PLANNING AND EXERCISING FOR SUCCESS: THE FOUR-STEP, SCENARIO-BASED PROCESS1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Gary L. Ott ◽  
LCDR David C. Stalfort

ABSTRACT “No two spills are alike” is an important maxim in oil spill response that requires planners and responders alike to remain adaptable in their thinking regarding response actions. The majority of oil spills are small and can usually be addressed adequately within the confines of a rigid response management system. However, a large spill is not simply a “scaling up” of a routine, small spill. Large spills require input from many more stakeholders, public outrage is intensified, and often difficult decisions on environmental, economic, and emotional tradeoffs are necessary. As a result, a catastrophic spill requires responders to have more than the equipment-focused organizational skills that are satisfactory during routine spills. Complex spills require responders to have advanced interpersonal skills such as team building, risk communication, and organizational problem solving. It is very difficult, however, to evaluate the responder's grasp of these skills and ability to implement them, even though these skills are so critical to the success of a large spill response. The skills that often ensure success for small, frequently occurring spills are not the only skills required for success in a large, complex spill incident. On the federal level, the area contingency planning process was established to plan for, respond to, and evaluate the adequacy of response capability in a given area. Currently, area contingency plans consist primarily of boiler-plate language, reference materials such as lists of resources, notification procedures, and general incident command system information, all written to satisfy the format required by the guidelines (U.S. Coast Guard, 1992). What is usually missing, however, is a useful discussion by the area committee on how responders might work together to solve problems and on detailed “how to” strategies for preventing a bad situation from getting worse. As a result, the requirement that there be an “assessment of the effectiveness of the plan” (Public Law 101-380, 1990 and 1992) may not be able to take into account an evaluation of the problem-solving and communications skills of the response organization, which is necessary for both the public perception and the reality of a successful complex spill response. Our objective is to demonstrate how a four-step, scenario-based approach to training, contingency planning, and exercises can improve the response management system's (RMS) performance and ability to succeed. If the area committee is trained with an outward focus on stakeholder needs, develops a scenario-based contingency plan with its stakeholders, and exercises its response organization using these scenario-based processes, it will improve the effectiveness of a response to a major, complex spill.

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 743-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt

ABSTRACT An act of terrorism resulting in an oil spill triggers a unique set of response considerations that bring diverse agencies together under crisis conditions. To manage such incidents effectively, a systematic approach is needed to standardize incident response, command, and control methods and to better define the planning process for these demanding scenarios. The National Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the common denominator that has been adopted by the United States Coast Guard for oil spill response. This paper highlights recommendations to adopt the NIIMS-ICS nationally for combined law enforcement and environmental response incidents to ensure efficient and effective response methods.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 419-430
Author(s):  
Lea Gibson ◽  
Jeff Westervel ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

ABSTRACT: The Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) is tasked with preventing, preparing for, and responding to oil spills impacting state waters throughout California. A key component of prevention and preparedness is a robust training program that ensures worker safety and provides the necessary skills to work effectively. As a response organization, OSPR must also verify that its staff is appropriately qualified to assume specified positions within the Incident Command System, in order to achieve the best protection of California’s natural resources, as well as to maintain credibility with stakeholders and partners within the Unified Command. To achieve these training and response objectives, OSPR established a program that includes a dedicated Response Qualifications and Certifications Unit, identification of training needs based on job classification, development of a tracking database, a comprehensive task book system consistent with the framework instituted by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, succession planning, and ongoing evaluations to measure the effectiveness of OSPR’s training program. The Response Qualifications and Certifications Unit collaborates with local, State, and Federal agencies, as well as private entities, to develop and provide advanced online, classroom, and hands-on training courses. This paper will outline the successes, complications, and ongoing challenges in establishing OSPR’s training and qualifications program, as well as plans for the future of the program.


1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 557-562
Author(s):  
Edward Wirkowski

ABSTRACT Clean Harbors Cooperative is a nonprofit organization initiated by eight major oil companies whose purpose is to contain and clean up major oil spills effectively and efficiently throughout the Greater New York Harbor area. Initial efforts included defining the area of interest; determining the maximum size spill that is likely to occur; deciding the time to clean up the free oil on the water; determining the type and quantity of equipment required to contain and clean up the spill, where major spills are likely to occur, where the equipment should be located, and the means to finance the purchase of the equipment and the operation of the cooperative; and deciding who will store, operate, test, and maintain the equipment, and who will direct and handle the actual cleanup activities. These decisions were reached by discussions with company marine experts, by analyses of past major spills, by consultations with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regarding its experiences and recommendations, by visits with other major cooperatives throughout the country, and by studies that simulated oil spills at various locations throughout New York Harbor (by means of Shell Oil Company's spill computer program and the USCG vector analysis program). Secondary efforts consisted of establishing a response organization team that will be available to direct and supervise the entire containment and cleanup effort, and developing a major contingency plan manual that includes cleanup plans and techniques, and data on sensitive areas, training, disposal, communications, wildlife, etc., in addition to call-out procedures and emergency phone numbers. Parameters covering both technical and practical aspects were developed and used in preparing equipment specifications. Purchase decisions were based primarily on visual observations, recommendations of knowledgeable users, and impartial test results. Cost was a secondary consideration. The capital equipment purchase program was divided into three 1-year periods and totalled 3.9 million dollars. In conclusion, Clean Harbors Cooperative believes that by using the best technical and practical knowledge and experiences available, the time and money will have been spent wisely, and they will be prepared to contain and clean up major oil spills efficiently and effectively anywhere in the Greater New York Harbor area.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 651-655
Author(s):  
Jeff Simmerman

