U.S. Security Strategy and Southeast Asia

With the exception of the Philippines, America’s strategic interest in and engagement with Southeast Asia begins with World War II. Prior to that “Monsoon Asia” was remote and exotic—a place of fabled kingdoms, jungle headhunters, and tropical seas. By the end of the nineteenth century European powers had established colonial rule over the entire region except Thailand. Then, as the twentieth century dawned, the Spanish colonial holdings in the Philippines suddenly and unexpectedly became available to the United States as an outcome of the Spanish-American War and Admiral Dewey’s destruction of the decrepit Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. This chapter examines the strategic pivot in Southeast Asia and the role China plays in affecting the U.S. position in this region.

Economic and Strategic Trends in Southeast Asia

The tiny Southeast Asian city-state of Singapore has a reputation for adroit and nimble diplomacy, built upon an ingrained desire to overcome its vulnerability by maintaining its strategic relevance and economic prosperity in an international system that is seen as essentially anarchic. As its neighborhood experiences major shifts in the strategic and economic domains, Singapore finds itself once again having to strike a balance between getting out of harm’s way and capitalizing on opportunities.

ASEAN’s External Policy

ASEAN has long promoted its key interests in a stable and autonomous Southeast by binding outside powers to ASEAN’s norms and institutions. Today, domestic political change, divergent interests among ASEAN countries, and the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific are eroding the ASEAN cohesion necessary for a collective ASEAN external policy. ASEAN policy is based on soft power and therefore is dependent on a stable balance of power. China’s rise has upset that balance, triggering Sino-American tensions and conflicts with some Southeast Asian states. ASEAN’s goals of regional stability and autonomy from great power hegemony are increasingly coming into conflict, which may force ASEAN members to choose between them.

China’s Economic Approach to ASEAN

The implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) has deepened regional economic connectivity. Even so, challenges brought about by the potential of TPP, unsustainable trading patterns, and ASEAN misgivings remain concerning the prospect of CAFTA. The author presents two trends: On the one hand is the trend that bilateral economic ties will be further enhanced and, looking ahead, that ASEAN member states will benefit more from CAFTA. On the other hand, distrust and misgivings about China are mounting among Southeast Asian countries, largely due to the unresolved territorial disputes. Hence, the gap between their close economic ties and strategic mistrust will likely grow. Countries in East Asian have to struggle between these conflicting trends.

Not between Scylla and Charybdis

Malaysia’s relations with the United States and China are examined in the context of a changing balance of power scenario in Asia and Southeast Asia. China’s rise and U.S. “rebalancing” to the region as well as overlapping claims in the South China Sea are issues faced by Malaysia at the same time it is engaged in an era of increased trade and economic growth in the region. Malaysia’s posture and policy is to steer away from being embroiled in the Sino-U.S. rivalry, even as it continues to engage with both in “strategic partnerships.” As Malaysia is an ASEAN state of stature, with claims in the South China Sea, its position is to seek a peaceful solution with China and its ASEAN partners, and it will avoid any military conflagration.

Introduction

The introduction lays out the background, basic themes, and structure of the book. Southeast Asian states have returned to financial stability from the 1997 financial crisis; however internal political conditions and divergent foreign policies toward China and the United States have driven ASEAN to split. Most of ASEAN governments are facing a dilemma: become pro-Beijing or join with those states resisting Chinese policy. The future of ASEAN’s integration will depend on Beijing’s strategy regarding sovereignty and security. China’s current hard-line position in the South China Sea is likely to only widen the differences within ASEAN.

Japan’s Relationship with Southeast Asia

In many ways Japan is the perpetual potential partner for Southeast Asia. A relatively close economic relationship exists, and Japan has expressed a voice of partnership or leadership at various times in the past several decades. And yet neither the economic nor the strategic relationship is as strong as might be imagined given Japan’s geographical proximity and the strength of economic ties. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in office since the beginning of 2013, has made a concerted effort to raise Japan’s profile in the region as a strategic partner, driven by a desire to oppose China’s aggressive position on various territorial disputes it has with Japan and ASEAN. His policies appear to fundamentally alter and strengthen Japan’s relationship with the region. Nonetheless, what he can accomplish remains constrained by domestic and international factors, and his approach may not outlast his term as prime minister.

The Mainland minus One

The ancient cultural threads that linked Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar—the so-called Indianized states in Southeast Asia—have long since frayed. Shifts beginning in the 1990s signaled yet another new regional order, which is still being formed. The end of the Cold War, the Cambodian peace agreement and the subsequent enlargement of ASEAN, the rise of China and India, a modest renewal of U.S. interest in Southeast Asia, and Myanmar’s reform process have forged new relations with old adversaries but also created new (or renewed) tensions. This chapter examines the transformation of the foreign relations of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in this new regional environment.

Tightrope Walking over the Sea of Trouble

This chapter examines the main issues for Vietnam since the launch of its Doi Moi (“renovation”) policy in the mid-1980s and its foreign policy in the past, present, and near future. The chapter also analyzes the country’s relationship with its two most important partners—China and the United States—with the main focus on the interactions among key players in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

The concluding chapter examines the ambivalent future of ASEAN and the roles China and the United States will play in the process. The widening North-South split in ASEAN limits the chances of mutually supportive behavior among ASEAN states. Though there is a great deal of congeniality on the surface, there are few ties that will produce a solid front if there is an outside challenge to the region. China and the United States have a long history of involvement in Southeast Asia, and both have a desire to avoid conflict. However, they are competitive in this region and have strikingly different operating styles, which will possibly lead to friction and tension between the nations—unless one decides to change or they reach an agreement over semi-permanent spheres of interest.