a public condemnation were Professors Klyueva and Roskin, a married couple who already before the war had developed the so-called Preparation KR that was considered a promising cure for cancer. In 1946, the manuscript of a recently finalised monograph by Klyueva and Roskin on the topic of Preparation KR and a vial of the medicine were given to Americans under the auspices of scientific information exchange. This had been sanctioned by the authorities, but at the beginning of 1947 Stalin decided that it should be treated as betrayal of a state secret. Thus, an excuse, as well as the first “culprits” of a suitable category, was found to initiate a campaign against “those grovelling before the West“. It was launched on a broader scale with the help of the closed letter. The closed letter – an informative and instructive letter sent to the Party organisations by the Party’s Central Committee explained topical issues of internal and external politics and, if necessary, also provided concrete guidelines for action for the Party apparatus – was an important control mechanism for the Soviet leadership and remained a weapon in the arsenal of the Party apparatus until the Communist Party’s withdrawal from the limelight in 1990. The closed letter was a means for the Kremlin to implement a new policy at speed, mobilise the society, or exert an ideological influence on it, if required.   Also in 1947, the closed letter proved a suitable means for Stalin to forward orders and information to guarantee the successful implementation of the anti-Western campaign. Preparations for the letter had been started by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the UCP(b) in May 1947, but the final polishes were given to it by Stalin who signed the document on July 16, 1947. After that, the letter was copied and sent to government institutions, party organisations of the Soviet republics, oblasts and krais according to a detailed plan of dissemination drawn up by the Central Committee of the UCP(b) – 9,500 numbered copies all in all. It was strictly forbidden to make additional copies of the letter; the existing copies were to be sent back to the Central Committee by a certain date upon which they were destroyed.  The discussion of the closed letter in the republics, oblasts, krais and relevant institutions followed a pattern established in Moscow lasting mostly during the period from July to October 1947. The public was not informed about the closed letter, but keywords of the letter that were highlighted in the discussions – blabbers, grovelers, anti-patriotism, etc. – started to appear in the media. In this way, an ideological background was created for the social processes that would follow in the coming years and peak in the Estonian SSR in the year 1950.  The campaign against “the grovelers before the West” resulted in a voluntary isolation of the Soviet Union from the rest of the world and seclusion behind the Iron Curtain. Its most disastrous results concerned research contacts that were virtually abolished on all levels. Research was even more clearly subjugated to the controlling political power, academic scholarly discussion was eliminated and the researchers endorsed by the Kremlin had a chance to crush their opponents. The secrecy in society increased to a considerable extent. Naturally, all these processes did not fail to influence the Sovietisation of the research and cultural life in the post-war Estonian SSR. Awareness of the closed letter, as well as the more general effect and backstage circumstances of the anti-Western campaign conducted by the Kremlin, is certainly necessary when studying Sovietisation in the Estonian SSR as it highlights new facets in the power balance of the centre and the Republic, while facilitating the understanding of Moscow’s activities in the subjugation and directing of the fields of research and culture in the republic. Hitherto, the studies of the effect of the closed letter of 1947 on these processes have remained modest in specialised literature.  

Author(s):  
Evgeniya V. Sartikova ◽  

The article discusses the main trends in the rotation of the executive (the first) secretaries of the Kalmyk regional party committee in 1921–1943. The study is based on the documents from the fund of the Kalmyk regional committee of the USSR Communist Party kept at the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia. The principles of objectivism and historicism were used for the analysis of the archive materials that allowed to examine the problem in its relation to the existing specific historical circumstances. The goal of the article is to investigate the body of the first secretaries of the Russian Communist Party — All-Russia Communist Party in Kalmykia. The use of the common in the historical research methods (the broadside examination of the archive sources, historical description, chronological method) allowed to investigate the historical phenomena in the close relation to the historical situation. The author concludes that the specific feature of the rotation of the first secretaries of the Kalmyk regional party committee was the appointment of people from other regions of the country to this position. Mainly these were formal representatives, supervisors recommended by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party — All-Russia Communist Party for the positions of the first or second secretaries of the regional party committee. The analysis of the characteristics of the body of the first secretaries of the Kalmyk regional party in the given time period showed that all these people were from poor peasant families, without high education but with sufficient party service record who combined party and soviet activities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-139

This is the first article dealing specifically with Brezhnev in Soviet Moldavia. The article draws mainly on recently disclosed files from the Archive of the Social-Political Organizations of the Republic of Moldova, the former archive of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Moldavia. The authors are trying to understand the importance of the period when Brezhnev served as First Secretary of Central Committee of Moldavia from 1950 to 1952 for his subsequent career. In order to understand better the results of Brezhnev’s rule in Moldavian SSR and the impact on his leadership style, the authors discuss the previous career of Brezhnev as well as the activity of the previous First Secretaries in Soviet Moldavia. One of the main results of Brezhnev period in Moldavia was the consolidation of kolkhozes. In a broader sense, since this period at least, Brezhnev favoured quantity over quality.


