Terrorism and Its Claims to “Distinctive Significance”
Chapter 3 addresses four philosophical attempts to show that terrorist attacks, definitional issues aside, have a special moral significance. In their very different ways, these philosophers articulate a concern about terrorism also widely held amongst non-specialists. The philosophers addressing the idea of special significance most directly are Samuel Scheffler, Jeremy Waldron, and Lionel McPherson. Waldron does not use the phrase “special moral significance,” but the idea is at work in his discussion. The fourth is Karen Jones, who doesn’t use “special significance” but her discussion of terrorist disruption of “basal security” seems to mark some distinctive moral feature of terrorism in addition to its being a tactic committed to attacking non-combatants. That makes her claim relevant here. The chapter argues that these various attempts fail to make the strong case they promise, and that the failure is instructive for our understanding of terrorism and for policies to deal with it.