How to reason about religious beliefs

Intractable disagreements are commonly analyzed in terms of the semantic opposition of (at least) couples of disputed beliefs (purely epistemic view, from here on PEV). While such a view seems to be a very natural starting point, my intuitions are that such an approach is misleadingly unrealistic, and that an empirical modeling towards how individuals hold beliefs in intractable opposition constitutes a strong defeater for PEV. My work addresses disagreements within the religious domain. Accordingly, I will be concerned with developing my empirical understanding of religious beliefs, and will show the consequences of such proposal on how to answer the problem of religious diversity.

The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement

The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) has argued that the principle is better understood as an epistemic rule, guiding decision-makers in forming beliefs rather than choosing among possible acts. On the epistemic view, he claims there is a principle concerning expert disagreement underlying precautionary-based reasoning called the ecumenical principle: all expert views should be considered in a precautionary appraisal, not just those that are the most prominent or influential. In articulating the doxastic commitments of decision-makers under this constraint, Peterson precludes any probabilistic rule that might result in combining expert opinions. For combined or consensus probabilities are likely to provide decision-makers with information that is more precise than warranted. Contra Peterson, I argue that upon adopting a broader conception of probability, there is a probabilistic rule, under which expert opinions are combined, that is immune to his criticism and better represents the ecumenical principle.

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem: A Peaceful Coexistence

According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, $$\psi$$ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.

On the Classification Between $$\psi$$-Ontic and $$\psi$$-Epistemic Ontological Models

Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125–157, 2010) provided a categorization of quantum ontological models classifying them as $$\psi$$ ψ -ontic or $$\psi$$ ψ -epistemic if the quantum state $$\psi$$ ψ describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers’ knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein—who was a supporter of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics—endorsed an epistemic view of $$\psi .$$ ψ . In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of its consequences by proposing a twofold argumentation. Firstly, we show that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization implicitly assumes that a complete description of a quantum system (its ontic state, $$\lambda$$ λ ) only concerns single, individual systems instantiating absolute, intrinsic properties. Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that, since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather than individuals, such a view cannot be considered $$\psi$$ ψ -epistemic. As a consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein’s view concerning the nature of the quantum state. Next, we will focus on relational quantum mechanics and perspectival quantum mechanics, which in virtue of their relational and perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states $$\lambda$$ λ dealing with relational properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization is too narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of $$\lambda$$ λ across different interpretations of quantum mechanics.

The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness

According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.

On Backlash: Emotion and the Politicisation of Security

This article explores the role of emotion in the politicisation of security through the concept of backlash: the idea of visceral and reactionary episodes where security claims are adamantly rejected and the subject of ‘security’ becomes intensely controversial. Starting by examining the role of emotion in politicisation, I make the case for viewing emotions as playing a key role in the distribution of certainty in security discourse. Building on this epistemic view of emotion, I review how backlash is understood in other fields before tailoring a definition for security studies centered around four constitutive features: reaction, hostility, emotion, and contagion. The final section focuses on the politicising effects of backlash including the mobilisation of backlash movements, the intensification of controversy, and arena shifting. The discussion concludes by suggesting that the concept of backlash offers a promising research agenda for those inquiring into the politicisation of security.

Living in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology

In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines. I then go on to suggest that this epistemic view allows for a recognition of different discursive loyalties. In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence. In this way, I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account.