NON-USE VALUE IN NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS: THE NESTUCCA OIL SPILL

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 689-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Grigalunas ◽  
James J. Opaluch

ABSTRACT A contingent valuation (CV) study that attempts to estimate non-use damages from the Nestucca spill was reviewed. The CV study faces formidable obstacles because it focuses on a controversial subject, oil spills, about which the public is known to have exaggerated perceptions, and because respondents may not have well defined dollar values for the environment. An examination of survey responses leads us to conclude that these problems are significant, and that, despite the substantial efforts by well known CV researchers, the results provide no basis for estimating damages due to this spill.

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard T Carson

A person may be willing to make an economic tradeoff to assure that a wilderness area or scenic resource is protected even if neither that person nor (perhaps) anyone else will actually visit this area. This tradeoff is commonly labeled “passive use value.” Contingent valuation studies ask questions that help to reveal the monetary tradeoff each person would make concerning the value of goods or services. Such surveys are a practical alternative approach for eliciting the value of public goods, including those with passive use considerations. First I discuss the Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 1989, focusing on why it is important to measure monetary tradeoffs for goods where passive use considerations loom large. Although discussions of contingent valuation often focus on whether the method is sufficiently reliable for use in assessing natural resource damages in lawsuits, it is important to remember that most estimates from contingent valuation studies are used in benefit–cost assessments, not natural resource damage assessments. Those working on benefit–cost analysis have long recognized that goods and impacts that cannot be quantified are valued, implicitly, by giving them a limitless value when government regulations preclude certain activities, or giving them a value of zero by leaving certain consequences out of the analysis. Contingent valuation offers a practical alternative for reducing the use of either of these extreme choices. I put forward an affirmative case for contingent valuation and address a number of the concerns that have arisen.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wakefield ◽  
Theodore Tomasi ◽  
Angeline Morrow ◽  
Christopher Pfeifer ◽  
Heath Byrd

ABSTRACT Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) is a process used to determine the amount of compensation due to the public for natural resource injuries arising from oil spills. Two models, Resource Equivalency Analysis (REA) and Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA), are used in essentially all OPA NRDAs to compute compensatory restoration requirements. REA is applied when members of wildlife populations are injured: usually mortality or a loss of reproduction among a species of bird, turtle, marine mammal, or fish. HEA is used when habitats are injured: usually oiling of beaches, wetlands, or sediments. The models are often implemented in a cooperative setting with input from both the Responsible Party and the Trustees. In this setting the models provide a structure for organizing negotiations and identifying the types of agreements that need to be reached before restoration can be identified and “right sized.” The models also have a technical basis in economic theory that is fully justified, but only in particular, limited circumstances. This technical basis is the only means of assuring the Trustees, RPs, and stakeholders that the NRDA process has identified an appropriate level of compensation. When the circumstances of a spill do not approximate those in which HEA and REA are defensible, creative solutions are needed to adjust the models to the circumstances of the case if they are to provide a convincing basis for scaling restoration and reaching resolution. This paper identifies the circumstances under which REA and HEA are fully defensible as well as 35 years of evolving adjustments designed to make them “work” when applied to real-world cases they do not quite fit. We also look to the future and how climate change may alter restoration scaling.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 727-731
Author(s):  
Randall B. Luthi ◽  
Linda B. Burlington ◽  
Eli Reinharz ◽  
Sharon K. Shutler

ABSTRACT The Damage Assessment Regulations Team (DART), under the Office of General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has centered its efforts on developing natural resource damage assessment regulations for oil pollution in navigable waters. These procedures will likely lower the costs associated with damage assessments, encourage joint cooperative assessments and simplify most assessments. The DART team of NOAA is developing new regulations for the assessment of damages due to injuries related to oil spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. These regulations will involve coordination, restoration, and economic valuation. Various methods are currently being developed to assess damages for injuries to natural resources. The proposed means include: compensation tables for spills under 50,000 gallons, Type A model, expedited damage assessment (EDA) procedures, and comprehensive procedures. They are being developed to provide trustees with a choice for assessing natural resource damages for each oil spill.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 355-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Lanfear ◽  
David E. Amstutz

ABSTRACT The Department of the Interior is required to evaluate the risks of oil spills from outer continental shelf (OCS) oil leasing and must compare these risks to those of other oil sources, such as importing oil. Past practice has been to treat spill occurrence as a Poisson process, with a rate proportional to the amount of oil produced or transported. U.S. oil production and accident data and worldwide tanker data were used. Criticism of this approach has centered on the validity of using oil volume as an exposure variable, and the applicability of existing accident data to frontier OCS areas. To examine these questions, the Interior Department recently sponsored several studies on OCS oil spill occurrence rates. One study compiled an extensive listing of all known oil spills of recent years and is believed to be the most complete database on oil spills available to the public. Another study looked at trends in oil spills from U.S. OCS platforms and discovered a statistically significant decrease in the spill rate since 1974. Other studies examined oil spill data for Cook Inlet and Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and found that spill rates for these areas could not be shown to be significantly different from the U.S. OCS platform spill rate based on trend analysis. Studies are continuing to ensure that oil spill rates used by the Interior Department reflect the latest data and analyses.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 1019-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Zafante ◽  
Steve Hampton

