scholarly journals Are Conservatives More Rigid Than Liberals? A Meta-Analytic Test of the Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Shauna Bowes ◽  
Matthew Baldwin ◽  
Scott Owen Lilienfeld ◽  
Arber Tasimi

The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (RRH), which posits that cognitive, motivational, and ideological rigidity resonate with political conservatism, is the dominant psychological account of political ideology. Here, we conduct an extensive review of the RRH, using multilevel meta-analysis to examine relations between varieties of rigidity and ideology alongside a bevy of potential moderators (s = 329, k = 708, N = 187,612). Associations between conservatism and rigidity were enormously heterogeneous, such that broad theoretical accounts of left-right asymmetries in rigidity have masked complex—yet conceptually fertile—patterns of relations. Most notably, correlations between economic conservatism and rigidity constructs were almost uniformly not significant, whereas social conservatism and rigidity were significantly positively correlated. Further, leftists and rightists exhibited modestly asymmetrical motivations yet closely symmetrical thinking styles and cognitive architecture. Dogmatism was a special case, with rightists being clearly more dogmatic. Complicating this picture, moderator analyses revealed that the RRH may not generalize to key environmental/psychometric modalities. Thus, our work represents a crucial launch point for advancing a more accurate—but admittedly more nuanced—model of political social cognition. We resolve that drilling into this complexity, thereby moving away from the question of if conservatives are essentially rigid, will amplify the explanatory power of political psychology.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Fischer ◽  
Quentin Atkinson ◽  
Ananish Chaudhuri

This chapter provides an overview of studies that use incentivised experiments to study political ideology. We look first at studies that conceptualise political ideology along a unidimensional liberal-conservative spectrum and explore whether there are behavioural differences between liberals and conservatives. While recent studies find that liberals display more pro-sociality, many other studies find that liberals and conservatives display similar levels of pro-social, ingroup-biased, normative, and punitive behaviour. We then turn to experiments that study two-dimensional political ideology as embodied in the concepts of economic conservatism/progressivism (often measured with the Social Dominance Orientation scale) and social conservatism/progressivism (usually measured with the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale). In such experiments, economic conservatives display lower levels of pro-sociality and universalism and greater tolerance of inequality and tendencies to harm outgroups. Social conservatives tend to display “groupishness”, including distrusting anonymous strangers, cooperating with ingroup members, following rules, punishing in the ultimatum game, and sometimes harming outgroups.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Cory J Clark ◽  
Peter Meindl ◽  
Jamie B Luguri ◽  
Brian D. Earp ◽  
...  

In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs aredriven by stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign responsibility. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behaviour (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations of our hypothesis, we show that when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); that when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and that specific perceptions of wrongness mediate the relationship between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). Together, our results suggest political differences in free will are largely explicable through motivated reasoning and differing desires to blame, rather than reflecting some genuine disagreement about the metaphysical nature of human freedom. Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Cory J Clark ◽  
Peter Meindl ◽  
Jamie B Luguri ◽  
Brian D. Earp ◽  
...  

In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n=308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, we show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is statistically mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behavior (n=14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations to test our hypotheses, we show that: when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and specific perceptions of wrongness account for the relation between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). These results are consistent with our theory that political differences in free will belief are at least partly explicable by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jahnavi R. Delmonico ◽  
Erin Michelle Buchanan

This study examined the potential for a predictive relationship between political conservatism and change detection. Research on the visual system has revealed a general tendency to overlook changes in a stationary scene when two versions of it are displayed alternately with a masking slide, known as the flicker paradigm. We examined whether political conservatism and various related measures predicted whether and how quickly changes were detected during a flicker paradigm task. Measures of interest were conservatism as measured by the Social and Economic Conservatism scale (Everett, 2013), openness as measured by the short form of the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue & Kentle, 1991), authoritarianism as measured by the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 2006), political party, and a single bipolar conservatism scale. Despite predictions that greater conservatism and authoritarianism would shorten response latencies, authoritarianism appeared to lengthen the time it took to identify a change, while social conservatism shortened it. Openness and other forms of conservatism did not demonstrate significant predictive relationships. Implications of this pattern are discussed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 209
Author(s):  
Wouter Jacobs ◽  
Anton Vonk-Noordegraaf ◽  
◽  

Pulmonary arterial hypertension is a progressive disease of the pulmonary vasculature, ultimately leading to right heart failure and death. Current treatment is aimed at targeting three different pathways: the prostacyclin, endothelin and nitric oxide pathways. These therapies improve functional class, increase exercise capacity and improve haemodynamics. In addition, data from a meta-analysis provide compelling evidence of improved survival. Despite these treatments, the outcome is still grim and the cause of death is inevitable – right ventricular failure. One explanation for this paradox of haemodynamic benefit and still worse outcome is that the right ventricle does not benefit from a modest reduction in pulmonary vascular resistance. This article describes the physiological concepts that might underlie this paradox. Based on these concepts, we argue that not only a significant reduction in pulmonary vascular resistance, but also a significant reduction in pulmonary artery pressure is required to save the right ventricle. Haemodynamic data from clinical trials hold the promise that these haemodynamic requirements might be met if upfront combination therapy is used.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Hawes ◽  
H Moriah Sokolowski ◽  
Chuka Bosah Ononye ◽  
Daniel Ansari

