UCEDE

This chapter examines the failure of the UCEDE in Argentina, and compares it to the success of the UDI in Chile. The first section discusses the long history of conservative party weakness in Argentina. The second section asks why no “Argentine UDI” emerged from the 1976–1983 military regime, arguing that its poor governing performance—including, notably, its defeat in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War—made the formation of such a party unviable. The third section examines the emergence of the UCEDE, emphasizing its much weaker starting position relative to the UDI. The fourth section discusses the fall of the UCEDE, which suffered a series of schisms and a sharp drop in electoral support after newly elected President Carlos Menem (1989–1999), a Peronist, began to implement much of its economic program. While the proximate cause of the UCEDE’s collapse was the Menem government, the chapter argues that the deeper cause was the party’s various built-in weaknesses.

ARENA

This chapter examines ARENA in El Salvador and argues that, like the UDI in Chile, its success was the product of authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. The first section discusses El Salvador’s long history of right-wing military rule. The second section examines the October 1979 coup and the resulting establishment of a left-wing Revolutionary Governing Junta. The third section discusses the intense counterrevolutionary response that the junta triggered. This included large-scale death squad violence, with future ARENA founder Roberto D’Aubuisson playing a key role. The fourth section examines the formation of ARENA in response to an impending transition to competitive elections. The fifth section shows how D’Aubuisson’s role as a high-level official in the pre-1979 military regime endowed ARENA with several valuable resources. The final section discusses how ARENA’s origins in counterrevolutionary struggle served as a powerful source of cohesion.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter considers the theoretical, empirical, and normative implications of the book’s argument. The first section discusses its contributions to two classic findings in the party-building literature about the importance of (1) mobilizing structures and (2) polarization and conflict. The second section shows that the authoritarian successor parties discussed in preceding chapters are part of a much larger phenomenon. It highlights the prevalence and diversity of authoritarian successor parties in Latin America in particular, discussing several additional cases not covered in previous chapters and presenting questions for future research. The final section considers the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy. It argues that while these parties can be harmful in several ways, they can also contribute to democratic stability by incorporating potential “spoilers” into the new regime—especially when they double as conservative parties.

UDI

This chapter discusses the UDI in Chile, arguing that its success was the product of authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. The first section provides historical background, including on the decline of the country’s traditional conservative parties. The second section discusses the Movimiento Gremial, the precursor of the UDI, and the role that it played in the struggle against the leftist government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973). The third section examines the participation of these gremialistas in the Pinochet regime (1973–1990). The fourth section discusses the UDI’s status as an authoritarian successor party, and the ways that it resembled and differed from its coalition partner, RN. The fifth section discusses how the UDI benefited from its ties to the military regime, inheriting a party brand, clientelistic networks, and territorial organization. The final section discusses how the UDI’s origins in counterrevolutionary struggle served as a powerful source of cohesion.

A Theory of Conservative Party-Building

This chapter lays out the book’s theory of conservative party-building, emphasizing two independent variables: (1) authoritarian inheritance and (2) counterrevolutionary struggle. The first section examines the challenges of conservative party-building in contemporary Latin America. The second section discusses the concept of authoritarian inheritance, arguing that authoritarian regimes can endow their partisan successors with a range of valuable resources. The third section discusses the role of counterrevolutionary struggle, arguing that intense struggles to preserve the existing order from a government perceived as an existential threat can serve as a powerful source of cohesion. The final section asks why conservative authoritarian successor parties emerged in some Latin America countries but not others, showing that this can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by looking at three simple antecedent conditions.

Other Attempts at Conservative Party-Building in Latin America

This chapter examines a number of other high-profile attempts at conservative party-building in Latin America. The first section examines RN in Chile, the PFL/DEM in Brazil, ADN in Bolivia, and Fujimorismo in Peru. Like the UDI and ARENA, all four were authoritarian successor parties; unlike the UDI and ARENA, however, they did not emerge from intense counterrevolutionary struggles and all faced serious problems of cohesion. The second section examines the Party of the U in Colombia, arguing that it was the “exception that proves the rule,” given its ties to violent armed groups. The third section considers four potential alternative paths to conservative party-building: (1) opposition to authoritarian regimes, (2) corporation-based parties, (3) the subnational strategy, and (4) conservative fusion. It discusses the viability of each by looking at several high-profile historical cases, and considers the implications for new conservative parties that cannot yet be definitively scored, notably the PRO in Argentina.

Introduction

This introductory chapter presents the central puzzle of the book and sets the stage for the chapters to come. The first section defines the terms “conservative party” and “party-building.” The second section discusses the rise of the “new right” in Latin America during the 1980s. The third section presents data on new conservative parties formed in the region between 1978 and 2010. It highlights the puzzling fact that all of the successful cases (e.g., UDI in Chile, ARENA in El Salvador) were authoritarian successor parties, while those with more democratic origins (e.g., UCEDE in Argentina, PAN in Guatemala) failed. The fourth section briefly lays out the book’s argument about authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. The fifth section considers potential alternative explanations. The final two sections discuss research design and provide a road map for the rest of the book.

PAN

This chapter examines the failure of the PAN in Guatemala, and compares it to the success of ARENA in El Salvador. The first section discusses the country’s history of right-wing military rule. The second section asks why no “Guatemalan ARENA” formed, arguing that this was due to the sui generis nature of the Ríos Montt dictatorship (1982–1983) and the resulting formation of an important non-conservative authoritarian successor party (FRG). The third section examines the formation of the PAN, drawing attention to the relative weakness of its starting position. The final section looks at the series of schisms that led to the PAN’s demise, highlighting the complete absence of the mechanisms of cohesion found in ARENA—a problem made worse by the quick-fix solution that it found to its problem of organizational weakness: incorporating local bosses from an existing party, who had little loyalty to the PAN’s founders and would later turn against them.