scholarly journals Responder Safety - Evolving Safety Systems, Processes, and Behaviours in an International Oil Spill Response Cooperative

Author(s):  
Declan O'Driscoll

Abstract Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) is a United Kingdom based industry cooperative for emergency oil spill response and preparedness. The company provides emergency surface and subsurface response to oil spills on a global basis. The nature of emergency oil spill response requires responders to understand and deal quickly with the safety risks arising from working in new and unfamiliar surroundings. The risks derive from the physical nature of the incident, the geographical locations, the local weather conditions as well as working with new colleagues and organisations. OSRL was originally established in the United Kingdom in 1985 and now employs 265 people in 9 countries. This growth has been the result of mergers with response cooperatives in the United States and Singapore and the introduction of a new subsea well capping services division. A common understanding and alignment on safety in an organisation with a range of nationalities and cultures as well as local compliance requirements is critical to safeguarding employees. To ensure this, OSRL began a programme to review safety management systems, processes and procedures as well as employee behaviours. An Operations Excellence Management System, known as ‘The Blueprint', was introduced to provide structure and control in corporate documentation as well as providing better navigation to employees in locating specific procedures. The introduction of the Blueprint prompted a major overhaul of OSRL's core safety procedures, in particular, risk management. While the basic principles of risk assessment were similar, there was a difference across the company in how risk assessments were prepared, approved and presented. The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) Life Saving Rules were introduced. The Rules provide clear guidance on how to prevent accidents known to have caused industry fatalities in the past. OSRL also undertook a review, with employee participation, of the company's values that led to a new corporate ‘Values Compass' with safety at the centre. Employees are encouraged to take personal ownership of their own safety and that of colleagues. Awareness is promoted by setting formal objectives, linked to remuneration, on hazard identification and behavioural safety observations. This paper will show the strategies and initiatives applied to develop a framework of rules, processes and behaviour to support and protect OSRL responders from the range of safety risks encountered when responding to an oil spill.

Author(s):  
Rodrigo Cochrane Esteves ◽  
Anna Carolina Pereira ◽  
Rodrigo Zapelini Possobon ◽  
Gustavo Xavier

Abstract In 2000, Brazil experienced its most relevant oil spill accident until today: 1.3 thousand cubic meters (c.m.) of crude oil were leaked from a pipeline to the waters of Guanabara Bay, in Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, in 2001 the Government implemented a federal legislation requiring oil spill response plans (OSRP) which was strongly inspired in the United States requirement for ports and terminals. In 2016, an interdisciplinary task force was initiated to improve this legislation. Thus, a new risk-based framework was developed in order to better engage some of the environmental and social-economical complexities of Brazil as adequate inputs for the oil spill response planning process. This methodology was expanded from the guidelines published by International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP). First, the concept of sensitive receptors were introduced to describe any valuable element that can be harmed by the spill. These were selected from environmental sensitivities, protection areas, wildlife occurrence, human occupation, tourism and fisheries, among others. These criticalities were categorized in five classes using an oil slick forecast modelling results for different spill volumes such as the minimum time to reach these receptors and oiling probability. After this, they were associated with certain spill volumes, resulting in three possible requirement levels. Consequently, the minimum response capability demand for the facility is calculated, as well as tactical and logistics plans. This new approach not only optimizes the allocation of first response equipment at the highest risk spots, but also regulates the sharing of these capabilities when there is a concentration of these facilities. In this paper, this methodology was applied to a major oil terminal located in a high sensitivity area at Ilha Grande Bay, in Rio de Janeiro. The worst-case scenario was around 6.923 c.m., which allowed the identification of 116 vulnerable receptors. Of these, 02 were identified as having high criticality and, therefore, were prioritized for response planning. The minimum nominal response capability was estimated as being equal to 4.760 m3/day for full deployment condition after the initial 60 hours. This value is about 25% higher than that predicted in facility's existing OSRP. However, with the application of resource sharing rules, the amount of equipment staged on site is equal to only 1298 m3/d, allowing a significant optimization due to logistics processes after the initial 24h.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 389-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Cunningham ◽  
Karen A. Sahatjian ◽  
Chris Meyers ◽  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Julie M. Jordan

ABSTRACT Dispersants have been a controversial oil spill response technique since their introduction during the Torrey Canyon oil spill off the coast of the United Kingdom in 1967. Despite reductions in the toxicity of dispersants and improvements in their application since then, dispersants have not been used extensively in the United States because of logistical difficulties, unfavorable weather conditions, and a lack of demonstrated effectiveness during actual spill conditions. In addition, there is a widely held perception in the United States that dispersant use has been limited by complex authorization procedures. This paper reviews the dispersant policies of several European nations and Canada and compares them with those of the United States. Recent developments in U. S. dispersant policy are outlined, particularly those designed to expedite decision making. The paper concludes by examining some recent U. S. oil spills in which dispersant use was considered.