Where and under what conditions do spatial and numerical skills converge and diverge in the brain? To address this question, we conducted a meta-analysis of brain regions associated with basic symbolic number processing, arithmetic, and mental rotation. We used Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) to construct quantitative meta-analytic maps synthesizing results from 86 neuroimaging papers (~ 30 studies/cognitive process). All three cognitive processes were found to activate bilateral parietal regions in and around the intraparietal sulcus (IPS); a finding consistent with shared processing accounts. Numerical and arithmetic processing were associated with overlap in the left angular gyrus, whereas mental rotation and arithmetic both showed activity in the middle frontal gyri. These patterns suggest regions of cortex potentially more specialized for symbolic number representation and domain-general mental manipulation, respectively. Additionally, arithmetic was associated with unique activity throughout the fronto-parietal network and mental rotation was associated with unique activity in the right superior parietal lobe. Overall, these results provide new insights into the intersection of numerical and spatial thought in the human brain.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vukašin Gligorić ◽  
Allard Feddes ◽  
Bertjan Doosje

Frankfurt defined persuasive communication that has no regard for truth, knowledge, or evidence as bullshit. Although there has been a lot of psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit, no study examined this type of communication in politics. In the present research, we operationalize political bullshit receptivity as endorsing vague political statements, slogans, and political bullshit programs. We investigated the relationship of these three measures with pseudo-profound bullshit, ideology (political ideology, support for neoliberalism), populism, and voting behavior. Three pre-registered studies in different cultural settings (the United States, Serbia, The Netherlands; total N = 534) yielded medium to high intercorrelations between political bullshit measures and pseudo-profound bullshit, and good construct validity (hypothesized one-factor solution). A Bayesian meta-analysis showed that all political bullshit measures positively correlated with support for the free market, while only some positively correlated with social (political statements and programs) and economic conservatism (programs), and populism (programs). In the U.S., higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability that one voted for Trump (vs Clinton) in the past and higher intentions to vote for Trump (vs Biden and Sanders). In the Netherlands, higher receptivity to political bullshit predicted the intention to vote for the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. Exploratory analyses on merged datasets showed that higher receptivity to political bullshit was associated with a higher probability to vote for right-wing candidates/parties and lower probability for the left-wing ones. Overall, political bullshit endorsement showed good validity, opening avenues for research in political communication, especially when this communication is broad and meaningless.


Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Anna Miglietta ◽  
Barbara Loera

We analyzed the relationship between modern forms of populism and citizen support for exclusive welfare policies and proposals, and we focused on support for left-wing- and right-wing-oriented welfare policies enacted or proposed during the Lega Nord (LN)–Five Star Movement (FSM) government in Italy (2018–2019). In light of the theoretical perspective of political ideology as motivated by social cognition, we examined citizens’ support for the two policies considering adherence to populist attitudes, agreement on the criteria useful to define ingroup membership, and personal values. We also took into account the role of cognitive sophistication in populism avoidance. A total of 785 Italian adults (F = 56.6; mean age = 35.8) completed an online survey in the summer of 2019 based on the following: support for populist policies and proposals, political ideologies and positioning, personal values, and ingroup boundaries. We used correlation and regression analyses. The results highlight the relationships between populism and political conservatism. Populism was related to the vertical and horizontal borders defining the “people”; cognitive sophistication was not a relevant driver. We identified some facilitating factors that could promote adherence to and support for public policies inspired by the values of the right or of the left, without a true ideological connotation.


Author(s):  
Gemma Learmonth ◽  
Marietta Papadatou-Pastou

AbstractYoung adults exhibit a small asymmetry of visuospatial attention that favours the left side of space relative to the right (pseudoneglect). However, it remains unclear whether this leftward bias is maintained, eliminated or shifted rightward in older age. Here we present two meta-analyses that aimed to identify whether adults aged ≥50 years old display a group-level spatial attention bias, as indexed by the line bisection and the landmark tasks. A total of 69 datasets from 65 studies, involving 1654 participants, were analysed. In the meta-analysis of the line bisection task (n = 63), no bias was identified for studies where the mean age was ≥50, but there was a clear leftward bias in a subset where all individual participants were aged ≥50. There was no moderating effect of the participant’s age or sex, line length, line position, nor the presence of left or right cues. There was a small publication bias in favour of reporting rightward biases. Of note, biases were slightly more leftward in studies where participants had been recruited as part of a stand-alone older group, compared to studies where participants were recruited as controls for a clinical study. Similarly, no spatial bias was observed in the meta-analysis of the landmark task, although the number of studies included was small (n = 6). Overall, these results indicate that over 50s maintain a group-level leftward bias on the line bisection task, but more studies are needed to determine whether this bias can be modulated by stimulus- or state-dependent factors.


Author(s):  
Alessandro Varacca ◽  
Giovanni Guastella ◽  
Stefano Pareglio ◽  
Paolo Sckokai

Abstract The impact of the European Union common agricultural policy direct payments on land prices has received substantial attention in recent years, leading to heterogeneous evidence of capitalisation for both coupled and decoupled payments. In this paper, we provide an extensive review of the empirical works addressing this issue econometrically and compare their results through a Bayesian meta-regression model, focussing on the impact of decoupling and its implementation schemes. We find that the introduction of decoupled payments increased the capitalisation rate, although the extent of this increment hinges on the implementation scheme adopted by the member state.


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