scholarly journals Holismus und Perspektivismus in Hegels Auffassung der Willensfreiheit

Author(s):  
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGHegelsche Philosophie wird oft als eine metaphysische Konstruktion angesehen.Demgegenüber wird in dem Beitrag eine Position eingenommen, laut der Hegel,innerhalb seines holistischen philosophischen Rahmens, eine perspektivistischeVorgehensweise verwendet, um immer neue, immer konkretere, weil begrifflichimmer mehr vermittelte, Einsichten zu erreichen. Die perspektivistische Methode Hegels wird anhand des Phänomens des freien Willens gezeigt. Hegel glaubt, dass es sich nicht auf einen Schlag erklären lässt, ob und in welchem Sinne der Wille frei ist. Der Beweis, der diese Versicherung begründen soll, wird erst auf dem Weg der vielschichtigen philosophischen Deduktion geliefert. Einer neuen Auffassung des Trägers der Willensfreiheit entspricht dabei immer ein neues Konzept des Gegenstandbereiches. So impliziert etwa das moralische Konzept des Willens eine völlig neue begriffliche Konstellation, mit welcher der Wille und seine Welt aufgefasst wird, als das rechtliche Konzept des Willens. Im letzten Teil des Beitrags wird analysiert, welche Schlüsse aus Hegelscher Rekonstruktion des freien Willens für heutige Debatten zu ziehen wären. Demgemäß sollte ein hegelianisch gesinnter Denker nicht das von dem Naturalisten entworfene Bild des empirisch determinierten Willens, sondern dessen absoluten Anspruch auf Erklärung desavouieren. Es wird klar, dass empiristische Vorgehensweise im Fall der Willensfreiheit einen gewaltigen Teil unserer sozialen Erfahrung und unseres Diskurses gar nicht erklären kann. Mann sollte die theoretische Ebene vertiefen (sie um moralische, rechtliche, so ziale Perspektiven bereichern), auf der die Polemik mit den naturalistischen Gegnernder Willensfreiheit aufzunehmen ist.SCHLÜSSELBEGRIFFE:FREIHEIT, WILLE, PERSPEKTIVE, HOLISMUS, MORALITÄTABSTRACTHegel's Philosophy is often seen as a metaphysical construction. Contrary to that, the author of the paper tries to show that Hegel uses - in the context of his holistic philosophy - a perspectivist strategy which allows him to present newer and more and more detailed insights, which are conceptually richer. This perspectivist strategy of Hegel is demonstrated using the example of the problem of the freedom of will. According to Hegel there is no possibility to show at one blow that, and in what sense, the will is free. The argument that vindicates this assumption can only be given in the context of multi-layered philosophical deduction. A new concept of the subject of the free will always implicates a new concept of the objective sphere. For example, the moral understanding of the will implies a wholly new configuration of concepts to grasp the will and its world than the legal understanding of it. At the end of the paper an analysis is given of what kind of conclusions may be drawn from Hegel's reconstruction of the free will that could bring new insights in the actual debates on the free will. According to this analysis a hegelian thinker should not disavow the naturalist’s picture of the empirically determined will, but should instead disavow the claim of this picture to have an absolute explanatory status. It is suggested that the empirical strategy of the denial of the free will is not able to explain a huge range of our social experience and our social discourse. The theoretical level on which the discussion with a naturalistic opponent to the freedom of will is being undertaken should be deepen, i.e. enriched with moral, legal and social perspectives.KEYWORDSFREEDOM, WILL, PERSPECTIVE, HOLISM, MORALITY

