Personal Identity and Impersonal Ethics

On the Reductionist View, the fact of a person’s existence and that of her identity over time just consist in the holding of certain more particular facts about physical and mental events and the relations between these events. These more particular facts are impersonal—they do not presuppose or entail the existence of any person or mental subject. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that if the Reductionist View is true, then ‘it is … more plausible to focus, not on persons, but on experiences, and to claim that what matters morally is the nature of these experiences’. But why think that the Reductionist View has this implication? As critics such as Robert Adams, David Brink, Mark Johnston, Christine Korsgaard, and Susan Wolf have suggested, it is not clear why the Reductionist View should have any implications regarding the moral importance of persons. This chapter argues that in contrast to Non-reductionist views, Psychological Reductionism, a version of the Reductionist View that assumes a psychological criterion of personal identity, supports the kind of impersonal moral outlook that Parfit describes.

Features of criminal liability of persons with mental anomalies: foreign experience

Annotation: Despite the rather large number of works devoted to the study of the characteristic features of mental anomalies, which do not exclude criminal prosecution, the peculiarities of criminal prosecution of such persons, a number of insufficiently solved problems remain. In the criminal law of a number of countries, the liability of persons with mental anomalies has long been regulated within the institution of limited sanity. And in this aspect, the study of foreign experience in the legislative regulation of this institution is necessary. The purpose of the study is to study the rules of foreign criminal law, which determine the features of criminal liability of persons with mental anomalies, and compare them with the relevant rules of criminal law of Ukraine. Among the countries whose criminal law provides for limited sanity for persons with mental anomalies, there are two conditional approaches to the criminal liability of persons with mental anomalies (mental disorders) in accordance with the legal family: England-American and Romano-Germanic. In the vast majority of countries of the Romano-Germanic legal family, whose criminal law defines the specifics of the responsibility of persons with mental anomalies (limited sanity), criteria such as medical (mental anomaly or disorder) and psychological (lack of awareness and / or control of their actions). The criminal law of the England-American legal family does not have a clear definition of the concept, criteria and consequences of the state of limited sanity in the subject of the crime. The criminal legislation of Ukraine on determining the features of criminal liability of persons with mental anomalies in the form of their legislative definition corresponds to the legislation of the Romano-Germanic legal family. The legal criterion of limited sanity, which is defined in the theory of criminal law, should be called psychological, because it is an intellectual-volitional manifestation of behaviour, not legal. It may be legal to establish a medical and psychological criterion of limited sanity in the relevant norm with an emphasis on the criminal consequences that will have a mental anomaly on the criminal liability of such an entity.

Derek Parfit and yearning for personal identity (we do not exist, but really want to)

The article critically represents Derek Parfit’s view on personal identity and its connection with our bodies. During the discussion with animalists who claim that persons are identical with bodies Parfit defends Lockean view and concludes that person isn’t identical with human being and easily can exist beyond it. Yet it seems obvious that person isn’t identical with body, such views lead to the controversial effects. For example, Parfit claims that abortion or euthanasia wouldn’t be a crime. This article discusses some of the most debatable basics of Parfit’s position and suggests at least three points worth of next thinking. At first, the author highlights that the so-called psychological criterion of personal identity is rather conventional. At second, the real experience of personal life doesn’t match with the famous Lockean definition, because we have no any continuity. At third, D. Parfit doesn’t explain what it means to be an animal (or human animal). If there is some biological «base» of a person (head, cerebrum, or part of a cerebrum), it still stays an animal. In the conclusion of the article the author suggests that we are not human beings, nor persons. But it doesn’t mean that we can’t become them

We Are Not Human Beings / trans. from Engl. U. V. Dobronravova

The article presents a comparative analysis the views on the problem of personality identity by Neo-Lockeanism (Shoemaker, Parfit, Lewis) and Animalism (Olson, Snowden, Carter). A certain of main objections to the psychological criterion (the problem of too many thinkers, the too many persons problem, the thinking parts problem, etc.) are critically examined. Basic animalist intuitions are refuted by the embodied person view (McMahan)

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF MIGRANTS FROM TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA STATES

The article was prepared on the base of the of sociological research materials. The research program included criteria and indicators on the basis of which the author determines a vector of development of diaspora communities and the results of socio-cultural integration of culturally different migrants. The author examines religious practices as an indicator of the socio-psychological criterion. The results of the research indicate a generally high level of religiosity and active use of cult practices by the majority of the respondents. However, religious practices which in some cases mark the cultural boundary are not clearly isolationist in their character.

