Cosmos in the head?

2017 ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs

‘Cosmos in the head’ contains a criticism of the neuroconstructivist epistemology, according to which phenomenal reality is to be understood as an internal modelling of the outer world in the brain. As it turns out, the idealistic theory of representation is still the basis of this conception. The criticism emphasizes, in contrast, the enactive character of perception which is always connected with the engagement of the body in the world. In order to show that the subjective space of the lived body is not only virtual, its coextension with the space of the objective body or the entire organism is demonstrated. On this basis, the objectifying achievement of perception, which brings us into direct connection with the world by means of circular interactions, can be recognized. Finally, taking the example of colours, the claim of a mere virtuality of perceived qualities is rejected.

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1454-1459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Søren Ventegodt ◽  
Tyge Dahl Hermansen ◽  
Trine Flensborg-Madsen ◽  
Erik Rald ◽  
Maj Lyck Nielsen ◽  
...  

In this paper we look at the rational and the emotional interpretation of reality in the human brain and being, and discuss the representation of the brain-mind (ego), the body-mind (Id), and the outer world in the human wholeness (the I or “soul”). Based on this we discuss a number of factors including the coherence between perception, attention and consciousness, and the relation between thought, fantasies, visions and dreams. We discuss and explain concepts as intent, will, morals and ethics. The Jungian concept of the human collective conscious and unconscious is also analyzed. We also hypothesis on the nature of intuition and consider the source of religious experience of man. These phenomena are explained based on the concept of deep quantum chemistry and infinite dancing fractal spirals making up the energetic backbone of the world. In this paper we consider man as a real wholeness and debate the concepts of subjectivity, consciousness and intent that can be deduced from such a perspective.


Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs

Overcoming the brain centrism of current neuroscience, Ecology of the Brain develops an ecological and embodied concept of the brain as a mediating or resonance organ. Accordingly, the mind is not a product of the brain: it is an activity of the living being as a whole, which integrates the brain in its superordinate life functions. Similarly, consciousness is not an inner domain located somewhere within the organism, but a continuous process of engaging with the world, which extends to all objects that we are in contact with. The traditional mind–brain problem is thus reformulated as a dual aspect of the living being, conceived both as a lived or subjective body and as a living or objective body. Processes of life and of experiencing life are inseparably linked. Hence, it is not the brain, but the living human person as a whole who feels, thinks, and acts. This concept is elaborated on a broad philosophical, neurobiological, and developmental basis. Based on a phenomenology of the lived body and an enactive concept of the living organism as an autopoietic system, the brain is conceived in this book as a resonance organ, mediating the circular interactions within the body as well as the interactions between the body and the environment. Above all, a person’s relations to others continuously restructure the human brain which thus becomes an organ shaped by social interaction, biography, and culture. This concept is also crucial for a non-reductionist theory of mental disorders, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, which is developed in a special chapter.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Schroeder ◽  
Pedro Rebelo

In this paper we reflect on the performer–instrument relationship by turning towards the thinking practices of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological idea of the body as being at the centre of the world highlights an embodied position in the world and bestows significance onto the body as a whole, onto the body as a lived body. In order to better understand this two-way relationship of instrument and performer, we introduce the notion of the performative layer, which emerges through strategies for dealing with discontinuities, breakdowns and the unexpected in network performance.


Author(s):  
Vittorio Gallese ◽  
Michele Guerra

Why do people go to the movies? What does it mean to watch a movie? To what extent does our perception of the fictional nature of movies differ from our daily perception of the real world? The authors, a neuroscientist and a film theorist, propose a new multidisciplinary approach to images and film that can provide answers to these questions. According to the authors, film art, based on the interaction between spectators and the world on the screen, and often described in terms of immersion, impressions of reality, simulation, and involvement of the spectator’s body in the fictitious world he inhabits, can be reconsidered from a neuroscientific perspective, which examines the brain and its close relationship to the body. They propose a new model of perception—embodied simulation—elaborated on the basis of neuroscientific investigation, to demonstrate the role played by sensorimotor and affect-related brain circuits in cognition and film experience. Scenes from famous films, like Notorious, The Shining, Full Metal Jacket, Persona, The Silence of the Lambs, and Toy Story are described and analyzed according to this multidisciplinary approach, and used as case studies to discuss the embodied simulation model. The aim is to shed new light on the multiple resonance mechanisms that constitute one of the great secrets of cinematographic art, and to reflect on the power of moving images, which increasingly are part of our everyday life.