ABSTRACT In the development of the area contingency plan, the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) received a vast array of response expertise from the membership of each area committee. This expertise provided a wealth of response knowledge vital in contingency planning. Additionally, each agency in the area committee could be involved in the response command structure. These agencies, each with very different policies and procedures, offer a unique challenge to the FOSC in implementing that area contingency plan. Another challenge faced by the FOSC is ensuring that the operational expertise contained in the area contingency plan is available to each member of a diverse response organization, including personnel mobilized from agencies in areas outside the FOSC area of responsibility, who may be unfamiliar with both the contingency planning process and the command and control (C & C) structure they are augmenting. The solution to both these challenges lies in arranging the area contingency plan in a format outline directly representing the C & C response structure determined by the FOSC and the area committee. This paper discusses the steps in the Savannah Area Contingency Plan and the evolution of its format; the operational and training advantages of this format; and the potential for this format to incorporate improvements.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Haynes ◽  
Gary L. Ott

ABSTRACT Can an Area Contingency Plan (ACP) embody a response organization's potential for success? Can the response effectiveness and efficiency of an ACP be measured through expert evaluation? On a scale of low, medium, or high, how well does an ACP predict a response community's ability to achieve certain “Critical Success Factors”? Intuitively, Area Committees know that area contingency planning should better prepare a response community for effective and efficient spill response—accomplishing Critical Success Factors. Yet, at present, ACPs are generally evaluated on their conformance to a prescribed format rather than their ability to achieve Critical Success Factors. Likewise, the future holds that ACPs will be evaluated on their conformance to the U.S. Coast Guard's newly developed Incident Command System (ICS) format. However, a basic analytical method is needed to determine whether an ACP has the necessary planning elements that can be internalized and implemented to enhance and, if utilized appropriately, produce a truly successful response. This paper describes an analytical evaluation technique that uses a recently developed ACP scorecard process. Using the scorecard approach, the authors will score a number of ACPs from across the nation to determine each plan's potential (probability) for a response organization to achieve predefined Critical Success Factors.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 567-571
Author(s):  
Mark O'Malley

ABSTRACT Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the need for an effective organization to manage a spill of such magnitude was readily apparent. The publication of a revised NC? reflected this need by defining a Spill of National Significance (SONS) as a spill that, because of its severity, size, location, or actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, the necessary response effort is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party (RP) resources to contain and clean up the discharge. The U.S. Coast Guard adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as the response management organization for oil and hazardous substance incidents in 1996. An integral part of ICS is the Area Command concept, which provides a level of strategic management and support for the existing Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) response organization. This concept was evaluated for its suitability at a SONS exercise held on 16–18 September 1997 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The exercise was also designed to assess interagency policy and cooperation with regard to emergency response by having the participants deliberate on critical issues in a collegial setting, as opposed to a stress-elevating, oil spill equipment deployment and command center organization drill. This paper examines the makeup of the unique design of the exercise and discusses several issues that arose during the exercise.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-173
Author(s):  
Michael R. Moore ◽  
Thomas C. Miller ◽  
George L. Boone ◽  
Rendall B. Farley

ABSTRACT Salvage operations must be conducted with the utmost concern for the safety of personnel, as well as protection of the marine environment, and property. Due to the highly dynamic circumstances involved in salvage operations, there is no standard or foolproof method for responding to a casualty. Therefore, contingency planning and pre-established relationships with industry become indispensable to ensure that informed decision making, maximum responder cooperation and optimum asset coordination. Inherent in contingency planning is having an understanding that the role of the Captain of the Port (COTP) / Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) during a salvage response is multifaceted. While the COTP/FOSC has federal responsibilities to protect people, property, and the environment, it is achieved only through close coordination of multiple responding agencies, the response/salvage community and their resources. This successful coordination is greatly facilitated through an understanding of FOSC roles and proper use of the Incident Command/Unified Command (ICS/UC) System. This paper also describes the assets and authorities available to the COTP/FOSC during a salvage response, the triggers and overriding issues that would initiate full or partial federalization.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 479-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Kathleen Jennings ◽  
Michael Ziccardi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Steve Hampton

