Motivations of the adherent

Chapter 3 explores the three principal motivations that have been proposed to explain altruistic behavior—rational self-interest, moral obligations, and social norms—and asks to what extent they are plausible explanations of the motivations of adherents and how they are distinct from the motivations of the constituents. It shows how the adherents’ disjoint (i.e., asymmetric) motivations differ from the conjoint (i.e., reciprocal) motivations of constituents. It proposes that adherents are motivated by self-owned moral obligations to others and disjoint norms of service. It also explores the associated costs of these motivations for the social movement, showing how these too differ.

Adherents and constituents

Chapter 2 develops a new definition, based on motivations rather than expected outcomes, renaming the conscience constituent as the adherent. An adherent puts resources into the movement in order that others, of whom she is not one, will benefit directly from the movement’s success. The adherent is contrasted with the constituent, who puts resources into the movement in order that she herself, or others of whom she is one, will benefit. The use of adherents depends on two features of a social movement’s activity. The first feature is orientation: the nature of the work that a social movement (or a group within it) is doing. There are four orientations: outward (pursuing interests); expressive (expressing identities); empowerment (empowering activists); and solidarity (increasing the movement’s cohesion). The second feature is ambition, which concerns the extent of the change the movement seeks and the degree to which it presumes equality.

Conjointness restored?

Chapter 10 defines and assesses five new approaches to adherence which respond to the late-modern obligation of “having to be what one cannot be.” They are drawn from contemporary social and critical theories, especially those influenced by poststructuralist thinking. These involve loosening the obligation to be what one cannot be (intersectionality, chains of equivalence, translation); denying the impossibility of being what one cannot be (Judith Butler’s performativity); being it anyway (Slavoj Žižek’s unabashed approach); sharing incompleteness (Derridean approaches); and beginning from equality (Jacques Rancière). The chapter argues that that each response has its merits and will be attractive to some forms of social movement work, but none of them produces answers with which all movements can be content.

Problems of belonging in solidarity work

Chapter 8 explores the dilemmas of belonging that arise in the solidarity orientation, in work aimed at increasing group and movement cohesion. The chapter considers first whether constituents and adherents can share work-in-common within the movement itself. It distinguishes between three approaches: disjoint “unlived politics,” conjoint “prefiguration,” and “self-sufficiency.” The chapter also considers whether constituents and adherents can derive the same emotional satisfaction from the life of the social movement. It argues that the emotions that motivate constituents differ from those that motivate adherents. The adherent’s disjoint emotions—felt for or in relation to others—are hard to share with the constituents, whose own emotions—hurt, anger, pride—shared conjointly with each other, are hard to share with the adherents. The theory is used to explain the last of the puzzling cases: the difficulties of middle-class Victorian socialists in achieving fellowship with the workers.

Causes and combinations in the long nineteenth century

Chapter 4 develops, through a historical illustration, the arguments concerning motivation presented in chapter 3. It makes a distinction between causes—movements made up of adherents motivated (disjointly) by others’ gains—and combinations—movements made up of constituents motivated (conjointly) by their own gains. This distinction is applied to three British historical cases from the long nineteenth century, to explain why—and with what consequences—the place of adherents differed between the metropolitan antislavery movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Chartists of the mid-nineteenth century, and movements of and for the poor (“neighboring” and “charity”) in the Victorian slums in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The conscience constituent reconsidered

Chapter 1 provides a critical account of the conscience constituent in social movement theory. It identifies the points at which conscience constituents are deployed in social movement theory: in resource mobilization theory, rational choice accounts of mobilization, political process theory, and framing theory. It considers the weaknesses of the conscience constituent theory both in terms of supply (why conscience constituents participate) and demand (why social movements make use of them). It introduces four puzzling empirical cases the existing theory struggles to explain: women’s movements and their male supporters, anticolonialism and its British friends, labor representation and its professional advocates, and Victorian socialists and middle-class fellowship. The chapter also provides a roadmap to the book as a whole and explains and justifies methodological and definitional choices.

Becoming- work

Chapter 11 describes a new approach to adherence. Earlier chapters have examined the various forms of work that social movements do and asked whether and when such work can be pursued conjointly, by adherents as well as constituents. Chapter 11 reverses the question and looks beyond the answers so far given. It asks: what else would the work have to be, in order for it to be possible for adherents and constituents to pursue it conjointly? It defines a sixth approach, beyond the five already discussed in chapter 10—which it terms “becoming- work,” drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. It assesses the implication of becoming- work for the older dilemmas of adherence and describes some contemporary and emerging examples of the approach in alter-globalization politics and queer theory.

On having to be what we cannot be

Chapter 9 sums up the findings of the historical case studies by looking at the long-run changes and making a conjecture about the trajectory they indicate from the beginnings of modern social movements to the late-modern present day. The conjecture is that adherent selves can no longer act for others with the same confidence and authority as they once did. Nor can they give up their desire, based in part on others’ expectations, to assist in other people’s struggles. Nor is it easy for them to change themselves as required to belong in those struggles. The late-modern adherent is therefore cross-pressured. She has to be what she cannot be. The claim is illustrated and supported with empirical examples from contemporary social movements, especially the changing nature of charitable participation.

Problems of agency in empowerment work

Chapter 7 examines dilemmas of agency in the empowerment orientation, in which participants develop their capabilities as activists. Empowerment is ultimately non-transferable and perishable: it must end or fail. Whether adherents can empower others turns on whether the capabilities are ones that they do not themselves possess; or, more ambitiously, ones they already have but have not yet discovered; and on whether they are willing to acquire such capabilities passively—as pupils—rather than, more ambitiously, through interactive discussion between teacher and taught. The chapter distinguishes between three approaches: disjoint “instruction,” conjoint “co-learning,” and “self-empowerment.” The supporting case study for this chapter concerns British supporters of the Indian anticolonial movement. The historical puzzle is why some Indian anticolonial activists sought the help of such British supporters but others rejected such help even when it was offered and potentially useful to them.

Problems of authenticity in expressive work

Chapter 6 considers work in the expressive orientation, which concerns the articulation and expression of identities. The dilemma is one of authenticity, and it turns on questions of provenance. When the identity is grounded in shared experiences, needs, and desires, the adherent may be well placed to help. When the experiences, needs, and desires are unshared, she is a less possible and less useful ally. Three approaches are distinguished: disjoint “validation,” in which the adherent attests, on the basis of her expertise, that the claimed identity is valid; conjoint “crossing-over” in which the adherent seeks to share the identity-forming experiences of the constituents; and “self-expression,” in which constituents seek to secure their identities alone. The supporting case study for this chapter contrasts the mobilization of male sympathizers in the Edwardian women’s suffrage movement with their demobilization in the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1970s.