Analysis of Cutback Management Strategy in Financial Sustainability in the Public Sector in Indonesia

There are many literature reviews that write about the causes and expected consequences of an environmental, social, and economic crisis. It should be remembered that the role of the public sector is critical to overcoming crises, to promoting sustainable development and to managing the balance between supply and demand for public services. This qualitative research takes a case study approach to public agencies under the Ministry of Finance, namely the Directorate General of Customs and Excise. This study aims to explain financial sustainability in public bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic, and explain cutback management strategies indicated through refocusing carried out by government agencies during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as explain the relationship between cutback management and financial sustainability which is significantly directly related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of the analysis show that there are differences in the financial sustainability of Customs and Excise during the pandemic, namely in terms of state revenues, it certainly changes (decreases) in terms of tax revenues, import duties, and excise. Then identified indicators of cutback strategies at Customs and Excise, and there is a conceptual link between financial sustainability, the COVID-19 pandemic and cutback management strategies.

The role of public service bargains in cutback management: Insights in reforms in the Dutch penitentiary sector

Public managers need to interact with their political principals when managing cutbacks. However, research on cutback management did not put much emphasis on this interaction. We analyse how the interaction between public managers and political principals develops during cutbacks, and how this affects cutback management. We analyse these interactions between political principals and public managers as a public service bargain. This study employs an in-depth qualitative case study on recent cutbacks in the Dutch penitentiary system. The results show that cutbacks put the interaction between public managers and political principals under pressure. As political principals feel that public managers’ loyalty towards them is violated, they centralise decision making. Consequently, public managers are withheld responsibility for cutback management. Strong resistance to cutbacks from public managers and subsequent political uproar leads to both actors having to find a new balance in the bargain. Furthermore, it leads to changes in both the content (what is cut back back) and the process (how are cutbacks decided upon and implemented) of cutback management. The first conclusion of this study and our contribution to the cutback management literature is that if we want to understand the work and behaviour of public managers during cutbacks, we cannot neglect the political context public managers work in. Second, we contribute to the literature on PSBs, as we conclude that cutbacks, even if they do not impact the institutional, formal part of the bargain, have the potential to affect public service bargains and thus, the interactions between public managers and political principals.

UNESCO: Between Sectoral Fragmentation and Budget Crisis

Chapter 7 examines the case of UNESCO and the effects of the sectoral and vertical fragmentation of the organization. The case is particularly pertinent since the US stopped its contributions after Palestine was admitted as a member in 2011, resulting in a major financial crisis for the organization. Despite the need for rigorous cutback management, budgeting procedures and budgeting administration have remained highly routinized. While this highlights the important procedural role of international bureaucrats and their ability to ensure the continued functioning of IOs, these solutions also show the limits to the substantive influence of international bureaucracies in budgeting. In essence, UNESCO remains an organization that is highly fragmented along policy lines, horizontally and vertically, and both among member states as well as inside its own bureaucracy. This results in budgetary segmentation and increased proceduralization well beyond the core budgeting stages regulated by formal rules.