Experimental Archaeology

Experimental archaeology is a multifaceted approach employed by a wide and rapidly expanding range of exponents including everybody from lab-based archaeological research scientists through to museum professionals and re-enactment groups. Scientific experiments are trials designed to test a hypothesis which will either be rejected (falsified) or validated. Validation does not imply truth, but demonstrates that the hypothesis is viable, though there may be equally viable alternatives. Experiments are the mainstay of almost all hypothetico-deductive science. Hence, one could define most archaeological science as being a form of experimental archaeology. However, most practitioners of experimental archaeology would view an attempt to replicate past activities and processes using authentic materials as an essential, defining aspect of the field. A laboratory scientist’s approach to experimentation is likely to minimize the variables being investigated at any one time while maximising control over conditions. Other experimental approaches, however, aim to see how processes work within life-like scenarios that involve authentic materials and variables. The term “actualistic” is often applied to such a mode of experimentation, alongside “reconstruction” and “replicative.” The best research often involves both controlled and actualistic experimentation to provide a sound understanding of individual variables and the interaction of many variables within realistic scenarios. These approaches are complementary and on a continuum. While some experimental archaeologists view their approach as an actualistic branch of hypothesis-based archaeological science, where the strict definitions of an experiment apply, others view the field as somewhat broader. Such practitioners value what can be learned from attempting to carry out activities, or even live, in conditions and with the materials that would be available in a particular time or place. This type of activity is often not based upon the testing of particular hypotheses but on experiential learning. Exponents of this approach will gain insights into the potential challenges faced by past peoples that might not otherwise occur to us or be reflected in the ethnographic record. Groups of practitioners that fall into this category might variously identify as being “re-enactors,” exponents of “living history,” “primitive technologists” or even “survivalists.” Thus, experimental archaeology can range from strictly scientific and objective methods to more subjective, experiential approaches, while retaining the essential aim of undertaking experiments which usually include actualistic activities using authentic materials. An additional noteworthy attribute of experimental archaeology is that re-enactment and reconstruction activities lend themselves particularly well to engaging forms of public presentation and education. As such, open-air experimental archaeology museums are currently expanding in number and visitorship. This field is expanding exponentially in almost every branch of archaeology making an individual section on every possible topic impossible, thus our approach is indicative and organized by broad themes of inquiry.

From Kant to Popper: Reason and Critical Rationalism in Organization Studies

The objective of this essay is to revisit the theoretical construction of Critical Rationalism, starting from the philosophy of Kantian reason contained in the works Critique of pure reason and Critique of practical reason to discuss their respective influences over the work of Karl Popper. We aim, with this exercise, to shed light on the critical-rationalist approach in Organization Studies. Our argument is that Kantian thought has been conducive, on the one hand, to a negative philosophy that considers idealism prior notions and a priori knowledge fundamental to the creative conception of knowledge and, on the other hand, to a hypothetical-deductive science that seeks to bring us closer to truth through criticism. The basis of critical rationalism lies in the search for reason and transcendental truth. This is a call not only for the production of theories, but for dedication to test their validity – a problem that has not received much attention from researchers in the field of organization studies.

De Kant a Popper: Razão e Racionalismo Crítico nos Estudos Organizacionais

The objective of this essay is to revisit the theoretical construction of Critical Rationalism, starting from the philosophy of Kantian reason contained in the works Critique of pure reason and Critique of practical reason to discuss their respective influences over the work of Karl Popper. We aim, with this exercise, to shed light on the critical-rationalist approach in Organization Studies. Our argument is that Kantian thought has been conducive, on the one hand, to a negative philosophy that considers idealism prior notions and a priori knowledge fundamental to the creative conception of knowledge and, on the other hand, to a hypothetical-deductive science that seeks to bring us closer to truth through criticism. The basis of critical rationalism lies in the search for reason and transcendental truth. This is a call not only for the production of theories, but for dedication to test their validity – a problem that has not received much attention from researchers in the field of organization studies.

