The reverse motion illusion in random dot motion displays and implications for understanding development

Across two independent developmental labs, we have been puzzled by the observation that a small proportion of our child and adult participants consistently report perceiving motion in the direction opposite to that presented in random dot motion displays, sometimes even when the motion is at 100% coherence. In this review, we first draw together existing reports of misperceptions of motion direction in random dot displays across observers in a small percentage of trials, before reporting evidence of consistent reverse motion perception in a minority of observers, including previously unreported observations from our own studies of visual development. We consider possible explanations for this reverse motion illusion, including motion induction, motion energy, correspondence noise and spatial undersampling. However, more work is required to understand the individual differences relating to this percept. We suggest that errors in perceived motion direction are likely to be more widespread than can be currently gleaned from the literature and explain why systematic study is needed, especially in children. Finally, we list some remaining open questions and call for collaborative efforts to document this phenomenon and stimulate future investigation.

Improvement of association between confidence and accuracy after integration of discrete evidence over time

When making decisions in real-life, we may receive discrete pieces of evidence during a time period. Although subjects are able to integrate information from separate cues to improve their accuracy, confidence formation is controversial. Due to a strong positive relation between accuracy and confidence, we predicted that confidence followed the same characteristics as accuracy and would improve following the integration of information collected from separate cues. We applied a Random-dot-motion discrimination task in which participants had to indicate the predominant direction of dot motions by saccadic eye movement after receiving one or two brief stimuli (i.e., pulse(s)). The interval of two pulses (up to 1s) was selected randomly. Color-coded targets facilitated indicating confidence simultaneously. Using behavioral data, computational models, pupillometry and EEG methodology we show that in double-pulse trials: (i) participants improve their confidence resolution rather than reporting higher confidence comparing with single-pulse trials, (ii) the observed confidence follow neural and pupillometry markers of confidence, unlike in weak and brief single-pulse trials. Overall, our study showed improvement of associations between confidence and accuracy in decision results from the integration of stimulus separated by different temporal gaps.

A Hierarchical Attractor Network Model of perceptual versus intentional decision updates

Changes of Mind are a striking example of our ability to flexibly reverse decisions and change our own actions. Previous studies largely focused on Changes of Mind in decisions about perceptual information. Here we report reversals of decisions that require integrating multiple classes of information: 1) Perceptual evidence, 2) higher-order, voluntary intentions, and 3) motor costs. In an adapted version of the random-dot motion task, participants moved to a target that matched both the external (exogenous) evidence about dot-motion direction and a preceding internally-generated (endogenous) intention about which colour to paint the dots. Movement trajectories revealed whether and when participants changed their mind about the dot-motion direction, or additionally changed their mind about which colour to choose. Our results show that decision reversals about colour intentions are less frequent in participants with stronger intentions (Exp. 1) and when motor costs of intention pursuit are lower (Exp. 2). We further show that these findings can be explained by a hierarchical, multimodal Attractor Network Model that continuously integrates higher-order voluntary intentions with perceptual evidence and motor costs. Our model thus provides a unifying framework in which voluntary actions emerge from a dynamic combination of internal action tendencies and external environmental factors, each of which can be subject to Change of Mind.

Detaching from influence in decision-making: objective and subjective freedom of choice

How much can people resist influence in choice? In this study, we explored participants’ abilities to voluntarily detach from irrelevant information to make free choices. Participants saw random-dot-motion stimuli and a colour-cue indicating whether their response should be congruent or incongruent with the direction of dot-motion. Importantly, in a third condition, the colour-cue instructed participants to detach from dot-motion direction and to freely choose how to respond. After each trial, participants rated how much they felt their decision was influenced by the stimulus. Our results showed that participants conflated opposition and independence: responses incongruent with the stimulus were systematically associated with a greater sense of freedom and detachment, whether these responses were instructed or made freely. Further, this effect seemed stronger in participants who tended to oppose the stimulus more frequently. Taken together, these results suggest that feelings of freedom rely on opposing suggestion and breaking from our habits.

Dynamic expressions of confidence within an evidence accumulation framework

Human observers can reliably report their confidence in the choices they make. An influential framework conceptualizes decision confidence as the probability of a decision being correct, given the choice made and the evidence on which it was based. This framework accounts for three diagnostic signatures of human confidence reports, including an opposite dependence of confidence on evidence strength for correct and error trials. However, the framework does not account for the temporal evolution of these signatures, because it only describes the transformation of a static representation of evidence into choice and the associated confidence. Here, we combine this framework with another influential framework: dynamic accumulation of evidence over time, and build on the notion that confidence reflects the probability of being correct, given the choice and accumulated evidence up until that point. Critically, we show that such a dynamic model predicts that the diagnostic signatures of confidence depend on time; most critically, it predicts a stronger opposite dependence of confidence on evidence strength and choice correctness as a function of time. We tested, and confirmed, these predictions in human behaviour during random dot motion discrimination, in which confidence judgments were queried at different points in time. We conclude that human confidence reports reflect the dynamics of the probability of being correct given the accumulated evidence and choice.