Micro-behavioral Characteristics in a Recessionary Environment: Moral Hazard and Strategic Default

Author(s):  
Ioannis Asimakopoulos ◽  
Dimitris Malliaropulos ◽  
Panagiotis K. Avramidis ◽  
Nickolaos G. Travlos
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-517
Author(s):  
Rajeev Darolia ◽  
Dubravka Ritter

Bankruptcy reform in 2005 restricted debtors’ ability to discharge private student loan debt. The reform was motivated by the perceived incentive of some borrowers to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 even if they had, or expected to have, sufficient income to service their debt. Using a nationally representative sample of millions of anonymized credit bureau files, we examine whether private student loan borrowers distinctly adjusted their Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing behavior after the reform. We do not find evidence to indicate that the moral hazard associated with dischargeability appreciably affected the behavior of private student loan debtors prior to the policy. Thus, our findings do not provide empirical support to the theoretical concerns about pervasive strategic default that inspired lawmakers to make private student loan debt largely nondischargeable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 763-784
Author(s):  
Djaffar Lessy ◽  
Fouad Khoudjeti ◽  
Marc Diener ◽  
Francine Diener

            This paper introduces a Markov chain model for Islamic micro-financing, especially mudarabah  and murababah contract. Mudarabah and murabahah  are two Islamic micro-financing contracts that have enormous potential in creating a balance between the monetary and sharia sector because these two products are moving to manage the business sector which undoubtedly adds value to the economic movement directly.  On the other hand, these two contracts have the potential to cause problems in their implementation. The most common problem of the two contracts is asymmetric information, which consists of adverse selection and moral hazard. We propose the Markov chain model as a solution for the Islamic banks to reduce the risk because of adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah  and murabahah  contract. In our model, we also propose a mechanism to avoid strategic default in mudarabah contract. We observed two different probabilities of an applicant to become a beneficiary to find the solution to the problems. The results of this study, the bank can decrease the probability of an applicant to become a beneficiary to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah  and murabahah contract.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassandra L. Hinger ◽  
Laura Cobourne ◽  
Shola Shodiya-Zeumault ◽  
Hyunji Lee ◽  
Iman A. Said ◽  
...  

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Magleby ◽  
Elaine Clark ◽  
Janiece Pompa ◽  
Kathryn Swoboda ◽  
Michael Gardner ◽  
...  

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 


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