“Quality of Government”

Until recently, with some notable exceptions, contemporary political philosophy has had little to say about topics of “governance.” Unlike earlier thinkers, contemporary theorists have largely ignored topics such as bureaucracy, institutions, corruption, public integrity, and public service. Accordingly, Rothstein and Jan Teorell’s idea of “Quality of Government” (“QoG”), combined with the work of other political scientists and public administration theorists, invites a welcome and long overdue return to topics of governance for political philosophy. This chapter first aims to clarify the precise question to which “QoG” is intended to be answer, that is, the question of “good governance” and distinguish it from more traditional philosophical concerns with justice and legitimacy. We review the limited philosophical landscape, and then critique of the QoG as a theory of good governance. Finally, we tentatively outline an alternative account, and consider directions for future research.

Measuring the Unmeasurable? Taking Stock of QoG Measures

This chapter discusses a wide scope of the available indicators of quality of government. It begins with a brief history of the development of the indicators and their scientific impact on social science research. The chapter posits a typology of the various ways in which indicators of governance can differ and implications of such differences. The chapter then reveals the degree to which contemporary cross-country indicators of corruption in particular correlate. Next, several well-established critiques of contemporary data are presented. The chapter concludes with several comments on what makes a good quality indicator and puts for several suggestions for future work in this ever-growing field.

Inequality, Education, and Corruption

This chapter shows a link between levels of mass education in 1870 and corruption levels in 2010 for 78 countries that remains strong when controlling for change in the level of education, GDP/ capita, and democracy. A model for the causal mechanism between universal education and control of corruption is presented. Early introduction of universal education is linked to levels of economic equality and to efforts to increase state capacity. First, societies with more equal education gave citizens more opportunities and power for opposing corruption. Secondly, the need for increased state capacity was a strong motivation for the introduction of universal education in many countries. Strong states provided more education to their publics and such states were more common where economic disparities were initially smaller.

Economic Diversification, Homogeneity of Interests, and the Impartiality of Government

Can economic diversification constrain elites from shaping government institutions to their own advantage? This chapter reviews scholarly work that suggests it can. Elites frequently use government institutions to cement their position and enrich themselves at the expense of others, but to overcome opposition to their own advancement they must form coalitions. The ability to form coalitions is conditioned by the compatibility of underlying interests; the more diverse the economy, the less cohesive the underlying interests are, making it harder for the elites to form collusive coalitions. This chapter outlines political theory and recent research on the role played by diverse and competing interests in shaping the exercise of government power, democratization, and institutional reform. Considering the sectoral structure of the economy can help us better understand ongoing economic and political processes such as reconcentration of economic activities, the position of transient labor, and state-led efforts for economic diversification.

Inequality and Corruption

Corruption is a primary problem for the quality of government. Since most corrupt exchanges favor the wealthy and the powerful rather than the poor and the powerless, corruption tends to reinforce and widen existing inequalities of wealth and power. Higher inequalities in income and wealth may lead to higher levels of corruption by undermining democratic accountability mechanisms. The wealthy elite may capture policymaking and implementation processes and corrupt electoral process through sponsoring clientelistic politics. Also, high inequality is likely to affect norms and perceptions about corruption, eroding social trust and encouraging corruption. The reciprocal causality may create a vicious cycle of high corruption and high inequality as well as a virtuous cycle of low corruption and low inequality, especially in democracies.

Happiness and the Quality of Government

This chapter uses happiness data to assess the quality of government. Our happiness data are drawn from the Gallup World Poll, starting in 2005 and extending to 2017 or 2018. In our analysis of the panel of more than 150 countries and generally over 1,500 national-level observations, we show that government delivery quality is significantly correlated with national happiness, but democratic quality is not. We also analyze other quality of government indicators. Confidence in government is correlated with happiness, however forms of democracy and government spending seem not. We further discuss three channels (including peace and conflict, trust, and inequality) whereby quality of government and happiness are linked. We finally summarize what has been learned about how government policies could be formed to improve citizens’ happiness.

Quality of Government

In trying to conceptualize quality of government (QoG) one enters into the same difficulties as with other central concepts in the social sciences such as power, democracy, corruption, violence, etc. It is argued that conceptual precision is necessary for creating valid and reliable measures without which empirical research and policy solutions will not be possible. The strategy used in this conceptual operation has been to try to define what could be the opposite of corruption. It is argued that quality of government should be defined as separate from quality of democracy and also government effectiveness since we want to explain the latter by the former. A number of choices for defining QoG are presented (normative vs. empirical, substantive vs. procedural, universal vs. relativistic, multi- vs. unidimensional) are presented. The suggested definition is based on the idea of impartiality in the exercise of public power. Lastly, a number of challenges to this definition are presented.

Pockets of Effectiveness and Islands of Integrity

The administrative quality of states is typically measured at the level of national governments, tacitly presuming organizational strength is evenly distributed throughout the organizations comprising central state administration. However, those organizations vary substantially in providing impartial, effective, and honest administration. This chapter examines variation in the quality of government within central state administrations, a newly consolidating subfield identified with “pockets of effectiveness” or “islands of integrity.” This scholarship analyzes how some state agencies manage to offer high-quality administration in challenging institutional contexts where many peer organizations are weak, ineffectual, or corrupt. The chapter discusses methodological challenges and traces the history of first- and second-wave scholarship in this subfield. Then through meta-analysis, it identifies four major theoretical themes in prior scholarship: technical competence and incentives, external networks, autonomy, and organizational culture. The chapter concludes with promising avenues for future research, identifying ways scholars and practitioners interested in quality of government broadly can benefit from the findings of this subfield.

Bringing Politics Back In

Why are some states able to provide public goods and promote broad-based development whereas other states do not have the capacity to do any of these things? In search for an answer to this question, the past few decades have witnessed a radical increase in studies emphasizing a presumed negative role of ethnic fractionalization. Having been referred to as “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy,” the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization is now even so widely accepted that it has become a “standard” control in regressions explaining variation in political, social, and economic development. This chapter introduces, revisits, and confronts this so-called “diversity debit hypothesis,” focusing on the role of the Quality of Government. In particular, the chapter emphasizes the need to endogenize the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and public goods provision in a way that brings the state up front of the analysis as a social force in its own right, with the power to shape notions of “us” and “them” and, thus, development outcomes.

The Quality of Government and Civil Conflict

What does existing research tell us about the relationship between the quality of government and civil conflict? There is no clearly delineated literature that scholars interested in this relationship ascribe to. In general, scholars have devoted more effort to examining variations in the outlook of formal state institutions, rather than how governance is exercised within these structures. We discuss how research falling under other conceptual umbrellas, such as democracy, state repression, inequality, and institutional trust help inform the debate about the relationship between the quality of government and civil conflict. Through this broader lens we synthesize what we know both about the quality of government as a predictor for conflict outbreak and recurrence, and how civil conflict shapes the quality of government, drawing on macro- and micro-level studies. The chapter concludes by pointing towards fruitful avenues for future research.