Generality and Particularity in Moral Thought

Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter explores the role of particularities in moral thought and moral life and the forms of understanding of these particularities necessary in moral philosophy in order to substantiate the idea, developed in Chapter 3, that moral philosophy is a descriptive activity facing a dual task, both general and particular. The chapter falls into two parts. The first part is an investigation of the role of general principles in moral thought that aids an understanding of how far general descriptions (for example in the form of moral theories) may be of help to us in philosophy. The second part provides an understanding of the role of the particular in moral thought that serves to substantiate the claim that moral philosophy has to provide a substantial understanding of moral development, imagination, and discernment. This part also investigates whether the qualification of the role of general principles in moral thought can be reconciled with the idea that moral considerations are objective, universal, and absolute. The chapter concludes that moral philosophy should rediscover itself as one practice among others that aim to assist and improve moral life, while taking into account the most comprehensive understanding of human life.

Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The final chapter develops the conception of a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory moral philosophy established throughout the book and investigates the relationship between moral philosophy and moral life. It expands on two central suggestions of this work, namely that moral philosophy is fundamentally descriptive, and that the moral cannot be delineated, but is a pervasive presence in moral life. This leads to a discussion of how we are to understand the practicality of moral philosophy, and how it can be said to be aiding moral life, namely by advancing moral orientation, by making recommendations for moral attention, and by inviting us to develop and engage with new forms of moral thought, even forms of moral change. A central discussion concerns the role of the moral philosopher, and it is argued that philosophical work is an activity that itself involves a two-sided responsibility, an inward responsibility to continuously work on one’s wants and expectations and an outward responsibility to continuously stay open and attentive towards the investigated phenomenon. The last section recapitulates and evaluates the work done in the book.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The chapter contributes to the development of a pluralistic conception of moral philosophy consisting of a diversity of descriptive activities by exploring one example of how to combine an understanding of the particulars of moral life with the more general and abstract insights traditionally developed in moral philosophy, namely via moral philosophy’s engagement with literature. The chapter is motivated by the argument that the irreducible role of the particular in moral life raises a demand for moral philosophy to interact with other disciplines which may serve as sources of knowledge about the particularities of moral life. It is argued that engagement with literature offers us knowledge by acquaintance and possibilities of moral cultivation, and that literature can be a suitable partner for moral philosophy in three activities that differ from the development of moral theories: namely in the exploration, the critique, and the development of moral life. The last type of activity, where literature is a partner for moral philosophy in initiating forms of moral change, is given special attention, and it is shown that this is an integrated part of moral philosophy, even if it is currently underexplored.


Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Alif Achadah

AbstractEducation is a very important thing in human life. When talking about education, it is inseparable about education personnel called teachers. Therefore in this study discussed about the role of teachers of Islamic religious education which is basically a forum for fostering student morals when the students are in the school environment. This study uses qualitative methods that basically collect data from interviews, observations, and observations. With this method it is considered very good for this research so that it can answer the problem. The teacher at this school is very cooperative in improving student morals both at school and outside school. Keyword: Role, Teacher Islamic Education, Moral Development AbstrakPendidikan merupakan hal yang sangat penting dalam kehidupan manusia. Ketika bicara tentang pendidikan, tak dapat dipisahkan tentang tenaga pendidikan yang disebut dengan guru. Oleh sebab itu dalam penlitian ini dibahas tentang peran guru pendidikan agama islam yang dasarnya adalah untuk wadah membina akhlak siswa ketika siswa tersebut dalam lingkungan sekolah.  Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif  yang pada dasarnya mengumpulkan data dari wawancara, pengamatan, dan observasi.  Dengan metode tersebut dirasa sangat baik untuk penelitian ini sehingga dapat menjawab permasalahan. Guru disekolah ini sangat kooperatif dalam meningkatkan akhlak siswa baik ketika di sekolah amupun diluar sekolah. Kata Kunci: Peran, Guru PAI, Pembinaan Akhlak 


Author(s):  
Roger Crisp

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 311
Author(s):  
Sokhi Huda

This article discusses a study of the existence of Sufism of the contemporary Islamic preaching of M. Fethullah Gülen. The thought of Gülen’s Islamic preaching originates from his view of Sufism as the spiritual life and the journey of a human life to achieve happiness in this world and hereafter. This thinking evolves and can be accepted by the global community in the contemporary era. This thought disseminates the ideas of love, tolerance, and pluralism and receives attention from over 160 countries. Then, the praxis of the Gülen’s Islamic sufi preaching manifestes into Islamic preaching practices with a methodical system that emphasizes the hizmet movement with the philanthropist and contemporary media tactics. This praxis exists in its role of producing the golden generation progressively, contributing to an increase in the positive image of Islam and Muslims and moral development of the world community.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The chapter presents a critique of the idea that morality is impersonal and an investigation of how and to what extent personal features of our lives may be morally relevant and shape us as moral agents. In doing so, the chapter explains why moral life resists theorisation of the form criticised in Chapter 2, and it provides a better understanding of the challenges involved in developing a form of moral philosophy that can take the particularities of moral life into consideration. The chapter opens with a clarification of the approach and the central concepts of chapters 5 and 6, before turning to two suggestions of how to account for the personal dimension of moral life in terms of agent-relativity and strong moral self-definition. As these suggestions are shown to be inadequate, this leads to an investigation of the role of personal particularities in the moral formation and the moral positions of individuals. The centrality of the personal in moral life furthermore creates a demand on the subject to engage in justification in relation to others and self-understanding in relation to oneself, where self-understanding in many cases is to be understood as a process of both self-discovery and self-determination; of striving to settle both who one is and who one wants to be.


2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernice Serfontein

Every human society and almost all of human life are infused with ethics. How do we best understand human morality and ethics? I want to argue that responsible ethics rests on a credible understanding of what it means to be human. This article proposes that a more comprehensive understanding of the distinctive human imagination, religious awareness and morality – all of which are significant aspects of being human – will facilitate a more responsible understanding and practice of ethics. Such an understanding entails a bottom-up view, which takes seriously the exploration of the fundamental evolutionary realities of human nature, that is, a natural history of morality. The quest for understanding the propensity for imagination, religious awareness and morality can be aided by exploring the core role of the evolutionary transition between becoming and being human. Accordingly, this research combines a niche construction perspective with fossil and archaeological evidence, highlighting the role of complexity in human evolution, which adds to our understanding of a completely human way of being in the world. A distinctively human imagination is part of the explanation for human evolutionary success and accordingly our sense of morality and religious disposition. The methodology this article applies is that of an interdisciplinary approach combining perspectives of some of the most prominent voices in the modern discourses on imagination, religious awareness and morality. What results from this approach is, first, a more comprehensive understanding of the human imagination, the capacity for religious awareness and morality. Ultimately, by creatively integrating the various perspectives evident in this research – by way of a philosophical bridge theory between evolutionary anthropology and theology – this article attempts to determine whether evolutionary thought can be constructively appropriated to interdisciplinary Christian theology and ethics.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Fullinwider

Moral educators have little to learn from the moral theories in which philosophers routinely trade. These theories — including those by Slote, Hume, and Kant — leave behind the concrete world in which the moral educator labors. As interesting as they may be, they merely devise alternative routes to the same destination — to the main general features of morality as we know it. It is not so much these general features but the particular forms of moral life under which children and their tutors live that give specificity to duties and rights, content to virtues, and shape to purpose. To navigate successfully through this stuff of moral life, the developing youth needs not only a good heart but a casuistical temper.


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