Author(s):  
Andrey Aleksandrovich Yurasov

The subject of this research is the concept of free will. The modern philosophical discussions either do not explicate it, or interpret far from the traditional meaning that has been instilled into this term throughout the centuries, The goal of this article lies in the historical-philosophical reconstruction of the concept of free will. However, the interest towards achieving this goal is not limited to the sphere of history of philosophy. Understanding of the key term largely determines the fruitfulness of theoretical constructions aimed at solution of the problem of free will. The article expounds and substantiates the methodological principles the reconstruction concept of free is based upon. It is demonstrated that free will features two characteristics that can be designated as conformity and independence. Therefore, free will can be defined as the will that corresponds to the value system of an individual and is independent of external factors. Such definition summarizes the practice of utilization of this term in history of philosophy. However, since the late XIX century, and namely in the XX century, there has developed a strong tendency towards distortion of the traditional concept of free will, which implies exclusion of the characteristic of independence and defining free will through the concept of moral responsibility.


Author(s):  
Tobias Zürcher

Freedom of the will is not only an issue in the attribution of moral and legal responsibility—it also fundamentally shapes how we look at ourselves and how we interact with others. This is essential in everyday life but even more so in psychotherapy. In the debate on freedom of will, the main controversy is concerned with the relationship between determinism and free will. In this chapter, different positions are presented and discussed. The compatibilist viewpoint, which claims determinism and freedom of will to be compatible, is defended against competing theories and applied to psychotherapeutic work. Mental disorders affect free will in many ways, as is demonstrated by the examples. Nevertheless, a compatibilist approach to free will can be used as a resource to increase the patient’s autonomy. As a result, it is justified and sometimes appropriate within the therapeutic context to ascribe responsibility and, within certain limits, to express blame.


Author(s):  
Denis Tikhomirov

The purpose of the article is to typologize terminological definitions of security, to find out the general, to identify the originality of their interpretations depending on the subject of legal regulation. The methodological basis of the study is the methods that made it possible to obtain valid conclusions, in particular, the method of comparison, through which it became possible to correlate different interpretations of the term "security"; method of hermeneutics, which allowed to elaborate texts of normative legal acts of Ukraine, method of typologization, which made it possible to create typologization groups of variants of understanding of the term "security". Scientific novelty. The article analyzes the understanding of the term "security" in various regulatory acts in force in Ukraine. Typological groups were understood to understand the term "security". Conclusions. The analysis of the legal material makes it possible to confirm that the issues of security are within the scope of both legislative regulation and various specialized by-laws. However, today there is no single conception on how to interpret security terminology. This is due both to the wide range of social relations that are the subject of legal regulation and to the relativity of the notion of security itself and the lack of coherence of views on its definition in legal acts and in the scientific literature. The multiplicity of definitions is explained by combinations of material and procedural understanding, static - dynamic, and conditioned by the peculiarities of a particular branch of legal regulation, limited ability to use methods of one or another branch, the inter-branch nature of some variations of security, etc. Separation, common and different in the definition of "security" can be used to further standardize, in fact, the regulatory legal understanding of security to more effectively implement the legal regulation of the security direction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Warren Swain

Intoxication as a ground to set aside a contract is not something that has proved to be easy for the law to regulate. This is perhaps not very surprising. Intoxication is a temporary condition of varying degrees of magnitude. Its presence does however raise questions of contractual autonomy and individual responsibility. Alcohol consumption is a common social activity and perceptions of intoxication and especially alcoholism have changed over time. Roman law is surprisingly quiet on the subject. In modern times the rules about intoxicated contracting in Scottish and English law is very similar. Rather more interestingly the law in these two jurisdictions has reached the current position in slightly different ways. This history can be traced through English Equity, the works of the Scottish Institutional writers, the rise of the Will Theory, and all leavened with a dose of judicial pragmatism.


