scholarly journals TEN YEARS OF REALTIME, NEAR-SURFACE CURRENT OBSERVATIONS SUPPORTING OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 541-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Martin ◽  
Norman L. Guinasso ◽  
Linwood L. Lee ◽  
John N. Walpert ◽  
Leslie C. Bender ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Trajectory modeling is one of the few tools that allow spill managers to get ahead of an oil spill. To that end, the Texas General Land Office is committed to maintaining and improving the Texas Automated Buoy System (TABS) and its associated modeling efforts to ensure a reliable source of accurate, up-to-date information on currents along the Texas coast. As the nation embarks on the development of an Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS), TABS will be an active participant as a foundational regional component to the national backbone of ocean observations. The lessons-learned from TABS’ ten years of spill response operations will provide a valuable roadmap for the operators of new ocean observing systems to ensure that they understand and meet the unique needs of the oil spill response community. This paper describes the circumstances which led to the creation of TABS; the unique, spill response-driven philosophy behind the development and operation of the system; lessons-learned and the resulting modifications to the system; examples of TABS’ service; new TABS forecasting models and real time analysis tools; and the future direction of TABS in the context of a national Integrated Ocean Observing System.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017031
Author(s):  
Steven Buschang

Texas produces nearly twice and much oil as the next highest producing U.S. state and has approximately 3300 miles of sensitive jurisdictional shoreline boarding the second highest area of our nation's oil production, the Gulf of Mexico. It is home to over 27 operating refineries and hosts 3 of the top 10 busiest ports in the nation. Since 1991, the Texas General Land Office (TGLO) has built an oil spill prevention and response program that is arguably the premier state oil spill program in the nation; one that responds 24/7 to over 600 reported spills per year, certifies, audits and inspects over 600 oil handling facilities, administers an abandoned vessel removal program, an oily bilge facility program, and has an ongoing oil spill R&D program and its own state Scientific Support Coordinator, ensuring that prevention, planning and response activities are state of the science. The TGLO produces the Texas Oil Spill Toolkit, now in its 17th edition, which is a spill planning and response resource for the western Gulf of Mexico, and houses a collection of plans and documents in a single, easy to use online/off-line .html format. Plans include up-to-date Area Committee Plans (ACP) and pre-planning documents, all aligned with the National Response Framework (NRF). Included are Regional Response Team VI (RRT) documents and guidance, pre-authorization plans and mapping for alternative spill response, Priority Protection Areas (PPA), Environmental Sensitivity Index Maps (ESI), and site specific Geographic Response Plans (GRP). This paper describes the conception, history and evolution of the building and operation of a state response organization in an era of “less government”.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-515
Author(s):  
John H. Giesen ◽  
Jon D. MacArthur

ABSTRACT Faced with training and travel dollar constraints, California's Department of Fish and Game and the 11th U.S. Coast Guard District worked to form a multiorganizational partnership designed to leverage required resources to conduct a premier operational-level oil spill response training program in the state. The partnership included no less than six major organizations from both the public and private sectors, each playing critical roles in planning and conducting the training. Major hurdles overcome were curriculum development and operational support. Both of these challenges were resolved through a unified management approach in which the ultimate objective became success of the course. The lessons learned from the program provide guidance and rationale for future such efforts.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 457-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Harmer

ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the incident at the Tupras Oil Refinery in Izmit, Turkey following the August 1999 earthquake, including the scenarios encountered and lessons learned. Oil spill operations are not simply confined to “at-sea incidents” and can be situated within areas of complete devastation, where priority for the cleanup of leaking oil is simply an afterthought. A good example of this would be Kuwait during the Gulf War and the strategic destruction of the oil fields.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 709-714
Author(s):  
Evan C. Thayer ◽  
Ilse Snoeks

ABSTRACT Oil spill response workers can face a variety of health concerns when a spill occurs in a remote area. Potential food, water, and disease hazards need to be addressed for both fly-in supervisory personnel and local cleanup crews. Pre-spill planning activities should consider a variety of scenarios covering a range of spills in the geographic areas of responsibility. Topics to address should include medical screening of oil spill response team members, vaccination/shots, travel kits, special clothing needs, disease control informational handouts, food and water sources, evaluation of medical personnel and facilities and identification of medical evacuation plans. Activities occurring during the spill cleanup period might include medical screening of food handlers and local workers, confirming the availability of local medical facilities and evacuation routes, conducting routine clinic operations, checking the sources and handling of food and water, checking housing conditions, implementing a disease vector control program, and providing training related to local environmental hazards. Post-cleanup activities would include safe disposal of medical and other waste, providing post-spill medical exams, and documenting lessons learned during the spill. Successfully controlling health issues during a spill may only be possible if an appropriate level of planning is conducted.


Author(s):  
LCDR John LaMorte ◽  
LT Rebecca Brooks

ABSTRACT During the evening of 20 April, 2010 U.S. Coast Guard District Eight Command Center watch standers received a report of an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), an oil rig working on the Macondo oil well approximately 42 miles Southeast of Venice, LA (OSC Report, 2011). The explosion on board the DWH and resulting fires eventually destroyed the oil rig and caused it to sink into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crewmembers lost their lives in the tragic events that unfolded that night, and one of the nation's largest environmental disasters would soon follow. Estimates of the oil discharged from the Macondo oil well were between 12,000 and 25,000 barrels per day, and the response involved approximately 47,000 oil spill response personnel, 6,870 vessels, approximately 4.12 million feet of boom, and 17,500 National Guard personnel, five states (OSC Report, 2011). The massive oil spill lasted 87 days and estimates suggest that more than 200 million gallons of oil was discharged into the Gulf of Mexico, which stands as the largest oil spill event in U.S. history. From these massive response operations came important lessons learned for SONS event planning, preparedness, and response, as it became apparent during DWH response operations that oil spill response governance and doctrine was not well understood across the whole-of-government. This issue was well documented in the National Incident Commander's report and several recommendations were identified to address this issue. This paper will explore the steps taken within the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) SONS Exercise and Training Program to promote a better understanding of oil spill response governance and doctrine among Cabinet-level senior leadership and the interagency representatives that will ultimately be involved when the next SONS event happens.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Ken Matsumoto

ABSTRACT There are many ways to evaluate the overall performance of an oil spill response operation. There is, or there should be, however, a common standpoint for looking at such operations, irrespective of the size of the spill. Lessons learned through an incident, however trivial, can provide valuable clues to the future improvement of the operation in refineries and oil terminals. But the number of incidents at one location is too few to stand the test of analysis. Evaluation by a variety of methods is now possible based on information and data available through the worldwide news and reporting networks. This paper presents a guideline, which is widely accepted by the Japanese oil industry, for evaluating responses to oil spills, and introduces a concise equation based on the rating of many response elements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry A. Romberg ◽  
Dennis M. Maguire ◽  
Richard L. Ranger ◽  
Rod Hoffman

ABSTRACT This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.


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