OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990: CURE, CATALYST, OR CATASTROPHE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 713-717
Author(s):  
Mary G. Holt ◽  
Lindy S. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Marine Environment ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
International Community ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
International Liability ◽  
Double Hull ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Congress departed from the international community to unilaterally enact comprehensive oil spill legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). OPA legislates in several areas not covered by the international liability scheme for oil spills, including requirements for double-hull vessels, manning standards for foreign vessels, vessel response plans, and detailed and extensive provisions for liability for natural resource damages. Thus, it clearly provides better protection for the U.S. marine environment than would the international liability scheme. While OPA has encouraged the international community to take certain steps to provide greater protection, significant differences remain between OPA and the applicable international rules and standards. Protection of the marine environment on a global scale would be increased if the United States and the international community could bridge these differences.

TANK VESSEL PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION AS A PREDICTOR OF MARINE OIL SPILLS

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Norton
Keyword(s):  
Marine Environment ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Strong Relationship ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Army Corps ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Annual Volume ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The annual volume of oil spilled into the marine environment by tank vessels (tank barges and tanks hips) is analyzed against the total annual volume of oil transported by tank vessels in order to determine any correlational relationship. U.S. Coast Guard data was used to provide the volume of oil (petroleum) spilled into the marine environment each year by tank vessels. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Transportation's (US DOT) National Transportation Statistics (NTS) were used for the annual volume of oil transported via tank vessels in the United States. This data is provided in the form of tonnage and ton-miles, respectively. Each data set has inherent benefits and weaknesses. For the analysis the volume of oil transported was used as the explanatory variable (x) and the volume of oil spilled into the marine environment as the response variable (y). Both data sets were tested for correlation. A weak relationship, r = −0.38 was found using tonnage, and no further analysis was performed. A moderately strong relationship, r = 0.79, was found using ton-miles. Further analysis using regression analysis and a plot of residuals showed the data to be satisfactory with no sign of lurking variables, but with the year 1990 being a possible outlier.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Oil Spill Risks from Nontank Vessels1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Emergency Plan ◽  
Heavy Fuel Oil ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

SECURITY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INLAND FACILITIES AND PIPELINES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-232
Author(s):  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Ellinor Coder
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Although facilities in the United States have not been subject to major oil spills caused by intentional acts, around the world acts of war and terrorism account for a large fraction of reported major oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires response plans that address a “worst case discharge;” however, the implementing regulatory agencies did not foresee the possibility of deliberate attacks that could involve multiple storage tanks or several pipeline response zones. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the problems with the current U.S. federal response and contingency plans. The U.S. Coast Guard published a rule that requires operators of marine-transportation-related oil facilities to implement a variety of security measures. Inland facilities and pipelines are generally exempt from the security regulations; nevertheless, those facilities and pipelines can take steps to increase their own security preparedness by emulating the Coast Guard provisions. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, identified critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific agencies to facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sectors. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating the protection of critical infrastructures in the Energy Sector, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in Federal requirements and current provisions for oil industry security planning. We highlight types of major oil facilities that need to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack, as well as recommendations by industry groups. We conclude with suggested areas for industry planning improvement.

Implications of OPA 90 in General and Its Effect on the T-AO 187 Class Oilers in Particular

1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Maritime Organization ◽  
The Status ◽  
Oil Tankers ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Hull Construction

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.

The Fourth Reverse Wave?

2022 ◽  
pp. 63-76
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Community ◽  
Reverse Wave ◽  
Globalized World ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the work of Samuel Huntington and his theory regarding waves of democratization. The chapter notes that the international community is witnessing a move away from the globalized world order that the era has facilitated (or de-globalization) and that de-democratization is seemingly occurring simultaneously. The chapter pays particular attention to the United States and actions that have been viewed as anti-democratic by the previous presidential administration, which has accelerated the global community's leeriness when it comes to international cooperation led by the U.S.

MEXUSPAC: MEXICO/U.S. PACIFIC REGIONAL RESPONSE COORDINATION TEAM1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 959-960
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Marine Environment ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Marine Safety ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and other Hazardous Substances, signed in Mexico City in 1980, provides a framework for cooperation in response to pollution incidents that pose a threat to the waters of both countries. Under this agreement, MEXUSPAC organizes Mexican and U.S. response agencies to plan for and respond to pollution emergencies in the marine environment. The MEXUSPAC contingency plan designates the commandant of the Mexican Second Naval Zone and the chief of the U.S. Coast Guard 11th District Marine Safety Division as the MEXUSPAC Cochairmen, and defines on-scene commanders, joint operations centers, and communications protocols that would be needed to coordinate the response to pollution incidents affecting both countries.

Development of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response

1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-355
Author(s):  
Cadets John P. Nolan ◽  
Susan J. Blood
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Marine Pollution ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Development Program ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Pollution Damage ◽  
Information Center

ABSTRACT The International Oil Pollution Prevention and Response (OPPR) Convention represents current international efforts to improve capabilities to prepare for and respond to catastrophic oil spills. Initiated by the United States, it is being negotiated by the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Major components of the proposal include the establishment of an International Marine Pollution Information Center located at IMO headquarters, National Response Centers in each coastal state, and oil spill response contingency plans for ships. Other proposed articles include prepositioning of oil response equipment in high-risk areas, a research and development program for response techniques, and international cooperation during responses to catastrophic oil spills. Several problems have complicated negotiations of the OPPR Convention. First, severe time constraints have been placed on the negotiators, with the final conference1 to consider the OPPR scheduled for November 1990. Second, the United States suffers from a lack of credibility in the IMO, since the Senate has not yet ratified previous initiatives, the 1984 protocols to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Finally, the IMO's financial troubles have placed the concept of the International Information Center in jeopardy. In spite of these obstacles, a clear majority of countries are willing to support the document, realizing that it fills a gap in marine oil pollution prevention and response. The OPPR Convention will likely be carried through to adoption by the November conference. This paper traces the development of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Response and Prevention. It summarizes the background and initial proposals of the Convention, and then discusses the problems that arose during negotiations. Finally, it describes the present status of the Convention and offers a projection of its future direction.

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