Janus Head ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-11
Author(s):  
Robert D. Stolorow ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  

It is sometimes said that Heidegger neglected the ontological significance of the lived body until the Zollikon Seminars, where he elaborates on the bodily aspect of Being-in-the-world as a “bodying forth.” Against such a contention, in this article I argue that, because of the central role that Heidegger grants to mood (disclosive affectivity) as a primordial way of disclosing Being-in-the-world, and because it is impossible to think mood without also thinking the lived body, Heidegger has actually placed the latter at the very center of Dasein’s disclosedness. Heidegger’s account of mood thus entails and highlights, rather than neglects, the ontological significance of the body.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth El Refaie

This article draws on phenomenological and sociological notions of the ‘lived’ body in order to develop a dynamic perspective on embodiment in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. My main argument is that even our most basic sensorimotor experiences are more complex, fluid, and more deeply imbued with socio-cultural meanings than many metaphor scholars assume. While our conscious awareness is ordinarily directed towards the world, making our physical actions and perceptions appear to be natural and straightforward, at times of dysfunction, such as illness and disability, the body suddenly seizes our attention and is perceived as alien. In these moments bodily experience often becomes not just the source, but also the target of metaphorical mappings. I demonstrate the usefulness of the notion of dynamic embodiment by applying it to the example of verbal and visual cancer metaphors.


Author(s):  
Aruthra Devi ◽  
Rita Narayanan

Nutrition is a basic human need and a prerequisite to a healthy life. Since it is bonded with food, it is essential to advocate nutrition in terms of food. A proper diet is important from the very early stages (gestation period) of life for proper growth and development. Neuronutrition portrays how food affects the brain and its function. Brain is where the performances begin and end. It monitors and controls all the energy metabolism of the body and it never stops working. Neuronutrition is the nutrition needed to achieve healthy brain and good neurocognitive function. Dietary manipulations are a viable strategy for enhancing cognitive abilities and protecting the brain from damage. No single food is key to good brain health but rather a combination of food. Neurological disorders such as Alzheimer's disease, mental fatigue, and memory problems are prevalent across the world, and this opens the door to provide tailormade products which cater to consumer's desire for better neuronutrition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Balázs Kékesi ◽  
Attila Márton Farkas

A megtestesült kogníció hipotézisre építő kognitív nyelvészet szemszögéből vizsgálva a siket jelnyelv éppoly komplex és természetes nyelv, mint bármely beszélt nyelv. Ebben a megközelítésben a gesztusnyelv és a szónyelv szemantikáját egyaránt meghatározza az agy-test-környezet interakció. A környezetben történő számtalan cselekvési szituáció kognitív szinten rögzülő konzekvenciái, továbbá az interaktív szituációk szimulatív rekonstrukciója kulcsszerepet játszik a nyelvi kommunikáció és megértés folyamataiban. A tanulmány a megtestesült kogníció kutatásra támaszkodva a testhasználat és a nyelvhasználat közti szoros kapcsolatot mutatja be, majd a szituált konceptualizáció tézisének alapján a siket jelnyelv és a szónyelv közötti azonos szerkezeti alapok mellett hoz érveket. A tanulmány célja a siketekkel szembeni negatív előítéletek rombolása a kortárs kognitív tudomány segítségével, rámutatva arra, hogy a jelnyelv korántsem kezdetleges és fejletlen a szónyelvhez képest, sőt, a siket jelnyelvi kifejezések mutatják meg igazán, hogyan is működik a nyelv maga. Továbbá rámutatunk arra, hogy a vizuális természetű gesztusnyelv kognitív nyelvészeti megközelítése közelebb vihet az információs társadalomban egyre nagyobb szerepet kapó képi kommunikáció működésének jobb megértéséhez. --- The significance of deaf sign language within the context of communication culture’s transformation It seems clear when investigating sign language and verbal languages from the perspective of embodied cognition hypotheses based cognitive linguistics that both kinds of languages are natural. In this approach, the semantics of sign and verbal languages are equally assigned by the brain-body-environment interaction. The cognitive consequences of the numerous interactions with the world, and the cognitive ability to simulate those interactions in off-line mode, de-coupled from the environment, are crucial for gaining an understanding of communication and meaning. This paper throws light on the connection between the body and language from the perspective of embodied cognitive science, and argues that situated conceptualization is the most suitable thesis to understand the semantics of both sign and verbal languages. An additional aim of the paper is to help to reduce prejudice against deaf people by demonstrating that deaf sign language is far from being primitive, and moreover, it will show that sign language can facilitate a better understanding of how verbal languages really work. Keywords: embodied cognition, cognitive linguistics, conceptualization, sign language, prejudices


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Diego Cosmelli

We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that the brain and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are explanatorily inseparable. Such entanglement implies that we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body, and hence we have good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system forconsciousness includes the body and not just the brain. In this way, we put the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to a new use, one that supports the “enactive” view that consciousness is a life-regulation process of the wholeorganism interacting with its environment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document