Interrogating the Brain

Can torture be studied as a biomedical problem? I contend that it most certainly can. Torture can be approached as a biomedical problem in a variety of ways. Torture can be examined in terms of its consequences (e.g., in torture patients); torture can be modeled, using special populations (e.g., elite soldiers) undergoing particular training and combat regimes; torture can be treated deductively, in an analytic fashion, by investigating the consequences of stressors focused on shared aspects of neuropsychological function. Predictions can be made, based on contemporary models of the effects of stress on neurocognitive function, and outcomes tested in differing populations. It is an epistemic mistake to think that torture can only be approached using randomized-control trial methodologies, as this misunderstands the nature of empirical-deductive science. Torture is a demonstrably poor truth-seeking practice, for reasons rooted deep in our shared psychology and neurobiology. Besides being morally abhorrent and manifestly illegal, torture is a demonstrable failure on its own terms. The extreme stressors employed during torture negatively affect the integrated psychobiological functioning of our brains and bodies. Hence the intelligence yield from torture both in recent experience, and historically, has typically been very poor. Finally, I examine outdated ideas regarding human behavior, but which live on in practice (“zombie” ideas). I conclude with a discussion of the centrality of the behavioral and brain sciences as evolving research domains central to solving the problem of reliably and ethically gathering information from other human beings, with a focus on the importance of evidence-based policy formation.

Logic of faith and deed. The idea and an outline of the theoretical conception

This paper discusses the theoretical assumptions behind the conception of the logic of faith and deed (LF&D) and outlines its formal-axiomatic frame and its method of construction, which enable us to understand it as a kind of deductive science. The paper is divided into several sections, starting with the logical analysis of the ambiguous terms of ‚faith’ and ‚action’, and focusing in particular on the concepts of religious faith and deed as a type of conscious activity relating to a matter or matters of social importance. After outlining the main ideas and basic assumptions of the theoretical conception of the LF&D as an axiomatic theory, the author introduces some axiom systems for: 1) the logics of faith LF (doxastic logics), 2) the logic of deed LD, and 3) certain logics of norms DL (deontic logics) connected with „duties” and concerning actions/deeds. Lastly, the paper outlines the scientific LF&D based on the three types of logic 1)–3).

Plato’s notion of hypothesis in dialogues Meno, Phaedo and The Republic

The author analyses Plato?s use of the hypothesis notion in connection with his hypotheses method, as it was articulated in Meno and Phaedo, and later criticized in The Republic. It is shown that, at first, Plato?s use of this notion was identical to its use in ancient Greek mathematics, and that the same stands in regards with his method of inquiry - this, too, was at first modeled after ancient Greek mathematical methods of analysis and diorismos. Later, as he developed the metaphysical theory of forms, Plato distanced himself from ideal of building philosophy on the model of ancient Greek deductive science and established it as auto reflexive, critical thinking instead, with dialectics as method in its own right.

Science, φ-Science, and the Dual Character of Chemistry

A central question in philosophy of chemistry is the status of chemistry as a science: Is chemistry simply a physical science, a science of its own type, or something else? In traditional philosophy of science, physics has been considered the epitome of science, and chemistry was long regarded as a physical science. Recently, however, the “physical” interpretation of chemistry has become unpopular, because it implies in one way or another that chemistry can be reduced to physics—an idea which has come to be seriously questioned. Philosophers of chemistry now emphasize that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have argued that chemistry is its own type of science, as, for example, biology has been recognized as a science in its own right. This view has been most directly expressed and systematically developed by Joachim Schummer, who observes: “Because it seems hard to decide whether chemistry more resembles physics, biology, technology, or whatever, I propose to handle it as its own type of science” (Schummer 1997, 329–330; cf. Schummer 2006; see also, e.g., van Brakel 1999, 134; 2000, 71–73). Understanding chemistry as its own type of science emphasizes the experimental nature of chemistry and its contrast to the experimental basis of physics. Drawing on historical and scientometric studies, it has been argued that in contrast to natural history; to biology as an initially descriptive, empirical-inductive science; and to physics—as the epitome of mathematical, hypothetico-deductive science for which experiments(in which measurements are primary) are only tools for testing theories, thus keeping theoretical knowledge connected with “empirical reality”; and, on the other hand, of natural history—“chemistry has always been the laboratory science per se, such that still in the nineteenth century the term ‘laboratory’ denoted a place for experimental research in which chemical operations were performed” (Nye 1993, 50). The chemical laboratory became the model for all the other laboratory sciences when they replaced “thought experiments” by real experiments. Although chemistry is no longer the only experimental science, it is by far the biggest one and historically the model for all others” (Schummer 2004, 397–398).

