The static game model and application of private equity companies' compliance management and government supervision

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Wei
Keyword(s):  
Private Equity ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
Government Supervision

scholarly journals Static Game Models and Applications Based on Market Supervision and Compliance Management of P2P Platform

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sulin Pang ◽  
Junkun Yang ◽  
Rongzhou Li ◽  
Jun Cao
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Guangdong Province ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Weak Supervision ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Good Agreement

This article focuses on the two-party static game between market supervisory organization and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. Considering 4 game modes with both “strong supervision” and “weak supervision” of market supervisory organization and “compliance management” and “noncompliance management” of P2P lending platform, the paper establishes a static game model between P2P lending platform and market supervisory organization and solves the market equilibrium solutions. Based on income, cost, disguised cost, and fine of P2P lending platform and income, cost, and reward of market supervisory organization, it discusses conditional strategies that P2P lending platform selects “compliance management” or “noncompliance management” and that market supervisory organization selects “strong supervision” or “weak supervision,” respectively. Furthermore, the relevant influencing factors are analyzed which come from 18 P2P lending platforms in Guangdong Province of China, and the conclusions were in good agreement with the actual market. The research has scientific guiding significance.

A Static Game Study between Food Enterprises Based on Value Perception Differences of Food Quality and Safety

2013 ◽  
Vol 791-793 ◽  
pp. 2171-2174
Author(s):  
Yuan Fen Yin ◽  
Yun Deng ◽  
Xiu Li Sang
Keyword(s):  
Food Quality ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Quality And Safety ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Value Perception ◽  
Safety Mechanism ◽  
Psychology And Economics ◽  
Food Quality And Safety ◽  
Food Market

Behavior strategy of food enterprises exerts a direct influence on food quality and safety. Against the backdrop of value perception differences on food quality and safety between different food enterprises, this paper establishes a static game model and based on prospect theory, explores the reasons for food quality and safety issues in our food market from the perspectives of psychology and economics. Finally, it presents a more scientific food quality and safety mechanism and countermeasures.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Bidirectional Multi-Input and Multi-Output Energy Equalization Circuit for the Li-Ion Battery String Based on the Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayu Wang ◽  
Shuailong Dai ◽  
Xi Chen ◽  
Xiang Zhang ◽  
Zhifei Shan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Storage ◽  
Storage Systems ◽  
Output Energy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Li Ion Battery ◽  
Energy Storage Systems ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Li Ion

Energy inconsistency among Li-ion battery cells widely exists in energy storage systems, which contributes to the continuous deterioration of the system durability and overall performance. Researchers have proposed various kinds of battery energy equalizers to reduce such inconsistency. Among them, the inductor equalizer is a predominant type in fast equalization applications. However, it requires relatively more complex control than other types of equalizers. In order to reduce the control complexity of inductor equalizers, a bidirectional multi-input and multi-output energy equalization circuit based on the game theory is proposed in the present work. The proposed equalizer has the modularized circuit topology and the mutually independent working principle. A static game model is developed and exploited for the mathematical description and control analysis of an energy equalization circuit comprised of these equalizers. The feasible control of each equalizer was obtained by solving a series of linear equations for the Nash Equilibrium of the model among the states of charge of the battery cells. The complexity of equations grows linearly with the cell number. The equivalent simulation model for the four-cell equalization is established in the PISM software, where the operational data and simulation results justify the static game model and verify the control validation, respectively. It is concluded that the proposed inductor equalizer is suitable for large-scale battery strings in energy storage systems, electrical vehicles, and new energy power generation applications.

Benefit Analysis about Parts Supplier and Bus Factory as Well as Users Based on Game Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 202-205
Author(s):  
Liang Han ◽  
Xiang Mei Si
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

This thesis analyzes the benefit produced by the cooperation or non-cooperation of parts supplier and bus factory as well as users by use of the perfect-information static game model of the game theory in connection with the current situation of China's bus market supply chain. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis that good after-sales service not only brings benefits to users but also can efficiently promote the voluntary cooperation between a parts supplier and a bus factory, so that the individual benefit and the overall benefit are both increased, and a win-win situation is finally achieved.

A Study on Feasibility of Upstream and Downstream Ecological Cooperation - An Example of Game Among Upstream and Downstream Villages

2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 3589-3593
Author(s):  
Xiao Hong Zhao ◽  
Jun Xin Cao
Keyword(s):  
Complete Information ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Harmonious Development ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Ecological Construction ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The feasibility of area ecological cooperation without government interaction, and the possibility of building up effective ecological cooperation mechanism are the main questions need to be studied for ecological construction and area harmonious development. This article used the game among upstream and downstream villages as an example, analyzed upstream and downstream village under static game of complete information, single stage game and repeated game model, and stated that the sanction among upstream and downstream ecological cooperation is very low without government interaction, however, this result can be remodeled at certain degree through changing the rules of the game and payoff matrix of both game side.

scholarly journals Research of Complete Information Static Game Model for Software Manufacturer, White Hats and Black Hats

2018 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 832-840
Author(s):  
Qiang Leng ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Ruixuan Pan ◽  
Hao Hu
Keyword(s):  
Complete Information ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Static Game
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