Author(s):  
Eugeniusz Mironowicz

The analysis of the content of the appeal leaflets was to show what the Soviet leadership set for the people responsible for propaganda. The image of the enemy presented to the Belarusian society convinced them to uncompromising fight. The propaganda also left no doubt that any work strengthening the occupants’ potential was a betrayal of the Soviet homeland. It reminded that the loyalty of the inhabitants of occupied Belarus should be shown only to the Soviet authorities. The one more goal of the research was to show the effects of propaganda work. They were clearly visible. This was manifested by a powerful guerrilla movement on the territory of the republic and a small, compared to neighboring republics Lithuania and Ukraine, implementation of imposed standards for the supply of labor to Germany and food contingents.


1972 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 382-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert H. Donaldson

On March 30, 1971, as the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened, the prediction was widely voiced in the West that no surprises were in the offing. Basing their judgments on the aura of “business as usual” which had emanated from the Soviet leadership in the months prior to the Congress, Western specialists predicted a dull gathering, keynoted by signs of stability and ostensible unity—a far cry from the lively Congresses, full of unanticipated developments, over which Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev had presided.


Author(s):  
Yu. Latysh

The article deals with the impact of disputes of leaders of the USSR over the visit of US President R. Nixon to the fall of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine P. Shelest. The article was published in the ‘Washington Post’ by D. Anderson, which based on the CIA's secret materials contained information about the conflict between L. Brezhnev and P. Shelest regarding R. Nixon's visit and the support of General Secretary by V. Shcherbytsky, are analyzing. P. Shelest's position in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the politics of Détente, R. Nixon's visit and his assessment of the foreign policy of L. Brezhnev is revealed. The positions of other members of the Politburo have been covered. The reasons and circumstances of the increasing influence of L. Brezhnev on the foreign policy of the USSR and the defeat of the supporters of the hard course and the class approach were found out. The role of the international factor in ending the political career of P. Shelest and ascending to the top of the political Olympus of the USSR V. Shcherbytsky was investigated. As a result of the study, it became known that P. Shelest was an conservator in the foreign policy of the USSR, demanded the suppression of the “Prague Spring”, was skeptical of the Détente and attempts of L. Brezhnev to establish personal contacts with Western leaders. The brutal bombing of North Vietnam and the death of Soviet citizens were a good reason for P. Shelest and N. Podgorny to endure R. Nixon's visit. P. Shelest's removal was due to internal reasons: his independence position, desire for economic autonomy, insufficiently decisive struggle with dissidents, complaints of other Ukrainian leaders. However, the sudden replacement of the leader of the republic on the eve of the arrival of the President of the United States in Kiev may have been caused by P. Shelest's position regarding Détente and visit of R. Nixon.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 48-55
Author(s):  
Oleh Bazhan

Based on a detailed study and analysis of archival sources and testimonies of contemporaries, the characteristics of Petro Shelest’s methods and principles of personnel selection for key positions in the Ukrainian SSR, his relations with subordinates in the process of work, formation of the closest circle of colleagues are presented. The analysis of the personnel of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1963-1972 has been made. Based on memoir sources, character traits have been studied; personal qualities, as well as originality of relations of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party both with subordinates and the top leadership of the Soviet state and family members have been de- scribed. The author of the article clarifies the main trends in the development of the system of privileges and the privileges of the Soviet nomenklatura in the period of “stagnation”. The pro-Ukrainian course of the leader of the republican party organization was reflected in the author’s book OUR SOVIET UKRAINE, which was published in 1970. At first glance, the openly ideological propaganda work of Petro Shelest clearly demonstrated the attention of the republican party-state elite to the social economic problems of Ukraine, and the interest in its history and culture. Sometimes Shelest defended individual Ukrainian cultural figures who were subjected to ideological persecution. At the same time, Petro Shelest remained a typical expression of the Soviet command-administrative system. It was during his leadership of the republic that mass punitive operations against the Ukrainian national movement took place. In August 1968, Shelest was one of the initiators of the suppression of the “Prague Spring” which, in his opinion, contributed to the spread of anti-Soviet sentiment in Ukraine.However, P. Shelest’s pursuit of an autonomist course, his independence in resolving issues, and “localism and manifestations of nationalism” could not please the allied leadership. In April 1973, a campaign was inspired against his book OUR SOVIET UKRAINE. The book, which had a circulation of 100,000 copies, was withdrawn from sale and libraries. Shelest was removed from the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee “for health reasons” and was forced to take retirement.


Akademos ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 102-106
Author(s):  
Marius Tarita ◽  

The article addresses the subject on the interest shown by Polish journalists towards the Moldovan SSR in years 1978–1984. Evocative texts in this regard were published in the articles from “Polityka”, “Trybuna Ludu”, “Kraj Rad”, “Przyjaźń” and “Dziennik Ludowy” newspapers and magazines. References to specific topics related to the Moldovan SSR also appeared in the internal news bulletins of the Polish Press Agency. The present study is divided into three. In the first part, there are reflected articles containing personal (sometimes lyrical) opinions of journalists who visited the republic (E. Gajda, A. Strońska, M. Porajska). The second part highlights the official communiqués dedicated to political, ideological or economic events. In addition, interviews with secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and with the chief executive of the Moldovan SSR are revealed. The third part examines the analysis by the Polish Press Agency of a possible conflict between Moscow officials and the Republican party leadership in December 1983–February 1984.


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