Matemática, adjetivo: a demonstração pela ótica da cultura

ResumoO presente texto visa explicitar alguns valores presentes na matemática escolar, especificamente no procedimento dedutivo, e, portanto, na demonstração. Nosso olhar para a matemática e sua organização lógico dedutiva ocorrerá de um ponto de vista cultural, respaldado por abordagens provenientes do campo da etnomatemática que discutem que toda prática é imbricada de valores. Mostraremos que, nas orientações curriculares e em guias do Programa Nacional de Livros Didáticos atuais, a demonstração permanece sendo valorizada na matemática escolar. Para explicitar os valores serão consideradas demonstrações contidas em “Os Elementos” de Euclides de forma a mostrar como a matemática, mais especificamente a geometria, incorporou a lógica aristotélica assim como a valorização do conhecimento dedutivo sob o indutivo. Sendo a matemática vista como uma ciência dedutiva, argumentamos que nela ainda se coloca a superioridade desta em relação a outros conhecimentos. Os processos dedutivos realizados na matemática escolar serão problematizados para além da noção de rigor, trazendo valores associados a eles.Palavras-chave: valores; dedução; silogismo; lógica; Os Elementos de Euclides.Mathematics, adjective: The demonstration by the perspective of cultureAbstractThe present text aims to clarify some values in school mathematics, specifically in the deductive procedure, and therefore in demonstration. Our approach to mathematics and its deductive logical organization will focus on a cultural perspective, based on ethnomathematics which discuss that every practice is closely tied to values. We will show, both in the current curricular guidelines as in National Textbook Program, that demonstration is valuable in school mathematics. To clarify these values, we will take into account demonstrations contained in Euclid’s Elements, in order to show how mathematics, specifically geometry, incorporated Aristotelian logic as well as the appreciation of deductive knowledge under the inductive. Since math is conceived as a deductive science, we argue that it still gives it a higher position in relation to other forms of knowledge. Deductive procedures held in school mathematics will be discussed beyond the notion of accuracy, bringing some related values. Keywords: values; deduction; syllogism; logic; Euclid’s Elements.

Matemática, adjetivo: a demonstração pela ótica da cultura

ResumoO presente texto visa explicitar alguns valores presentes na matemática escolar, especificamente no procedimento dedutivo, e, portanto, na demonstração. Nosso olhar para a matemática e sua organização lógico dedutiva ocorrerá de um ponto de vista cultural, respaldado por abordagens provenientes do campo da etnomatemática que discutem que toda prática é imbricada de valores. Mostraremos que, nas orientações curriculares e em guias do Programa Nacional de Livros Didáticos atuais, a demonstração permanece sendo valorizada na matemática escolar. Para explicitar os valores serão consideradas demonstrações contidas em “Os Elementos” de Euclides de forma a mostrar como a matemática, mais especificamente a geometria, incorporou a lógica aristotélica assim como a valorização do conhecimento dedutivo sob o indutivo. Sendo a matemática vista como uma ciência dedutiva, argumentamos que nela ainda se coloca a superioridade desta em relação a outros conhecimentos. Os processos dedutivos realizados na matemática escolar serão problematizados para além da noção de rigor, trazendo valores associados a eles.Palavras-chave: valores; dedução; silogismo; lógica; Os Elementos de Euclides.Mathematics, adjective: The demonstration by the perspective of cultureAbstractThe present text aims to clarify some values in school mathematics, specifically in the deductive procedure, and therefore in demonstration. Our approach to mathematics and its deductive logical organization will focus on a cultural perspective, based on ethnomathematics which discuss that every practice is closely tied to values. We will show, both in the current curricular guidelines as in National Textbook Program, that demonstration is valuable in school mathematics. To clarify these values, we will take into account demonstrations contained in Euclid’s Elements, in order to show how mathematics, specifically geometry, incorporated Aristotelian logic as well as the appreciation of deductive knowledge under the inductive. Since math is conceived as a deductive science, we argue that it still gives it a higher position in relation to other forms of knowledge. Deductive procedures held in school mathematics will be discussed beyond the notion of accuracy, bringing some related values. Keywords: values; deduction; syllogism; logic; Euclid’s Elements.