ABSTRACT From 2001–2002, oiled birds were found along 220 miles of California's central coastline, with more than 2,000 birds recovered and transported for care. No significant slicks or other obvious sources of oil were observed. Response activities were coordinated to address a prolonged wildlife event, rather than proceeding as a typical short-term oil spill response. This event was part of a long pattern of repeat “mystery” oil spills in this region that puzzled investigators for 10 years, most believing the oil resulted from illegal dumping; but when the 2001/2002 event extended well beyond the winter season, investigators looked deeper. After an extensive investigation by state and federal agencies, the sunken vessel, SS Jacob Luckenbach was identified. A six month, $19 million, multi-agency response operation was undertaken by the U.S. Coast Guard with operations concluding October 2002. To address the 11-month wildlife response for the 2001/2002 season, the Incident Command Structure was modified to address the unique needs of this event, including: activation and deactivation criteria for beach searches; weather prediction for oil release and animal stranding patterns; hybridization of field team functions; changing response priorities for key species; and long-term staffing, communication and coordination among the multiple agencies. Spill-specific policies and protocols were established, and information was made available to remote personnel through a website. On-going staff debriefs were conducted and adjustments implemented. Based on lessons learned, California's Wildlife Operations Plan is being revised and an electronic data collection system is being implemented to streamline animal tracking. Although most response organizations are structured to respond to “batch” spills, with hundreds of aging sunken vessels along the California coast alone and as the continuous release from the TV Prestige demonstrated, organizational modifications may be necessary to adequately prepare for and respond to the more unusual, but potentially growing risk of long-term, intermittent releases in the off-shore environment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017312
Author(s):  
Lauren Glushik

This recently published IPIECA-OGP good practice guidance updates and replaces the long-standing IPIECA oil spill report series on contingency planning for oil spills on water. It provides a comprehensive and modern tool for designing an appropriate and justified spill response capability that is in compliance with the regulatory framework and commensurate with the oil spill risks of an organization. The guidance seeks to align industry practices, inform stakeholders, and serve as a communication tool to promote awareness and education. It presents an integrated approach to contingency planning, which stresses the importance of all the various inputs and considerations, and how they interconnect. The planning process is illustrated in nine steps. To begin, the assets and operations to be included in the planning scope should be clearly defined. Next, a thorough review of the regulatory framework is required, along with a determination of the relevant stakeholders and a plan for their involvement, as appropriate. The process continues with a structured approach for designing a capability specific to the unique needs of an organization, and the jurisdiction and community within which it operates. Planners proceed by assessing the risks within the planning scope and selecting representative scenarios. The scenarios are then analyzed to determine a tiered response capability. Following this, planners should compile the information into effective plans and thorough documentation. As the response capability is implemented, it should be verified to confirm it is achievable and meets the desired level of preparedness. Lastly, a reliable system of review and maintenance will ensure the planning remains relevant and appropriate to the level of risk as an organization matures or evolves. This is a cyclical process that should remain active over the lifetime of an operation. The degree of complexity involved will greatly depend on the type of operation, local conditions, and environmental and socio-economic sensitivities. However, the overall objective of contingency planning will always be to develop a capability to effectively react to a spill and sustain an ongoing response, which is proportionate to the risk. This capability requires suitable equipment, sufficient logistics, and competent, trained responders supported by proven, exercised plans.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Steve Wischmann ◽  
Lome Thomas ◽  
Jim Gynther

ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's response to the need for technological solutions to the incident management challenges posed by oil spills and hazardous material releases. Additionally, this paper will examine some of the difficulties presented by technology itself; that is to say, technological tools come with both implicit and explicit ramifications that must be understood and overcome in order to fully harness the potential contained within such capabilities. With the advent of both the public and Congress demanding increasingly effective spill response and fiscal conservancy, the Coast Guard has sought technological innovations to enhance its ability to coordinate and manage complex, multi-agency response operations. Through the development of the On-Scene Command and Control (OSC2) system, the Coast Guard intends to bring the potential leverage of computer-based technology to the Incident Command System (ICS) by harnessing the advantages of large-screen display, relational databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS) for mapping response resources and activities. The decision-support and resource tracking advantages produced by OSC2 are expected to contribute mightily to improve performance within the Unified Command/ICS organization. However, the challenges posed by the implementation of OSC2 cannot be ignored. Factors ranging from human resource inhibitions and training requirements to blending individual technical components into a seamless whole must be considered when technological tools are designed, developed, and employed. Technology is not inherently good or bad, but remains always contextual—it is dependent on the intervening factors introduced by the human condition in which it is imagined and then utilized. This paper will discuss these issues and describe the key elements in achieving the success of OSC2 as one of the Coast Guard's spill response management tools.


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