Justice as Fairness: John Rawls

Author(s):  
Yvonne Denier
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-145
Author(s):  
Paulo Fernando Rocha Antunes

O móbil do presente artigo é dado a partir do subponto 52 da obra Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) de John Rawls – “Addressing Marx’s Critique of Liberalism” –, mais precisamente quanto à objeção que o autor destaca de Karl Marx em relação à “divisão do trabalho” sob o capitalismo. Rawls considera que tal “divisão”, pelo menos da maneira como foi apontada por Marx, seria “superada” no âmbito dos princípios de justiça. Assim, através da Kritik des Gothaer Programms e de uma famosa Lettre de Marx (acerca de Proudhon), procuramos uma confrontação com as considerações avançadas por Rawls.


Author(s):  
Eric Beerbohm

This chapter challenges an account of citizenship that treats us as political philosophers or perennial deliberators and instead proposes the model of the philosopher-citizen who exhibits a computationally intense life of the mind. It first describes the ideal of the philosopher-citizen before considering how a theory of justice is to be employed by well-intentioned citizens by taking into account the views of John Rawls. It argues that the model of the philosopher-citizens tends to be monistic, collapsing the diversity of moral achievements that citizens can make in a democracy, and that this ideal should be separated from an account of the citizen's decision-making obligations. The chapter also examines the principles for citizens and for representatives in the context of Justice as Fairness and concludes by outlining the essential assumptions of a nonideal democratic theory.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.


Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  

The aim of this article is to characterize the John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), Replay to Habermas (1995) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), with a view to identifying the convergent points between deontological conception with teleological characteristics and identify a substantive conception of justice, not purely procedural, which is universalist albeit not transcendental, making possible an approach between communitarian and liberal ethical theories.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira

O objetivo deste artigo é estabelecer algumas considerações sobre o papel dos procedimentos de posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Eu pretendo mostrar que Rawls faz uso de um modelo coerentista-pragmático de justificação dos princípios de justiça em um âmbito público, que é não-fundacionalista em razão da interconexão entre estes procedimentos.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-92
Author(s):  
Martin Benjamin ◽  


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Cristi Campbell Coursen,

There is overwhelming evidence that social inequalities affect health outcomes. Health deprivation as a consequence of poverty is a moral concern. Inequitable access to healthcare may be considered a subject of social justice inquiry. Concepts within John Rawls’ (2001) theory of justice as fairness are used as a philosophical template to identify inequalities in healthcare delivery within the complexity of the Medicaid system. From a caring perspective, Medicaid can be fair if the individuals responsible for its policies and their implementation believe that health equity is a moral imperative and they act with intent to provide health equity


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.


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