The Quality of Democracy as a Key to Cyber-Democracy

Author(s):  
Thorsten D. Barth ◽  
Willi Schlegelmilch
Keyword(s):  
Liquidity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-152
Author(s):  
Mukhaer Pakkanna

Political democracy should be equivalent to the economic development of the quality of democracy, economic democracy if not upright, even the owner of the ruling power and money, which is parallel to force global corporatocracy. Consequently, the economic oligarchy preservation reinforces control of production and distribution from upstream to downstream and power monopoly of the market. The implication, increasingly sharp economic disparities, exclusive owner of the money and power become fertile, and the end could jeopardize the harmony of the national economy. The loss of national economic identity that makes people feel lost the “pilot of the state”. What happens then is the autopilot state. Viewing unclear direction of the economy, the national economy should clarify the true figure.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Hamada ◽  
Khushbu Agrawal

Money is a necessary component of any democracy: it enables political participation, campaigning and representation. However, if it is not effectively regulated, it can undermine the integrity of political processes and institutions, and jeopardize the quality of democracy. Therefore, regulations related to the funding of political parties and election campaigns, commonly known as political finance, are a critical way to promote integrity, transparency and accountability in any democracy. Political finance regulations must adapt and adjust to political, economic and societal changes. This report contributes to the discussion of the future of political finance by exploring the following trends, opportunities and challenges related to money in politics that need to be taken into consideration when improving political finance systems: • mainstreaming political finance regulations into an overall anti-corruption framework; • supporting the implementation of existing political finance regulations and monitoring their performance; • harnessing digital technologies to ensure transparency and accountability in political finance; and • designing targeted political finance measures to encourage the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Davide Vittori

Abstract Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110261
Author(s):  
Richard Nadeau ◽  
Jean-François Daoust ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville

Citizens who voted for a party that won the election are more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. This winner–loser gap has recently been found to vary with the quality of electoral democracy: the higher the quality of democracy, the smaller the gap. However, we do not know what drives this relationship. Is it driven by losers, winners, or both? And Why? Linking our work to the literature on motivated reasoning and macro salience and benefiting from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project—covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 1996 and 2018, our results show that the narrower winner–loser gap in well-established electoral democracies is not only a result of losers being more satisfied with democracy, but also of winners being less satisfied with their victory. Our findings carry important implications since a narrow winner–loser gap appears as a key feature of healthy democratic systems.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316801770073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anouk Lloren

Many argue that direct democracy improves the quality of democracy. In particular, many scholars claim that it increases the representation of the public’s preferences by fostering communicative responsiveness between politicians and citizens. While studies have come to mixed conclusions about the effect of direct democracy on policy outcomes, little is known about how direct democratic processes affect politicians’ responsiveness. Using a field experiment, this study examines whether direct democracy increases the responsiveness of Swiss state legislators to citizen-initiated contacts on policy concerns. Contrary to popular belief, our results show that direct democracy does not enhance politicians’ responsiveness to policy requests.


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