Duty

This chapter focuses on the concept of duty, which Løgstrup connects to thinkers such as Kant, Nowell-Smith, and the Stoics, and which he sees as originating from the different kinds of relationships human beings are in with each other, e.g. friendships, marriage, parent–child, employer–worker, etc. Løgstrup argues against Kant that his crude opposition between inclination and duty cannot accommodate the sovereign expressions of life; the latter are more fundamental than duty and duty only enters into the relationship when the sovereign expressions of life somehow fail to be realized.

Politics

Løgstrup firstly argues that the differences between the estate-based society of Luther’s time and our modern society mean that we cannot simply apply Luther to today’s problems. Løgstrup turns to specific political issues: state funding of culture, the influence of non-governmental organizations and pressure groups, and the rules of diplomacy in foreign policy. One particular problem related to Luther concerns the right of resistance, since Luther and the Reformers clearly forbade rebellion. But today, due to the structure of power in democracies, we not only have a right of resistance, but a duty to resist oppressors. Løgstrup discusses the problem of how to maintain high standards (e.g. in education and culture) in a democratic society, because democracy involves the risk that the knowledge of experts will be set aside by the will of the uninformed many. Løgstrup also discusses democracy’s risk of becoming a utopian trust in progress and development.

Politics and Ethics

The first problem discussed in this chapter is whether politics and ethics are somehow related or if they are to be treated as completely separate areas. This leads Løgstrup to discuss the golden rule which he sees as a tool for connecting politics and ethics through the reversal of roles it involves. There are two separate pitfalls here, which involve either seeing the golden rule as a mere rule of reciprocity, or indulging in Schwärmerei, i.e. indulging in an overly optimistic conception of human good-hearted nature. This then again leads to a discussion of how the good Samaritan actually acts in a loving way out there on the road, whereas a political Samaritan could be conceived of as someone who tries to transpose love into the field of politics.

The Ethical Demand and the Sovereign Expressions of Life

Løgstrup introduces two key ethical concepts: the ethical demand and the sovereign expressions of life. Løgstrup argues that we know the truth of the commandment to love the neighbour not only from Jesus’s proclamation, but also from the basic conditions of our existence. He goes on to introduce the sovereign expressions of life, such as trust and compassion. These phenomena are part of human existence and enable life to flourish. Løgstrup suggests that only when these possibilities for the flourishing of life are prevented from being realized does the ethical demand arise that one now ought to do out of duty what one failed to do out of spontaneity. This leads him to discuss Nietzsche, agreeing with Nietzsche’s anthropological claims regarding human egoism, but criticizing him for not recognizing that this is due to our distortion of the sovereign expressions of life, which he illustrates with our distortion of trust.

Choice, Decision, and Resolution

This very short chapter distinguishes between the three closely related concepts choice, decision, and resolution. In choices, we are the masters of the situation and are able to choose as we prefer. In the decision situation there is no possibility for indifference; whatever we do or refrain from doing alters our life. Finally, resolution differs from choice in that it requires deliberation, where a choice can be made in an instant.

Choice, Will, and Freedom

Løgstrup gives a phenomenological account of the will, which holds that to will something is not to have a freedom of choice but rather to already have chosen, meaning that the will is always already engaged. The idea of a free will thus rests on a misconception of the concept of the will. This leads Løgstrup to discuss Kant’s conception of the good will, and he considers the discussion between Luther and Erasmus, where Løgstrup sides with Luther: human beings do not have a free will to choose the good, but rather the human will is bound to the self and therefore a will to do evil. Løgstrup examines the concept of will found in Descartes’s fourth meditation, before he turns to a discussion of the concept of will in Kierkegaard and the notion of ‘freedom of existence’. Finally is the problem of determinism and indeterminism.

Responsibility

This very short chapter discusses the concept of responsibility. Responsibility is connected with concrete situations and relations in which we are placed. Løgstrup also discusses the difference between responsibility and duty through their opposites: irresponsibility and neglecting one’s duty. Referring to Luther, Løgstrup describes ‘responsibility’ as a two-sided relation involving a person who is responsible for someone while being held responsible by a third party.

The Ethical Demand and the Norms

In ‘The Ethical Demand and the Norms’, Løgstrup addresses the problem concerning relativity in ethics. He makes the claim that ethics involves both an unchanging and a relative and changeable element; the moral rules vary from time to time and in different cultures, whereas the fundamental element that one should be concerned for the well-being of the other is absolute and unchangeable. This leads Løgstrup to discuss the problem as to whether the Ten Commandments still hold good today, as they can reasonably be seen as part of the historical and thus relative moral rules of ethics rather than its unchangeable basis.

Three Ethical Traditions

The book begins by setting up what Løgstrup calls the main traditions of Western ethics: teleology and deontology. The teleological tradition is the oldest, originating in Plato and Aristotle, but it also includes Utilitarianism along with early twentieth-century thinkers such as Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. The central proponent of the deontological tradition is Kant, but it also includes Kierkegaard. Also, Løgstrup very briefly introduces a third, ontological, tradition with reference to Luther’s idea of natural law, and which is based on the fundamental conditions of our human existence. This tradition is further described in the subsequent chapters of the book.

Norm and Spontaneity

In this chapter, ‘Norm and Spontaneity’, Løgstrup starts by drawing a distinction between morality (rules and norms which can be applied and utilized) and the sovereign expressions of life (which cannot be applied or utilized, but can only be realized in the concrete situation). He then goes on to discuss conflicts between duty and temptation and also the possibility of situations where there is a conflict of duties, drawing in Kant and Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Sharer in the discussion.