Author(s):  
Pilar López de Santa María

Freedom is the focus of the first of the writings included in The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. The attention that Schopenhauer devotes to the subject does not stop here, however, since freedom appears recurrently in different parts of his system. It is linked to his theory of knowledge, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the denial of the will. This chapter follows that track and examines the presence in different contexts of Schopenhauerian thought of a freedom that is so undeniable as unexplainable. In this way will be shown Schopenhauer’s transition from the freedom of the voluntas to the freedom of noluntas [non-willing] and the state of great liberation that occurs because the will frees itself from itself. It is a transition that begins and ends at the same point: mystery


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Wiktor Wolman

The article is a part of the broad current of the philosophy of responsibility. It analyses and describes the basic elements of human activity in the anthropological and ethical perspective. A particular feature discussed in the article is selflessness, which is analysed in the perspective of the main ethical currents. In personalistic philosophy, responsibility and selflessness result from the will, whereas in deontological philosophy they result from the moral norm adopted by the subject. The concept that describes the nature and fundamental elements of an act is the theory of supererogatory act. According to it, a selfless act is a free, conscious act resulting from the realization of a norm immanent to the subject.


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 72-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kane Race

This article examines how the formation of markets in bottled water has relied on assembling a particular subject: the subject of hydration. The discourse of hydration is a conspicuous feature of efforts to market bottled water, allowing companies to appeal to scientifically framed principles and ideas of health in order to position the product as an essential component in self-health and healthy lifestyles. Alongside related principles, such as the ‘8 × 8 rule’, hydration has done much to establish new practices of water drinking and consumption in which the consumer appears to be always at risk of dehydration and must engage in practices of ‘frequent sipping’. This article traces the emergence of the concept of hydration from its origins in exercise science and explores its circulation, contemporary uses and purchase. I argue that the appeal to biomedical languages and concepts found in the discourse of hydration connects with much broader ways of conceiving and acting upon the self that have become prevalent in contemporary society – what Rose and Novas call ‘biological citizenship’ – indicating how the ensemble of hydration participates in wider-ranging transformations in forms of rule. The story of hydration reveals how biomedical techniques of the self can be made to double up as ‘market devices’ by offering specific procedures for assessing the self and calculating the body’s needs. In order to grasp these developments, I position the health sciences, and health and fitness in particular, as a potent site of popular culture in which bodies learn to be affected by the procedures of scientific experiment. A critical grasp of this context is best enabled, I argue, by situating the producers and consumers of scientific principles and commercial products as embodied and looking at their interconnection in processes of emergence. Through these means, we can begin to develop a fully materialized account of the question: how have we become so thirsty?


2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Hoff

AbstractThis paper aims to illuminate the ongoing significance of Locke's political philosophy. It argues that the legitimacy of political authority lies, according to Locke, in the extent to which it collaborates with individuals so as to allow them to be themselves more effectively, and in its answerability to the consent such individuals should thereby give it. The first section discusses how the free will inevitably asserts its authority; the second shows the inevitability of the will's incorporation of authority as a kind of prosthesis, which in turn transforms the operation of the will; and the third treats the issue of consent, arguing that Locke is less interested in explicit acts of consent than in the norm of consent, in answerability to which structures of authority should be shaped so as to honor the beings whose capacity to consent is definitive for them.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (121) ◽  
pp. 135-152
Author(s):  
Thomas Götselius

This article engages in the new concept of individual happiness that spread in the 18th Century and in Goethe’s pivotal novel Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795–96). In this novel, the process of “Bildung” is designed to lead the protagonist to happiness, but happiness turns out to be possible only if the process can be governed from the outside, by powers alien to the subject. For this reason, the article argues that the notion of happiness orchestrated in the novel is not based on a revolutionary concept of happiness or a victorious Enlightenment critique, but on a concept derived from a more local field of knowledge, namely “Polizeywissenschaft”. Central to German state reform, and the practices of local administration in the late 18th Century, “Polizeywissenschaft” was developed in order to render happiness to both states and individuals, and it did so by means of surveillance and secret intervention in everyday life. On a theoretical level, the breakthrough of ”the police” during the century could be mapped as an outcome of the transition from a sovereign power regime to a biopolitical one, in Michel Foucault’s teminology. In Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, as in the biopolitics encoded in the “Polizeywissenschaft,” the experience of happiness is thus coupled with a new way of governing life as such.


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