ABSTRACT Large oil spills routinely impact hundreds or even thousands of birds. In order to determine the compensation that responsible parties owe the public, trustee agencies typically examine the number of live and dead birds collected to estimate total bird mortality caused by the spill (Ford et al., 1987). In these natural resource damage assessments (NRDA), compensation is typically based upon the potential ecological benefits that flow from a restoration project. In the case of a bird kill, final compensation is based upon the cost of implementing a restoration project and not upon a dollar value per bird. The dominant paradigm for calculating compensatory restoration for bird injuries is Resource Equivalency Analysis (REA). This paper begins by providing a brief overview of REA when applied to birds. We then examine the REA implications of varying the level of mortality, baseline variability, and demographic variables in a simple population model that tracks both injured and baseline population levels. After finding no evidence that these factors necessarily produce short recovery times, we summarize two general approaches for calculating lost bird-years. We conclude that short recovery times (e.g., one-year) are unlikely for birds when using individual-based measures of injury. Further, we believe that recovery times may be much longer than currently calculated for situations where plausible “recovery mechanisms” cannot be defined.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 903-908
Author(s):  
James E. Elliott

ABSTRACT The United States National Park System contains over two million acres of submerged lands, and the nation's thirteen marine sanctuaries have over 18,000 square miles of ocean waters and habitats. From the public's perspective, national parks and marine sanctuaries are public goods that should be protected for future generations. Historically, however, response operations within these protected waters have not consistently preserved the environmental integrity of the nation's valuable resources. Vessels are often abandoned and remain aground, thereby emitting residual oil and physically damaging coral reefs and seagrass beds after the responders have removed the accessible oil. Additionally, responders often fail to consult with natural resource trustees and, as a result, physically damage the environment during response operations. This paper presents case studies and lessons learned from vessel groundings and oil spill response operations in national parks, marine sanctuaries, and other protected areas, from the Point Reyes National Seashore to the Florida Keys Marine Sanctuary. The topics of Natural Resource Trustee consultations, application of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, effective use of the Unified Command System, response cost internalization methods, and ecological sustainability are logically presented to argue for a more proactive and consistent national response posture in protected waters.“Surely our people do not understand even yet the rich heritage that is theirs … Our people should see to it that they are preserved for their children and their children's children forever, with their majestic beauty all unmarred.”—President Theodore Roosevelt (Shullery, 1979)


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1317-1325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schmidt Etkin ◽  
Deborah French-McCoy ◽  
Jill Jennings ◽  
Nicole Whittier ◽  
Sankar Subbayya ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT This study provides a comprehensive examination of the use of trajectory modeling to estimate financial impacts of oil spills, including natural resource damages, response costs, and socioeconomic costs, as well as an opportunity to examine how spill size, oil type, response strategy, and probabilistic trajectory factors impact costs. The inclusion of NRDA, response, and socioeconomic costs in the modeling allows for an assessment of the relative proportion of NRDA costs to response and socioeconomic costs to further support the findings of past studies that refute the myth that NRDA costs are the overriding factors in most spill cases. The study demonstrates the overall financial and NRDA benefits of dispersant use. Estimated total bio-economic costs for oil spill scenarios involving four oil types and three spill sizes for two locations in San Francisco Bay, were modeled. Assuming present-day mechanical-only response, total costs range from $30 to $520 million. Estimated total bioeconomic costs would be reduced to $11 to $113 million if dispersants were used with high effectiveness. Dispersant use would reduce response costs, and if used effectively, could reduce NRDA and socioeconomic damages substantially, as both of these costs are driven by the amount of surface and shoreline oiling.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1989 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-514
Author(s):  
Charles R. Corbett ◽  
David M. Bovet

ABSTRACT Comprehensive oil spill liability and compensation legislation has eluded the United States for about 12 years, despite the fact that well-crafted legislation would benefit all interested parties. The public would be better protected from catastrophic effects of oil spills; industry (both oil and shipping) would be provided reasonable limits of liability (or alternative measures); and state governments would become full partners in federally funded oil spill responses. Most of the parties who would be affected by oil spill legislation have made substantial contributions and shown increased flexibility since 1984. Still, one major hurdle must be crossed before legislation can become a reality: state liability law preemption.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1088-1108
Author(s):  
LT David Vihonski ◽  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
LT Donald Porter ◽  
LCDR Ryan Erickson

ABSTRACT When Kuchin and Hereth published the best response criteria at the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference, there was finally a concrete measure of success for response to oil spills. This criterion has been used since then by leaders of spill response operations to assist them in ensuring that they are maximizing the effectiveness of the response to an oil spill. One of the trends noted in their work was that not all of the criteria were the same when measured against each other. In particular, Kuchin and Hereth highlighted that Incident Commanders (ICs)/emergency responders should have focused more heavily on public communication and stakeholder service and support. This still holds true today with the increased demand for 24/7 updates in the news and on social media. When the ICs/emergency responders do not devote a significant amount of time communicating with the public and stakeholders through any and all available means, they are often not successful in a response. This paper addresses some of the overall changes to the response environment that affect Kuchin and Hereth’s best response criteria, discusses the changes in the measures of success, and provides recommendations for ICs/emergency responders to consider during an incident response. The goal is to assist ICs/emergency responders in being successful during their incident responses in the future through setting a new best response standard.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-141
Author(s):  
Jeffrey H. Rubini

ABSTRACT Governments and industry, both national and international, contend that dispersants are an effective and practical response option under certain circumstances. However, a comprehensive training and education program in dispersant operations used to establish a baseline of understanding among responders and stakeholders is lacking. Dispersant operations have played a positive and significant role on numerous oil spills in both national and international waters, yet a curriculum in dispersant operations remains a minor component of oil spill response course curricula. This may suggest that decision makers, responders and ultimately the public and environment are being shortchanged of alternative response technology training and education, which essentially fails to meet the needs of regional response teams, area committees, natural resource trustees, and the general oil spill response community's future decision makers. Supported through case study analyses and critical argumentation, this paper presents an oil spill dispersant operations curriculum that governments and industry, both national and international, can adapt.


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