Author(s):  
Tim Gunter ◽  
Ty Farrell

ABSTRACT Swift water oil spill response (SWSR) has many different aspects that present more of a challenge than slow moving or static water oil spills. The American Petroleum Institute (API)/Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL) Emergency Response Work Group's inland SWSR Guide will be a compilation of industry best practices describing initial spill response management and operational tactics in these uniquely challenging conditions. This paper will summarize the API Guide which focuses on the highest priorities of spill response including people, environment, and assets. The intended audience for this paper are responders that have baseline spill response knowledge. Operations managers will be able to use the API Guide to develop timely Incident Command System (ICS) 201 briefs, organizational structures, and Incident Action Plan (IAP) operational work assignments. Safety of responders will be emphasized, particularly site safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Site safety and job specific hazard identification best practices will inform responders, managers, and Incident Commanders of the important aspects of overall safety management. Site evaluation topics will cover the following areas: access, staging area, boat launches, shoreline composition, and wildlife considerations. Response strategies involving equipment for containment and recovery will be described for effective SWSR. Additional factors that must be considered include riverbed composition, current velocity, flow pattern, water depth, water course width, and obstructions. There is a limited amount of literature on the unique response techniques of SWSR developed by industry groups or governmental agencies.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Douglas Cormack

ABSTRACT As a result of recent studies in the United Kingdom and elsewhere on the factors affecting oil spilled at sea, it has been possible to redefine the problems presented for oil spill response given the general nature of response techniques and their likely future development. This topic has benefited in the past two years from discussions in the Bonn Agreement Working Group on Technical Scientific and Operational Aspects of Oil Pollution. The influence of this problem definition on the choice of response equipment in the United Kingdom is discussed. The chosen equipment is described in relation to success in meeting identified requirements and likelihood of success in real operations. The status of the various approaches exemplified by individual equipment choices is presented and future developments anticipated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 703-705
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Hall ◽  
Walter J. Henry

ABSTRACT The Alaska North Slope region is a challenging operating environment. During spill response operations, worksite hazards are magnified and ensuring safety of response personnel becomes more difficult. In the Incident Management Team, the Safety Officer develops a Site Safety Plan to identify hazards and establish guidelines for safe operations. This information is typically communicated to the field workers when they check-in at the Staging Area or other assigned location. The Site Safety Plan alone, however, fails to address specific behaviors of the personnel that lead to unsafe activities. Behavior-Based Safety Processes fill in this missing piece. The PIRATE Process is an example of behavior-based safety at work. PIRATE - Personal Involvement Reduces Accidents to Everyone - is a fundamental part of the safety culture in the Greater Prudhoe Bay operating area. The March 2006 Gathering Center 2 (GC-2) Transit Line oil spill response presented significant challenges to all involved: extreme weather conditions, congested work areas, spilled oil on frozen lake and tundra environments, and complex field operations competing for personnel and resources. Daily involvement with PIRATE (and similar North Slope Behavior-Based Safety Processes) has made the workforce acutely aware of each individuar'S role in workplace safety, enhancing the overall safety performance of the organization. This poster shows some of the difficulties of a complex arctic oil spill response, and the application of Behavior-Based Safety Processes to enable safe and efficient operations in the face of these challenges.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1881-1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford Benggio ◽  
Debra Scholz ◽  
Dave Anderson ◽  
Joseph Dillon ◽  
Greg Masson ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT In the United States (U.S.), oil spill response planning, preparedness, and response requirements are dictated primarily by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, a regulation that implements the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Clean Water Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. At the planning stage, these regulations require the development of national, regional, and local response capabilities and promote overall coordination among responders. During a spill, these capabilities are utilized by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) to analyze whether response actions are likely to impact protected resources. The consultation process required under Federal statutes, charges the FOSC to consult with Federal, state, Tribal entities, and other Federal agencies to determine potential effects of response actions during an incident and to develop strategies to avoid, minimize, and mitigate those effects (40 CFR § 300.135(j); § 300.305(e); and § 300.322(a), 1994). Consultations should continue until response operations are concluded and may continue after operations are complete. Four key regulatory mandates that require an FOSC to initiate consultation during a response include:Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended requires consultation with US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on federally listed species and designated critical habitats;Magnuson-Stevens Act requires consultation with NMFS on any action that may affect Essential Fish Habitats;National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended requires Federal agencies to consult with states, federally recognized tribes, and other stakeholders on potential impacts to historic and cultural resources; andTribal Consultations under Executive Order 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments when federally recognized Indian Tribes and their interests are affected by a response. Consultation is also required under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act when Native American burial sites, human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or items of cultural patrimony are identified on Federal or Tribal lands during a response and no pre-consultation plan of action has been developed.1 Consultation requirements are not universally understood, leading to uncertainty and inconsistencies across the response community and Trustees regarding when to initiate and how to conduct the consultations. This paper discusses the Federal consultation requirements and identifies areas of possible uncertainties in the consultation process throughout the pre-spill planning, response, and post-response phases of an incident. This paper will suggest resolutions and recommendations to further enhance the consultation process by the Federal spill response decision-makers and planning bodies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. abs104
Author(s):  
Dave DeVitis ◽  
William Schmidt ◽  
Jane Delgado ◽  
Mike Crickard ◽  
Steve Potter