Osobni identitet i kontinuitet mozga

One aspect of the problem of personal identity is considered in this article. In the introduction, the main frame of die problem is stated. After the exposition of the logically possible case of (whole) brain transplantation and the exposition of psychological criterion of personal identity, we introduce the problem of neuron exchange, one by one. Neurons are pulled out from one brain of a certain person, one by one, and they are implemented into the another personYs brain. At the end of this operation, all the neurons which were constitutive of the brain of the person A are assembled again in the head of the person B. The question is who is the person who survives and retains its personal identity? Contrary to John Robinson, I argue that the person who survives and retains identity is the person whose brain received the neurons and not the person from whom the neurons were pulled out. The main reason is the very way in which the neuron change took place.

Freges Kriterien der Sinngleichheit

Frege’s mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in „Über Sinn und Bedeutung“ (1892) and in „Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren“ (1906?) Frege seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a „momentary aberration“, but rather Frege’s official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by appealing to the thoughts of ideal thinkers.

SERŽANTŲ SITUACINIO ATRANKOS TESTO KŪRIMAS

Tyrimo tikslas – išskirti seržantų psichologinės atrankos kriterijus ir sukurti situacinio atrankos testo pirminį variantą. Iš viso tyrime dalyvavo 369 tiriamieji – kariai, seržantai (skyrininkai, būrininkai, kuopininkai) ir būrių vadai. Remiantis pirmojo tyrimų etapo duomenų analize išskirti penki seržantų atrankos kriterijai, vienam iš jų – lyderiavimui – nutarta kurti situacinį testą. Išskyrus problemines seržantų darbo situacijas, įvertintas jų aktualumas ir sunkumas (į pirminį testo variantą įtraukta 15 užduočių). Paskui atlikta užduočių sunkumo ir skiriamosios gebos statistinė analizė, įvertintas situacinio testo vertintojų patikimumas ir sutapimo validumas. Gauti rezultatai parodė, kad seržantų atrankos situacinio testo pirminis variantas pasižymi pakankamu patikimumu ir sutapimo validumu. Pakoregavus sudarytą situacinį testą (pašalinus 4 situacijas), taip pat nustatytas pakankamas jo sutapimo validumas. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: seržantų atrankos kriterijai, situacinis atrankos testas, testo patikimumas ir validumas. DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONAL TEST FOR SERGEANT SELECTIONNeringa Antanaitytė, Kristina Vabolytė, Gintautas Valickas SummaryThe role of sergeants in military units is important as they are officers who deal with soldiers and are responsible for their wellbeing and military preparedness. Sergeants can be set for a variety of duties, therefore different kinds of personality traits and abilities are required. In Lithuania, sergeant selection is based on education, health report and reference letter. So there is no appropriate psychological criterion for the selection of sergeants.The purpose of the present research was to identify criteria of selection of leaders of small army units (section and squad) as well as develop a situational test for their psychological selection and testing their psychometric characteristics. The situational test was based on the leadership criterion. The total number of 369 respondents – soldiers, leaders of sections, leaders of squads and their supervisors – participated in the research. A job analysis questionnaire based on the evaluation of interviewdata and on job descriptions for section and squad leaders was developed, as well as a questionnaire for rating the attributes possessed by good leaders of small army units was compiled. Afterwards one more questionnaire was made, in whichthe importance of the chosen attributes was assessed by linking them to the most important tasks of section and squad leaders. Factor analysis of data resulted in five selection criteria: target-oriented behaviour, leadership, military discipline, interpersonal competence, dutifulness. Within the initial version of the situational test, an interview with section and squad leaders and their supervisors was conducted. There were 29 problematic situations selected from their job. Experts assessed the relevance and difficulty of these situations. Finally, 15 situations were selected for the initial version of the situational test. Then the evaluation of test score reliability and concurrent validity was made. The level of difficulty and discriminative characteristics of each test item (problematic situation) was evaluated as well. Test score reliability and concurrent validity were significant (p < 0.01). Eleven situations were of a sufficient difficulty and discriminative power level. The concurrent validity of the test was assessed after making some corrections by excluding four situations, and it was significant (p < 0.01). Key words: criteria of sergeants’ selection, situational selection test, test reliability and validity.ly: Calibri, sans-serif;">

Adolf Grünbaum on religious delusions

Grünbaum claims it is possible that all belief in God is a delusion, meaning a false belief which is engendered by irrational psychological motives. I dispute this on the grounds that in many cases belief in God is engendered by purely cultural factors, and this is incompatible with its being engendered by psychological ones. Grünbaum also claims that saying a culturally engendered belief cannot be a delusion makes social consensus the sole arbiter of reality. I dispute this on the grounds that we can say that socially engendered beliefs fail to be delusions because they fail to meet the psychological criterion, rather than because they are true.