ABSTRACT The American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) subcommittee on skimmers recently adopted a standard methodology for measuring I skimmer performance, F 2709 - Standard Test Method for Determining Nameplate Recovery Rate of Stationary Oil Skimmer Systems. Current industry practice allows manufacturers to label skimmers with a nameplate capacity based solely on the skimmer's offload pump capability without regard to the recovery rate as a system. Additionally there is no consideration given to the degradation in recovery performance when pumping fluids with viscosities higher than water. Typically the manufacturer's claimed value is unrealistic when estimating the oil recovery rate (ORR) of a skimming system. Integrating actual performance data into the planning and regulation process is prudent from all perspectives. In the absence of third party data, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) will de-rate a manufacturer's claimed nameplate capacity by 80% or more when calculating the Effective Daily Recovery Capacity (EDRC). The USCG uses EDRC as a key component in rating and regulating the oil spill response capability of responsible parties and oil spill response organizations (OSROs). The ASTM's new skimmer protocol has been used recently at Ohmsett to evaluate four oleophilic skimmers as potential alternatives to the skimmers currently used in Alaska's Prince William Sound (PWS) oil spill response plan. The selected skimmer has undergone a number of modifications with improvements quantified over four additional tests series. This paper focuses on the most recent test of this skimmer, conducted in cold-water conditions using both fresh and weathered Alaska North Slope (ANS) crude oil. During the latest testing, two newly introduced tests were performed: a 24-hour endurance test and a qualitative recovery test in the presence of seaweed.


1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-241
Author(s):  
Bobby Burns ◽  
A. G. Campbell ◽  
Charles J. Adams

ABSTRACT Quick response to the stranding of a large freighter on French Frigate Shoals, Hawaii, by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and Navy salvage forces prevented a major oil spill with probably significant environmental damage and saved a valuable ship and cargo. The authority, funding, and contacts that allowed the use of navy salvage forces on a timely basis were key elements in the USCG On-Scene Coordinator and the Region IX (Oceana) Response Team actions. The incident particulars, including authority, funding, assets deployed, logistics problems, salvage efforts, planning, methodology, and operational problems are discussed. It was determined that efforts to mitigate possible oil spill damage, such as deployment of booms, would be impractical and probably totally ineffective in the shoal and sand spits subject to open-ocean weather conditions. Lightering of fuel and cargo was judged to be dangerous and difficult. Salvage of the intact ship was found to be the most practical means to prevent significant environmental damage. Jettisoning of 2,100 tons of nontoxic fine white clay cargo was necessary for the salvage. Logistic limitations and evaluation of tide and currents to minimize environmental impact were major concerns that limited amounts and times of discharge. The post-incident survey indicates minimal environmental damage. The incident points to the need for the creation of an “area to be avoided” within a 50-mile radius as is currently proposed by the United States to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Maritime Safety Committee for the Northwest Hawaiian Islands.


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